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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION
David G. Owen*t
I.

INTRODUCTION

Manufacturers have a powerful hold over the means for discovering and correcting product hazards.'

Through the processes of

design, testing, inspection and collection of data on product safety
performance in the field, the manufacturer has virtually exclusive
access to much of the information necessary for effective control of
dangers facing product consumers. Indeed, the strict principles
of modem products liability law evolved in part to motivate manufacturers to use this information to help combat the massive problem
of product accidents.'
0 1976 by David G. Owen.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. B.S. 1967; J.D.
1971, University of Pennsylvania.-Ed.
t The author is grateful to Frampton Durban, Jean L. Perrin, Robert E. Stepp
and William L. Todd, students at the University of South Carolina School of Law, for
their valuable assistance, and to the many lawyers who supplied invaluable information on the cases treated in this article.
1. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 3-4 (1970)
[hereinafter NOPS FINAL REPORT]; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
756-57 (1956); Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 927 (1967); Noel,
Comparison of Strict Liability in Products Area and Auto Accident Reparations, in
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 79 (U.S. Dept. of
Transp. 1970).
2. See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration
of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976);
Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on Automobile Accidents and Unsound Products, 53 VA. L. REv. 899, 908-09 (1967).
The National Commission on Product Safety estimated in 1970 that 20 million
Americans are injured in the home each year in product accidents. See NCPS
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. In addition, it has been estimated that as many
as seven million workers annually are injured in product accidents on the job. See
Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction o1 Law
and Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 425 (1974), biting PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (May 1972). A recent survey of the National
Center for Health Statistics estimated that over 62 million accidents occurre, A this
country in 1974. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 2 (1975). Since
the estimate of the National Commission on Product Safety excluded accidents from
foods, drugs, cosmetics, motor vehicles, insecticides, firearms, cigarettes, radiological
hazards, and certain flammable fabrics, NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at I n.*,
it may be conservatively estimated that the total annual figure for product accidents exceeds 30 million injuries and perhaps is considerably greater. The National
Safety Council has estimated the national cost of all accidents at $43.3 billion for
1974.

See

NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS
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Most manufacturers, both from a desire to avoid liability and

from a generalized sense of social responsibility, prudently use their
resources to prevent excessively hazardous products3 from reaching

or staying on the market.

On occasion, however, manufacturers

abuse their control over safety information and market defective

products in flagrant disregard of the public safety. One manufacturer of color televisions, for example, included in each set a high
voltage transformer it knew was prone to catch fire and, when

informed that its sets were causing frequent fires, refused to spend the

one dollar per unit it knew would eliminate the hazard. 4 In another

case, a major drug company submitted fabricated test data to the
Food and Drug Administration to obtain approval for the sale of a

dangerous new drug. Approval was granted, and approximately 500
persons developed cataracts as a result. 5
The strict liability theory of modem products liability law explicit-

ly addresses 'the loss distribution problems that arise when an injury is
caused by a defective product marketed by an "innocent" manufacturer, since liability is imposed even though the manufacturer has
exercised due care. 6 But the principles of strict liability are illequipped to deal with problems at the other end of the culpability
scale where an injury results when a manufacturer markets its
products in intentional or reckless disregard for consumer safety.
Nor has the criminal lIw filled this void. 7 A legal tool is needed
that will help to expose this type of gross misconduct, punish those
the figure for product accidents at one half the total for all accidents, the current
annual cost of product accidents may exceed $20 billion.
3. "The most persistent issue in the law of torts is the determination of when
an actor has imposed excessive risk of harm on another." C. FRiED, AN ANATOMY
OF VALUES 257 (1970). See 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 144-46 (1881). The
hazards in a product are considered to be "excessive," for the purposes of this article,
when the product is marketed in a "defective condition." The difficult issue of when
a product's condition may properly be characterized as defective is beyond the scope
of the present article. Roughly speaking, in this article, a product is considered to
contain excessive hazards and thus to be defective if it is marketed in a condition
that generates more accident costs than social utility. Stated otherwise, a product
is defective if the costs of improving its safety are less than the benefits resulting
from the improvement. See note 169 infra and accompanying text. However, the
principles of punitive damages developed in this article are of general application
and are not dependent upon any particular definition of defectiveness.
4. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); notes 474-80
infra and accompanying text.
5.

See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.

398 (1967); notes 336-51 infra and accompanying text; cf. Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).

7. See note 156 infra and accompanying text.
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manufacturers guilty of such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all
manufacturers from acting with similar disregard for the public welfare. The punitive damages remedy is such a tool.
Whether punitive damages may appropriately and usefully be

awarded in products liability litigation is a question that has remained
remarkably unexplored by both courts 8 and commentators." The
dearth of judicial analysis in this area can be explained in part
by the important 1967 Second Circuit decision in Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell,Inc.'

Striking down a punitive damages award

of $100,000 to a person who had developed cataracts as a result of
the defendant drug company's fraudulent marketing practices, Judge

Friendly delivered a characteristically powerful opinion outlining
three apparent drawbacks to extending the punitive damages remedy
to products liability litigation: (1) the inequity of punishing the
innocent shareholders of a manufacturer for the misdeeds of its lowlevel employees; (2) the probability that a manufacturer will insure against the risk of punitive damages assessments, and that the
deterrent value of the remedy will thus be eviscerated; and (3) the

risk that a manufacturer may be excessively punished or perhaps
even bankrupted by punitive damages verdicts in multiple actions for
marketing a single defective product.11
8. Only one decision has generally explored the issue. Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). Cf. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior
Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974).
9. Other published articles examining this topic are Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, 11 THE FORUM 50 (1975); DuBois,
Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and ProfessionalMalpractice
Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INs. COUNSEL J. 344 (1976); Haskell, The Aircraft
Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy
and the Public Policy, 40 J. Am. L. & CoM. 595 (1974); Tozer, Punitive Damages
and Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972); Note, Allowance of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972). Cf.
Silliman, Punitive Damages Related to Multiple Litigation Against a Corporation,
16 FED. OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 91, No. 3 (1966). See also Nolan, Punitive DamagesA Controversial New Area of Products Liability-A Capsule Study, in PRODUCTS
LIABILIT-LAw, PRACTICE, SCIENCE 6:18 (S. Schreiber & P. Rheingold eds. 1967);
Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1021 (1970).
An unpublished paper on the topic was delivered at the 1975 annual convention
of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in Toronto, Canada: Lloyd, Punitive Damages: A Social Imperative-A Survey of Recent Developments in Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Litigation. An excellent, early treatment is West,
Some Contemporary Corporate Problems Concerning Punitive Damages, 1967 (unpublished LL.M. seminar paper on file at Michigan Law Review).
10. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
11. 378 F.2d at 838-50.
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Roginsky appeared for some time to have laid the matter to
rest. 12 But there are indications that an increasing number of plain-

tiffs in products liability actions are now making claims for punitive
damages and are sometimes prevailing.' 3

Juries have recently

assessed punitive damages verdicts against product manufacturers in

amounts of $17.25 million, $10.5 million, and $5 million.'1 4 The
question of the proper use of punitive damages in products liability
cases is thus of major significance to manufacturers and their liability insurers, the general public, and the courts asked to resolve this

issue., 5
This article will first explore the doctrine of punitive damages
and its compatibility with the theories of products liability. The
functions of punitive damages and their applicability in the products
liability context will then be examined, with particular consideration

given to the three complicating factors raised by Judge Friendly in
Roginsky. In the following section attention will focus on the various

contexts in which manufacturer misconduct has arisen in the reported
decisions and a number of unreported cases that have involved this
issue. Finally, guidelines will be developed from these cases for
determining the appropriateness of punitive damages awards in

individual products liability cases. The article concludes that punitive damages may be usefully employed in products liability litigation
to punish and to deter the marketing of defective products in

flagrant disregard of the public safety.
12. With the exception of Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967), handed down only two months after Roginsky, there
have been only two recent reported cases involving personal injuries in which jury
awards of punitive damages against product manufacturers have been upheld on appeal: Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Jew2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970), affg. 116 111. App. 2d 109,
ellTea Co., 46 Ill.
253 N.E.2d 636 (1969).
13. "[M]anufacturers continue to be faced today with increasing punitive damages claims at the trial court level .... " Haskell, supra note 9, at 618. See notes
333, 334 infra.
14. The cases, respectively, were Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App.
3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202,715
(Super. CL Santa Clara County, Calif., March 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion, June
7, 1972), arid., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup.
Ct. Cal. (1976); Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civil No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. St.
Clair County, Ill., filed Apr. 30, 1970). The awards were stricken by the trial
courts in the first two cases and allowed to stand in the third. See notes 333, 334
infra.
15. Several cases squarely presenting the issue of the propriety of punitive damages awards in products liability litigation are presently pending appeal. See note
334 infra.
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THE DOCTRINE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The Doctrineof Punitive Damagesand Its Compatibility
with Theories of ProductsLiability
1.

The Doctrine of PunitiveDamages

The doctrine of punitive damages, 1 with deep roots in ancient
law' 7 and in medieval English statutes,' 8 first received explicit recog16. The classic article on punitive damages generally is Professor Morris' Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HAnv. L. REv. 1173 (1931). Other articles of particular
note include Friedman, Punitive Damages in Tort, 48 CAN. B. REv. 373 (1970)
(English and Canadian law); Lambert, The Case for Punitive Damages (Including
Their Coverage by Liability Insurance), 35 ASSN. OF TRIAL LAW. OF AM. LJ. 164
(1974) (collecting the literature); Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas,
24 ILL. L. Rv. 730 (1930); Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases,
21 Omo Sr. L.J. 216 (1960); Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REv. 307 (1969); Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A Critical
Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 369 (1965); Note, Exemplary Damages
in the Law of Torts, 70 HAR-v. L. RE-v. 517 (1957); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1158
(1966); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34
U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967); Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against
an Entrepreneur for the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J 1296
(1961). See also D. DoBBs, LAw OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, LAW
OF DAMAGES ch. 10 (1935); 1 T. SFDGwiICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES ch. 16 (9th ed.
1912).
17. "Multiple damages are a common feature of early legal systems ....

"

D.

PUGSLEY, TnE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS 31 (1972). Since multiple damages are awarded to a plaintiff in an amount equal to a legislatively prescribed multiple of his actual damages, they are plainly a form of punitive damages.
This. fact has been expressly recognized by some courts, see, e.g., Stovall v. Smith,
43 Ky. 378 (1844), and commentators, see, e.g., G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 500 (1952); W. HowE, STUDIES IN TmE CIVIL LAW 192 (1896); 2
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 522 (2d ed. 1899).

It has been overlooked by others, see, e.g., Walther & Plein, supra note 16, at 369
n.6, and has been generally ignored in the long dispute over the punitive damages
doctrine. That treble damages under the antitrust laws are in the nature of punitive
damages and achieve similar objectives has long been recognized. See, e.g., Clark
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1945); United Copper
Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916). See Stoll,
Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 AM. J. ComP. L. 3, 14 (1970). See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 360-62 (1972).

But cf. Vold, Are

Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J.
117 (1940).
Once it is recognized that multiple damages are merely one statutory form of
punitive damages, the depth of the historical foundation underlying punitive damages
becomes astounding. Multiple damages were provided for in Babylonian law nearly
4000 years ago in the Code of Hammurabi, the earliest known legal code. G. DRIVER
& J. MILES, supra, at 500-01. They were provided for in the Hittite Laws of about
1400 B.C., M. BELLI, MODERN DAMAGES 75 (1959), and in the Hebrew Covenant
Code of Mosaic law of about 1200 B.C., Exodus 22:1. See R. PFEIFFER, INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT 210 (1948); J. SMITH, THE ORiGIN AND HISTORY OF
HEBREW LAW 16 (1960). The Hindu Code of Manu of about 200 B.C. also provided

for multiple damages in at least one case. M. BELLI, supra, at 84.
The very basis of early Roman civil law, beginning with the Twelve Tables of
450 B.C., was punitive in nature, see W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW
AND COMMON LAW 344-45 (2d rev. Lawson ed. 1965); R. LEAGUE, ROMAN PRIVATE
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The doctrine was

rapidly transported to America 20 and by the middle of the nineteenth

century had gained substantial acceptance in this country. 21 Though
beset by a history of stormy controversy, 22 the doctrine has become

LAw 361 (2d ed. 1951); R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 377 (4th ed. 1956);
M. RADIN, ROMAN LAW 127 (1927), and several provisions in classical Roman law
prescribed double, treble, and quadruple damages, see W. BucKa.AND, A TEXT-BOOK
OF ROMAN LAW 581-84 (3d rev. Stein ed. 1966). "Delictual actions were classified
as penal (ad poenam persequemdam) by contrast with all other actions . . . and
. . . the essential distinction is to be found in the punitive or vindictive character
of the penal action. . . . The purpose of the action being punitive, it was irrelevant
that in this way the victim would be paid several times over." B. NICHOLAS, ROMAN
LAW 210 (1962). Assertions that punitive damages were unknown to the Roman
law thus appear to rest upon a dubious foundation. See, e.g., 1 T. SEDOwicK, supra
note 16, at 701; Walther & Plein, supra note 16, at 369. See also Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873); 2 S. GREENLEAF, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 246 n.2 (16th
ed. 1899).
18. The first English statutory provision for multiple damages appears to have
been enacted by Parliament in 1275. "Trespassers against religious persons, shall
yield double damages." Synopsis of Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 1, vol. 1,
in 24 STATUTES AT LARGE 138 (Pickering Index 1761). Including this first statute,
Parliament enacted a total of sixty-five separate provisions for double, treble, and
quadruple damages between 1275 and 1753. See id. at 138-41. See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArr.AND, supra note 17, at 522 (referring to these provisions as "penal
and exemplary damages").
19. Reputedly, the case that first articulated a theory of "exemplary" damages
in English law is Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763). See also Wilkes v.
Wood, 1 Lofft 1 (1763). It has been suggested that punitive damages were in fact,
if not in name, awarded by English juries prior to the mid-eighteenth century, but
that the appellate courts of that period did not take jurisdiction of questions involving
the excessiveness of jury verdicts and so had no occasion to enunciate rules of exemplary or punitive damages. See T. SEaDwIcK, supra note 16, § 347, at 687-89;
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 16, at 518-19.
In Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851), the Supreme Court, without
citing specifi6 authority, stated that the doctrine received support from "repeated judicial decisions for more than a century." This would indicate the existence of a
punitive damages decision before 1751, twelve years prior to the decision in Huckle.
Research has failed to uncover such a decision, and so it is assumed that the Day
court was simply mistaken.
20. The first reported punitive damages decision in this country appears to be
Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C. 3, 1 Bay 6 (1784), in which the plaintiff became ill after
consuming a glass of wine containing a large quantity of Spanish Fly that the defendant had added as a practical joke.
21. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (dictum); Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235 (1842). For brief historical reviews of the doctrine, see
1 T. SgDGWICK, supra note 16, § 351; Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, supranote 16.
22. The first and foremost debate over the doctrine's validity was between Sedgwick and Greenleaf. Compare 1 T. SEDrwIcK, supra note 16, § 355, with 2 S.
GREENLEAF, supra note 17, at 240 n.2. See 1 KENT'S COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Lecture 24(1), at 605-06 (11th ed. Comstock 1867); Walther & Plein,
supra note 16, at 379-80.
The early debates were over whether civil damages should or could be awarded
for other than purely compensatory purposes. Compare Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,
382 (1873) ('The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresay. It is an unsightly
and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the law"), with
Luther v. Shaw, 157 Wis. 234, 238, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (1914) ("The law giving ex-
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firmly established in the common law. 28
emplary damages is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated by law.
It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instrument of government, discourages
private reprisals, restrains the strong, influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the
right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in the courts of law
by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished by the criminal law"). The debate continues. Compare Ghiardi,
Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Affirmative, ABA
INS., NEGL.& COmp. LAW SECrION 282 (1965), with Corboy, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished?-A Statement for the Negative, ABA INs., NEGL. & CoMP. L.
SECTION 292 (1965).
23. By 1935 all states except four, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and
Washington, had adopted some form of punitive damages. C. McCoRMICK, supra
note 16, at 278-79.
But the doctrine was rather severely restricted in England by a decision of the
House of Lords in 1964, Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, which Professor
Fleming called a renunciation of exemplary damages in English law. J.FLEMING,
THE LAW OF TORTS 522 (4th ed. 1971). The Rookes decision provided that exemplary damages could thereafter be awarded in only three situations: (1) cases involving oppression of citizens by government employees; (2) cases in which the defendant intends to profit by his wrongful act despite the payment of actual damages;
and (3) situations in which such damages are provided for by statute. See SALMOND
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 546-49 (Heuston 16th ed. 1973). The appellate courts of
Australia, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand have refused to follow Rookes and have
insisted that the doctrine be given a wider interpretation. Id. at 547 n.26. See generally Hodgin & Veitch, Punitive Damages-Reassessed, 21 INTL. & COMP. L.Q. 119
(1972). The House of Lords, however, reaffirmed the Rookes restriction on punitive
damages in 1972. Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027 ("aggravated"
damages should adequately achieve the legitimate objectives of exemplary damages
in cases falling outside of the three Rookes categories).
Some scholars believe that the practical effects of the Rookes rule will not be
too significant since plaintiffs are still permitted to recover "aggravated" damages.
See J. FLEMING, supra, at 522 (" '[A]ggravated' damages are so difficult to disentangle from 'exemplary' that the retention of the former without the latter is not
apt to make much difference in practice"); Friedman, supra note 16, at 387-88 ("Is
this not exemplary damages under another rubric?"); Stoll, supra note 17, at 3, 5, 14.
Damages that are "punitive" in nature are provided for by the civil codes of Switzerland, Turkey, Germany, Norway, and Mexico. See F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN
Tr CIvm LAw 209, 212, 218 (1950 corrected ed.). See generally Stoll, supra note
17. In the United States, several states have statutes providing generally for punitive
damages awards in appropriate tort cases. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 (1968)
("additional" damages awardable in cases involving "aggravating circumstances"),
GA. CoDE ANN. § 105-2003 (1968) ("vindictive" damages awardable for injured feelings), construed in Westview Cemetery, Inc. v. Blanchard, 234 Ga. 540, 216 S.E.2d
776 (1975) (referring to section 105-2002 damages as "exemplary damages"); MONT.
REv. CODE ANN. § 17-208 (1947); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.010 (1975); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 32-03-07 (1960); 23 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 9 (1955); S.D. COMP. L.
ANN. § 21-3-2 (1967).
In addition, several federal and state statutes provide expressly for punitive or
multiple damages in a variety of specific situations. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (treble damages); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(n) (1970) (punitive damages); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (Supp. 1975) (wiretapping-punitive damages); Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (punitive damages); CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3340 (West 1970) (wrongful injuries to animals-punitive damages); IowA
CODE ANN.§ 639.14 (1950) (malicious attachment-punitive damages); IowA CODE
ANN.§ 709.14 (1950) (conversion of logs or lumber-double damages); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 93 (1959) (libel and slander-punitive damages); S.C. CoDE
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Punitive or exemplary damages2 4 are assessed in addition to
compensatory damages to punish the defendant for the commission

of an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct and to deter him
and others from such conduct in the future.2

tion 26

2

may render such an award

1

5

A jury in its discre-

in cases in which the defendant

injured2 the plaintiff intentionally 29 or maliciously,"0 or in which the
ANN. § 66071.13 (Supp. 1974) (unfair or deceptive trade practices-treble damages);
TEx. Ray. Civ. STAT. art. 8306, § 5 (1967) (wrongful death of workman-punitive
damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1973) (receiving certain stolen property-treble damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950) (knowingly making unauthorized use of another's picture-punitive damages). Punitive damages have also
been implied into a number of statutes. See, e.g., Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (deprivations of civil rights under color of state law);
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (wrongful death in admiralty).
24. The terms "punitive" and "exemplary" damages today are generally used interchangeably. Such damages have also been referred to as "punitory," "penal," "additional," "aggravated," "plenary," "imaginary," "presumptive," and sometimes as
"smart money." See Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 Omo ST. L.J.
5 (1935). In the civil-law nations similar damages are referred to as "moral" damages, "satisfaction," or "private fines." See Stoll, supra note 17.
25. RE TATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).

26. See id. § 908, comment d at 81. But see Sample v. Gulf Ref. Co., 183 S.C.
399, 191 S.E. 209 (1937).
27. Despite the fact that punitive damages are assessed against a defendant
largely for purposes of punishment, they are awarded to the plaintiff rather than
to the state. This has prompted some to criticize such awards as "windfalls" to
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501,
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (1961) (dissenting opinion). Some commentators suggest
that such damages should go to the state. See, e.g., Hodgin & Veitch, supra note
23, at 132. For a discussion of the reasons for allowing the plaintiff to retain a
windfall, see text at notes 152-203 infra.
28. Courts are divided on whether punitive damages should be recovered in actions brought under wrongful death acts. Compare Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 461-63, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 423-24 (1974) (punitive damages
not allowable under California wrongful death statute), with Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) (punitive damages allowable under
Texas wrongful death act). While the majority of jurisdictions formerly prohibited
recovery, see Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384 (1935), there is now a growing trend toward
recovery, see S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFuL DEATH § 3:4 (rev. ed. 1975).
While the advisability of allowing punitive damages in wrongful death actions is generally beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that a rule disallowing
such damages in both wrongful death and survival actions would create a major loophole for manufacturers that would frequently contravene the important objectives of
punitive damages. See Griswold v. The Lange Co., CCH PROD. Lun.. RPTm. 1[ 7634,
at 14,685, 14,691 (D. Colo. 1976) ("Since punitive damages are not recoverable under Colorado's wrongful death statute, preclusion of recovery under the survival statute as well would lead to the ironical result that a defendant in Colorado was in
a better position with a dead plaintiff than a maimed one").
29. Punitive damages are awarded most frequently in cases of fraud, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, defamation, trespass, conversion, battery, and assault, nearly all of which require a showing of intentional or reckless conduct as
a part of the plaintiffs cause of action. See note 34 infra.
30. Some courts distinguish between "actual" or "express" malice and "legal"
malice, the former evidencing deliberation and hatred, the latter indicating a wanton
or reckless disregard of the rights of another. See generally H & R Block, Inc. v.
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defendant's conduct reflected a reckless, wanton or oppressive 1 disregard of the rights32 or interests33 of the plaintiff.34 The amount
of the award is determined by the jury upon consideration of the

character of the defendant's misconduct, the nature and extent of
the plaintiff's injury, and the wealth of the defendant. 3

Punitive

Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975). Either type of malice generally will
support a punitive damages award in a tort action, see 275 Md. at -, 338 A.2d
at 52, but some courts stress the need to establish the moral culpability of the defendant's motive. See Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498,
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961) ("Punitive or exemplary damages have been allowed
in cases where the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil
or reprehensible motives . . ."). In many jurisdictions malice can be inferred from
acts of gross negligence that evidence a wanton disregard for the rights of others.
See, e.g., Adams v. Whitfield, 290 S.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974). But some courts require
that "actual" malice be established. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct.,
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
31. The difference between "reckless" and "wanton" conduct is, in most cases,
inconsequential, and the terms are frequently used interchangeably. See W. HALB,
HANDBOOK ON TE LAw OF DAMAGES 210 n.37 (1896).

For a sampling of the various verbal standards used by courts in claims for punitive damages, see Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Wantonness
is characterized by a realization of the imminence of damage to others and a restraint from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of indifference
as to whether it occurs"); Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 232, 246, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972) ("'Oppression'. . . means subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights"); Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 531-32, 191 N.E. 745, 750 (1934)
(" 'Wanton negligence' . . . implies the failure to exercise any care toward those
to whom a duty of care is owing when the probability that harm will result from
such failure is great and such probability is actually known to the defendant"). For
a thorough examination of verbal standards in the products liability context, see G.D.
Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975) and
text at notes 495-532 infra.
Although some courts consider "gross negligence" sufficient to support a punitive
damages award, a majority of jurisdictions require something more. See W. PRossnR,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 10 (4th ed. 1971).

Some courts have held that

for punitive damages to lie, the defendant's disregard for the rights of others must
partake of a criminal character. See, e.g., Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty,
307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962).
32. See, e.g., State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 759, 527 P.2d
798, 800 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Selinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 577,
521 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1974).
34. See REsrATEvmNT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).

A review of the approximately 370 punitive damages cases digested in the General
Digest over the five-year period between 1970 and 1974 indicates that fraud actions
account for about one sixth of the total reported decisions. Conversion actions were
the second most frequent type of tort case reported, followed by automobile accident
cases involving aggravated acts of misconduct. Other types of tort actions that appeared at least five times include, in decreasing order of frequency: malicious prosecution, assault and battery, false arrest and false imprisonment, defamation, interference with contractual relations, civil rights violations, wrongful failure to pay insurance claims, trespass, and nuisance. Some 50 of the total cases during the fiveyear period involved breaches of contract in which punitive damages were infrequently allowed. See text at notes 66-98 infra.
35. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOmTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
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damages may be assessed vicariously against a business enterprise
for the aggravated misconduct of an employee, 8 6 although some juris-

dictions restrict such awards to cases in which a managing officer of
the enterprise ordered, participated in, or consented to the
misconduct.

7

Despite its acknowledged place in the law, 8 the punitive damages doctrine continues to receive substantial criticism.

9

Any

expansion in its application is therefore certain to meet with vehement objections" emphasizing its many supposed flaws 41 and
"anomalous" presence in the law of torts.42 It is thus necessary to
36. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 12. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973); Note, Exemplary Damages Against
Corporations,30 GEo. L.J. 294 (1942); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16;
text at notes 205-38 infra.
37. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir.
1967). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973)
adopts this version of the rule. See text at notes 205-38 infra.
38. That the doctrine has been widely accepted on its merits is evidenced by
its adoption in several recent statutes. See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (Supp. 1975); Fair Credit Reporting Act
15 U.S.C. § 1681(n) (1970); NEv. REv. STAT. § 42.010 (1975) (broadly providing
for awards of punitive damages in tort cases).
39. See, e.g., Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 THE FoRuM 57 (1975); Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine
Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INsTTuTE: THE CASE AoAiNST
PUNrrivE DAMAGES 4 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in id. at 15; Ghiardi, supra note 22. See also
Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158, supra note 16.
40. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 500, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting). See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Haskell, supra note 9; Tozer,,
supra note 9; cf. DuBois, supra note 9.
41. The following are the most frequently cited purported flaws in the doctrine:
(I) Because punitive damages are punitive in nature rather than compensatory, they
are "anomalous" and mar the symmetry of the law, see note 42; text at notes 104-09
infra; (2) because they are in the nature of a criminal fine, yet are imposed without
the usual criminal procedural safeguards, they are unfair to the defendant, and perhaps even unconstitutional, see generally Comment, supra note 16; (3) since they
are usually considered noncompensatory, they result in an undeserved "windfall" to
the plaintiff, see text at note 153 infra; (4) the absence of an objective basis to
guide the determination of their amount invites abuse and often results in an overly
severe sanction on the defendant, see text at notes 277-99 infra; (5) it has not been
demonstrated that they do in fact deter undesirable conduct, see text at notes 12951 infra. See generally D. DoBBs, supra note 16, § 3.9; C. McCoRnMCK, supra note
16, § 77; Friedman, supra note 16, at 399-408. As developed in this article, these
problems are either illusory, outweighed by more important considerations, or capable
of being minimized through effective control by the trial and appellate courts.
42. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 384 (1873); W. PROSSER, supra note
3 1,at 9. While the punitive damages objectives of punishment and deterrence plainly
do not predominate in the majority of tort cases, their presence in tort law is hardly
"anomalous." As early as the thirteenth century, "in a characteristically English
fashion punishment was to be inflicted in the course of civil actions: it took the
form of manyfold reparation, of penal and exemplary damages." 2 F. POLLOCK &
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scrutinize the doctrinal and functional soundness of extending the
punitive damages remedy to the expansive field of products liability

litigation.
2.

Compatibility of Punitive Damages Doctrine
with Theories of ProductsLiability

Few courts or commentators today challenge the appropriateness

of including a punitive damages claim in actions brought in negligence43 or fraud and deceit, 44 even in the area of products liability
litigation. 45 But questions have been raised concerning the propri-

ety of such claims in actions brought in strict tort and implied

warranty,46 perhaps the principal theories employed today in prod-

ucts liability cases.

a. Strict liability in tort. At least two commentators have
suggested that the punitive damages doctrine is logically inconsistent
with the strict tort theory of liability. 7 "Strict liability and punitive

damages," it is asserted, "will not mix. In strict liability the character
of the defendant's act is of no consequence; in the punitive damages
claim the character of the act is paramount.

'4

The argument is that

a punitive damages claim based upon allegations of aggravated fault
is logically incompatible with a strict products liability action in which
the manufacturer's care, or absence thereof, is not relevant to the
F. MArrLAND, supra note 17, at 522 (footnote omitted). See note 18 supra. Moreover, rules of proximate causation and certainty of proof of damages are often modified in a plaintiff's favor in cases of aggravated misconduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs §*501(2) (1965); Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting
Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586 (1933). There now appears to be
a long overdue resurgence of interest in according punishment and deterrence a respected place in tort theory. See Kelly, The Inner Nature of the Tort Action, 2
IR.Jux. 279 (N.S. 1967); Veitch & Miers, Assault on the Law of Tort, 38 MOD.
L. RFv. 139 (1975). Cf. Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE
L.J. 656 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Koppinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Associates, 513 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.
1975) (negligence and res ipsa loquitur); Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111
Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599 (1975) (en banc) (negligence per se).
44. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488 (1961).
45. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 S.332 (1937) (fraud
and deceit); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967) (counts of fraud and deceit, breach of express and implied warranties,
negligence, negligence per se, and strict tort); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co.,
N.Y.LJ., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, cols. 3-4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.).
46. See, e.g., Haskell, supra note 9, at 618-20; Tozer, supra note 9; Note, supra
note 9, at 626-27.
47. See Haskell, supra note 9, at 618-20; Tozer, supra note 9. Cf. Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
48. Tozer, supranote 9, at 301.
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determination of liability for compensatory damages.4 9 This argument is based upon the apparent shift of attention in strict
tort from the manufacturer and its fault to the product and its
"defectiveness." 0

The incompatibility argument has some superficial appeal, but for
several reasons does not withstand analysis. First, its primary contention that liability in strict tort precludes consideration of a defend-

ant manufacturer's fault is highly dubious. In fact, rather than dispensing with the notion of fault from products liability law, strict tort
theory expands it by extending the legal consequences of fault to
the "innocent" manufacture of defective products5 1 in a manner
analogous to negligence per se.5 2 Yet even acknowledging that

strict tort eliminates the requirement of proving a manufacturer's
fault, this is so only with respect to establishing liability for compensatory damages. As a liability doctrine designed to compensate
product accident victims for their actual losses, strict tort theory has
never purported to delimit the remedies that might be appropriate

if a plaintiff's accident is attributable to some aggravated fault of the
manufacturer.
Second, the incompatibility argument rests upon the invalid
assumption that punitive damages claims must be established by facts

identical to those supporting the underlying claim for compensatory
damages. This assumption was repudiated over a century ago in
Fleet v. Hollenkemp,/ the earliest reported products liability case

involving punitive damages.

Addressing the question of whether

punitive damages could be awarded in an action brought in case as

well as in trespass, the court responded:

"[Wjhether exemplary

49. See, e.g., Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P. Hampton County,
S.C., filed March 12, 1976), in which the court denied defendant's motion to strike
punitive damages claim from strict tort cause of action (unpublished order, June 10,
1976). General Motors argued that since the degree of care exercised by the manufacturer is irrelevant under strict tort liability theory, "the punitive damages concept
is incompatible with the policy goals underlying strict tort liability." Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551, at 6.
50. See generally Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5
(1965); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of
Law and.Technology, 12 DUQUESNE L. REa. 425, 429 (1974).
51. Cf. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HAgv. L. REv. 401
(1959).
52. See, e.g., Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss.
L.J. 825, 835 (1972). Professor Wade argues that "[tlhe time will probably come
when courts are ready to declare that one who supplies a product which is unduly
unsafe is negligent per se. Selling a product which is not duly safe is negligence
within itself, and no more needs to be proved. Whether this is called negligence
or strict liability is not really significant." Id. at 850.
53. 52 Ky. 219 (1852). See note 333 infra.
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damages should or should not be given does not depend upon the
form of action so much as upon the extent and nature of the injury
done and the manner in which it was inflicted, whether by negli-

gence, wantoness [sic], or with or without malice." 54 In another
early punitive damages case in which the defendant raised the tres-

pass-case distinction, the court remarked that "[s]uch [a] distinction
would be as arbitrary and unjust, as it is technical. '"1 Punitive damages claims have long been deemed compatible with the negligence

cause of action despite the fact that considerably more, and
sometimes different, proof is required to establish that a defendant's
conduct was "willful and wanton" or "malicious" rather than merely
negligent." The first modem products liability case to address the
incompatibility argument in the context of an action brought in strict
tort, Drake v. Wham-O Manufacturing Co.,"1 similarly concluded
as follows: "Where the principal claim is based on strict liability

in tort and there is an additional claim of wanton disregard of the
plaintiff's rights, it is a simple matter to allow the plaintiff to make
a supplementary showing of aggravating conduct for the purpose of
proving entitlement to punitive damages.""8 The Drake court
reasoned that this was an appropriate approach since "a claim for
punitive damages is considered a prayer for a specific type of relief
in Wisconsin, not a part of the claim itself. ...."
Moreover, punitive damages awards have been held appropriate
in a number of cases involving various other causes of action based
on strict principles of liability, including nuisance,60 trespass to land
and liability for ultra-hazardous activities,61 negligence per se, 0254. 52 Ky. at 225-26.
55. M-errills v. Tariff Mfg. Co., 10 Conn. 384, 388 (1835).
56. See note 31 supra. But cf. LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co.,
82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964).
57. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
58. 373 F. Supp. at 611. Accord, Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551
(C.P. Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976) (unpublished order denying defendant's motion to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort liability cause of
action, June 10, 1976).
59. 373 F. Supp. at 611. See Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P.
Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976) (unpublished order denying defendant's motion to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort liability cause of action,
June 10, 1976).
60. See, e.g., Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 514 P.2d 1180 (1973).
61. See, e.g., Milford v. Tidwell, 276 Ala. 110, 159 S.2d 621 (1963). Cf. Berg
v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962); Atlas Chem. Indus.,
Inc. v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), a! d., 524 S.W.2d 681
(Tex.1975).
62. See, e.g., Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111 Ariz. 560, 535 P.2d 599
(1975); Garner'v. Maxwell, 50 Tenn. App. 157, 360 S.W.2d 64 (1961).
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defamation,63 and implied warranty in the sale of drugs. 64 In light
of this established use of punitive damages in strict liability cases
generally, and because there is no sound reason for not allowing a

plaintiff seeking punitive damages to show a greater culpability for
that purpose than he must for his underlying theory of compensatory
liability, the incompatibility argument should be rejected. 5
b. Warranty. Sometimes a plaintiff injured by a defective
product is able to bring his action only in warranty because other
claims are blocked by a shorter tort statute of limitations or other
procedural bar. Such a plaintiff faces a substantial doctrinal obstruction to the recovery of punitive damages no matter how serious the
manufacturer's misconduct and despite the likelihood that punitive
damages would be appropriate were the action framed in negligence
or strict tort. The obstacle is the rule, mechanically recited by courts
and commentators over the years, that punitive damages may not be

awarded in contract actions."

Since warranty actions have generally

been thought to sound in contract rather than tort,6 7 the assumption

that punitive damages will not lie in a products liability action
brought in warranty has not been questioned."8
The rule that punitive damages may not be recovered in contract

actions does have several closely circumscribed exceptions.

Thus,

63. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), alld., 223
F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Rogers v. Florence Printing
Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958).
64. See Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219 (1852).
65. In addition to strict tort, there are, of course, other "strict" theories of products liability in which fault need not be established by the plaintiff to recover compensatory damages. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402B; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 2-313 to -315; 1 R.

ANDERSON,

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§

2-313:16, 2-314:71, 2-315:9 (2d ed. 1970). The reasoning in the textual discussion
above should apply equally well to these theories of liability. Thus, the strict nature
of these theories should be no obstacle to the inclusion of punitive damages claims
in such cases. However, the UCC presents its own unique problems. See text at
notes 87-98 infra.
66. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342 (1932). See generally 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964); 10 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Damages § 566,
at 207 (1909); Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 284 (1959); Note, The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975); Note, Exemplary Damages in Contract Cases,
7 WILLAMETrE L.J. 137 (1971). The rule was so clearly established and incontrovertable in 1930 that it was not discussed at all when presented to the American
Law Institute for consideration. See 8 ALI PROCEEDINGS 340 (1929-1930).
67. See, e.g., Kreb-Stengel Co. v. Gora, 70 York Legal Record 207 (C.P. York
County, Pa., April 11, 1957); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1127 (1960).
68. See Note, supra note 9, at 627; Hawes v. General Motors, No. 76 CP 2551
U P. Hampton County, S.C., unpublished order, June 10, 1976) (implied warranty
o! merchantability); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, -

Ind. App. -,

-,

N.E.2d 377, 380-82 (1976) (express warranty); Nolan, supra note 9, at 6:20.
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punitive damages may be awarded upon proof of the requisite wantonness of behavior in the following types of cases: fraud; breach of

promise of marriage; breach of contract of service by a public utility
or common carrier; wrongful failure by a bank to honor a depositor's
check; breach of contract of employment; breach of fiduciary duty; interference with contractual relations of others; and breach of contract
amounting to or accompanied by an independent tort.,, Each purported exception, however, is ultimately reconcilable with the underlying rule that precludes the recovery of punitive damages for breach

of contract, since each involves conduct apart from the breach itself
that may amount to an independent tort for which punitive damages
could be awarded anyway.7"

Moreover, several of the exceptions

may be explained as merely a relaxation of the stricter damages rules
of contract law in situations in which actual damages are particularly
difficult to ascertain. 71 Deviations from the rigid application of the
rule are occasionally reported,"2 but close analysis shows that the
deviations are illusory and that the rule remains as firmly entrenched
as ever in the law."8
69. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077; L. SIMPSON, LAW OF CONcRAcTs
394 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACs § 342 (1932). One commentator has suggested that the various exceptions may be generally explained in
terms of situations involving oppressive abuse of power by the defendant. D. DoBs,
supra note 16, § 3.9, at 207. Professor Dobbs points to the cases that have approved
punitive damages awards against insurers for failing to pay on insurance policies,
utilities for terminating services, employers for discharging employees in breach of
contract, and other defendants such as banks, telegraph companies and public carriers
who have similarly committed "some serious abuse of a position of privilege or
power, even without guilty state of mind." Id. at 206. The product manufacturer
has analogous monopolistic control over the means of gathering information concern-ing product hazards, the means of evaluating such hazards, and often the means of
reducing or eliminating these hazards. One may plausibly conclude from these cases
that a product manufacturer that flagrantly abuses its position in a manner that results in injury or death to a consumer has committed a breach "not only of the
contract, but also of a duty imposed by law," id. at 207, and should therefore be
subject to liability in a contractual warranty action for punitive damages.
70. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 342, comment c at 562 (1932). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077.
71. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 342, comments a & b (1933). See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077.
72. See, e.g., D. RicE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS

190 (1975) ("A few cases,
notably in Ohio, hold that exemplary damages may be recovered in an action for
breach of an express warranty on the ground that formalism in characterization,
pleading and proof ought not to govern . . ."); R. NORDSTROM, SALES § 155, at
475 (1970) ("There are some cases . . . in which there is a sufficient sense of

indignation and outrage connected with the default so that penal damages will be
allowed by some states").
73. Both of the cases cited by Professor Rice, see note 72 supra, Craig v. Spitzer
Motors of Columbus, Inc., 109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E.2d 537 (1959), and Saberton
v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 66 N.E.2d 224 (1946), included claims of fraudulent
conduct that might have formed the basis for independent actions sounding in tort.
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Yet routine application of the rule in cases falling outside the

established exceptions is difficult to justify when punitive damages
otherwise appear appropriate.

Attention has been given to ap-

proaching the problem from a functional perspective when punitive
damages are sought in the areas in which tort and contract law over-

lap,7 4 such as warranty law in products liability litigation.75
Although largely absorbed into the law of contracts at a fairly
early date, warranty law was born in tort7 6 and has always retained

much of its original tort character.77 In recent years there has been
a lively contest between tort and contract for jurisdiction over warranty principles in the products liability field.7 8 While it appears that
at least in cases against manufacturers for personal injuries the law
of torts will ultimately triumph, 79 strict enterprise liability for defecSimilarly, the two cases cited by Professor Nordstrom, supra note 72, at 476 n.91,
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967),
and Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965), also involved claims
of fraudulent conduct in addition to the allegations of breach of warranty. But a
possibly permanent deviation with potentially far-reaching implications has appeared
in the general contract-law rule in one or two states. See Dold v. Outrigger Hotel,
54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368 (1972); Goo v. Continental Cas. Co., 52 Hawaii 235,
473 P.2d 563 (1970). See also State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757,
759, 527 P.2d 798, 800-01 (1974); Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170,
180, 429 P.2d 368, 378 (1967).
74. For example, one commentator has stated:
The classification of wrongs into torts and breaches of contract often leads,
as in the case of other legal classifications, to an erroneous belief in exactitude
and certainty. .

..

Many cases can be classified in either field; the classifica-

tion adopted will be found to vary with the purpose for which it is adopted ...
A greater flexibility of remedy exists in cases within the zone of overlapping
because the court is free to choose a rule customarily applied in either field,
in accordance with the particular combination of facts before it.
5 A. CorIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 440; see M. COHEN & F. COHEN, READINGS
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 197 (1951); Simpson, supra note 66, at

288.
75. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 634-36; Kessler, supra note 1;
Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preempted by the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional?,42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1974).
76. The origins of warranty have been traced to deceit on the case and, to a
lesser extent, to trespass on the case. See C. FIFOOT. HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE
COMMON LAW 330-40 (1949). See generally Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888); Prosser, supra note 67, at 1126; Titui, Restatement
(Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 713, 728-34 (1970).

77. See W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 634-35. See also Prosser, The Inplied
Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117, 118-22 (1943).
78. Compare Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305
(1965), with Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965). Compare Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's? or Should the
Judge's Monument Be Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HoFsTRA L. REv. 469 (1974),
with Wade, supra note 75.
79. See Center Chem. Co. v. Parzini, 234 Ga. 868, 218 S.E.2d 580 (1975); Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 399, 355 N.E.2d 275, 278, 373
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tive products can be broadly understood as a synthesis of both tort
law and the contract law of sales. 80

The strict warranty of product

quality sprang from this union. It is clearly retrogressive to burden
this hybrid theory, which only recently broadened the range of manufacturer responsibility, 81 with a restrictive contract-law rule of damages designed long ago under different conditions and for different
purposes.

The rule prohibiting punitive damages for breach of contract perhaps can be explained by the perpetual search for certainty and pre-

dictability in commercial transactions.82 By limiting the promisor's
liability for breach to the promisee's foreseeable loss, the law permits the promisor to predict his liability with some certainty and to
weigh this cost against the benefits of employing his resources elsewhere. The rule may be appropriate in the context of a commercial
transaction involving a mutual exchange of promises and obligations
in which only economic loss is likely to result from a breach of obli83
gation.
The modem strict warranty of product quality, on the other
hand, is a response to radical changes in the nature of sales transacN.Y.S.2d 39, 43 (1975). See also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 849 (1973).
See generally Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B.
FouND. RESEARCH J. 87, 94.
80. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436,
440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Markle v. Mulholland Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 263-68,
509 P.2d 529, 531-33 (1973); Kessler, supra note 1, at 898. Fearful that some of the
more restrictive aspects of warranty law might be incorporated into a combined theory
of strict products liability, some courts have scrupulously attempted to maintain the
doctrinal purity of strict tort and warranty. See, e.g., Romano v. Westinghouse Elec.
Co., - R.I. -, 336 A.2d 555 (1975). Other courts have attempted to blend the
concepts into a hybrid doctrine of strict products liability. See, e.g., Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973); Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974). Observing that the warranty action
"already seems to be fading into the action for strict liability, with the warranty
terminology and legal complications being elided," Professor Wade predicts that
"[a]s time goes on and we have more experience with the more recently developed
theories, they will surely begin to merge together into a single tort action." Wade,
supra note 79, at 850. Indeed, one contracts-law scholar has suggested that contract
law generally is being absorbed into the law of torts. See G. GILMORE, THE DRATH
For a valiant if futile attempt of another contracts-law
OF CONTRAC S (1974).
scholar to forestall the inevitable, see Hill, Breach of Contract as a Tort, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 40 (1974), and Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 679 (1973).
81. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Kessler, supra note 1.
82. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 440; Simpson, supra note 66,
at 284.
83. See 5 A. CORaIN, supra note 66, § 1077, at 438. This hypothesis, however,
has never been thoroughly demonstrated.
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tions that have left the modem consumer with little ability either to
bargain effectively to protect his financial interests or to examine
products effectively to protect himself from physical injury.8 4 Since
tort law to a much greater extent than contract law has developed to
protect the individual's interest in personal safety,8" "many decisions
. . . have held, regardless of the form of the action, that the tort as-

pects of warranty call for the application of a tort rather than a contract rule in various respects, such as . . . the more liberal tort rule

as to damages . ...8 This is especially true in warranty cases in
the field of products liability where the protection of manufacturers'
ability to predict their potential liability accurately is a less compelling
goal than the tort law's objective of deterring culpable accident-producing behavior. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that the tort law
doctrine of punitive damages should be available to injured plaintiffs
in common-law products liability litigation whether the action is
nominally brought in "tort" or in "warranty."
The problem of whether punitive damages can be recovered in
warranty cases, however, is not resolved quite so easily. Warranty
claims in products liability cases are today controlled largely by the
Uniform Commercial Code which provides for warranties of quality
in sections 2-313, 2-314 and 2-315. A serious question concerning
the availability of punitive damages in actions lying within the purview of the Code is raised by section 1-106(1), which states that
"[t]he remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position
as if the other party had fully performed but neither consequential
or special nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law." Official Comment 1 states
that one purpose of this section is "to make it clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation. They do not include consequential or special damages, or penal damages . .

. ."

The ques-

tion is, simply stated, whether section 1-106(1) precludes awards of
punitive damages in warranty actions brought to enforce rights or
obligations created by the Code.8 7
84. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467, 150 P.2d 436,
443 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 390, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
85. See generally Wade, supra note 75.
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 635.
87. Put another way, the question is whether the remedies provided for breach
of warranty in sections 2-714 and 2-715 are exclusive. Cf. Note, Punitive Damages
for Wrongful Dishonorof a Check, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 360 (1971). For
a pre-Code case allowing punitive damages for breach of warranty under the Uniform
Sales Act, see Craig v. Spitzer Motors, 160 N.E.2d 537 (Ct. App. Ohio 1959).
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The answer is far from clear and deserves a more thorough
examination than can be given here. The few courts that have considered the effect of section 1-106(1) on punitive damages claims
have differed in their approach. Courts in two cases"' involving claims
of fraud held that the section precludes recovery of punitive damages, one of them emphasizing that no other rule of law "specifically" providing for punitive damages in such a case had been
brought to its attention.8 9 Courts in two other cases,90 similarly
involving claims of fraud, held that punitive damages may be
recovered in rescission actions brought under the Code "where the
breach is accompanied by fraudulent acts which are wanton, malicious and intentional."91 Finally, one court indicated that a punitive
damages award in an action brought under section 4-402 for wrongful dishonor
of a check would not be inconsistent with section
1-106(l). 92
Since article two of the Code has no specific provision for punitive damages, 93 the language of section 1-106(1) and official comment 1 thereto limits punitive damages claims for breach of warranty
to situations in which such claims are "specifically" provided for "by
other rule of law." One commentator has suggested that the "other
rule of law" exception permits courts to continue awarding punitive
damages in cases in which "the failure to perform a promise (such
as a warranty of quality) is combined with tortious conduct (such
as wanton failure to determine whether the goods measured up to
their warranted quality)." 4 Other commentators have suggested
that the courts "will have to find or make up the 'other rule of law,'
by extrapolation from the fraud cases." 95 In view of warranty's tort
background and its special role in products liability litigation, a
liberal extrapolation from the common law appears desirable in personal injury cases brought under the Code despite the admonition
88. Bryan Constr. Co. v. Thad Ryan Cadillac, Inc., 300 S.2d 444, 448 (Miss.
1974); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972).
89. 503 P.2d at 1191.
90. Grandi v. LeSage, 78 N.M. 799, 399 P.2d 285 (1965); Z.D. Howard Co.
v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1975). In Grandi, the court made no mention
of section 1-106(1).
91. 537 P.2d at 348. Accord, Grandi v. LeSage, 74 N.M. 799, 810, 399 P.2d
285, 293.
92. See Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 315 n.3, 297 A.2d 758,
761 n.3 (1972) (dictum). See also Note, supra note 87.
93. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475. Punitive damages are not provided for elsewhere in the Code. See Note, supra note 87, at 369.
94. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475-76.
95. J. WHIr

& R. SUMMERS,
133 (1972).
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that "the other rule of law" must "specifically" provide for punitive
damages. 8 The marketing of a defective product in wanton disregard of its danger to consumers might then be broadly classified as

"tortious conduct"--sufficiently tortious, at least, to serve as the
"other rule of law"-and thus provide a rationale for punitive dam-

ages awards in products liability actions brought solely for breach of
warranty under the Code."

This novel interpretation, however, is

not free of internal weaknesses, and it stretches section 1-106(1)
further than its drafters probably intended.98 Yet perhaps the
product manufacturer guilty of an outrageous disregard for public

safety should have no standing to complain of a creative method of
dealing with the serious problem of product safety.
B.

The Functionsof Punitive Damagesand Their
Applicability to ProductsLiability Litigation

Punitive damages serve a variety of functions for both the
individual plaintiff and society. 9 The primary purposes of the

doctrine are usually said to be the punishment of the defendant 0 0
and the deterrence of similar wrongdoing in the future. 1' 1 The doctrine has been criticized as an intrusion into a domain more properly
served by the criminal law,' 0 2 which shares these goals.' 03 The
96. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-318, 2-719(3) (acknowledging the
need for expansion of the standard commercial law principles in cases involving personal injuries).
97. Cf. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 72, at 475-76.
98. The essential problem is how "restrictive" or "liberal" an interpretation
should be placed upon section 1-106(1) when personal injuries are involved in the
products liability context. Compare Dickerson, supra note 78, with Note, supra note
87.
99. See generally Lambert, supra note 16, at 167-75; Rice, supra note 16, at 30912; Note, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 191 (1972); Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, supra note 16, at 52024.
100. See, e.g., Campbell Estates, Inc. v. Bates, 21 Ariz. App. 162, 517 P.2d 515
(1973); Schmidt v. Central Hardware Co., 516 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974);
A. WATSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES § 714,
at 846 (1901). See text at notes 113-28 infra.
101. See, e.g., Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d 939, 94546 (1972). See text at notes 129-51 infra. While deterrence is achieved largely
through the threat of punishment and is itself a principal purpose of punishment,
it is analytically helpful to use the term "punishment" in a narrower sense and consider separately the purposes of punishment and deterrence. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
102. See, e.g., P. JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF TORTS 13-15, 402
(3d ed. 1969). But see, e.g., Veitch, Book Review, 22 N. IR. L.Q. 560, 563 (1971).
103. "We concede that smart money allowed by a jury, and a fine imposed at
the suit of the people, depend on the same principle. Both are penal, and intended
to deter others from the commission of the like crime." Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill 466,
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injection of these objectives into the civil law of damages, it is said,
destroys the majestic "symmetry" of the law. 10 4 This argument, first

articulated in the nineteenth century,105 fails to recognize the strong
historical and functional nexus between tort and crime' 0 and addi-

tionally betrays a passion for a geometrically balanced legal structure
that is undeserving of serious consideration.10 7 No doubt certain
problems are generated by the straddling of the civil and criminal

law, 0 8 but the strength received by the punitive damages doctrine
from both fields enhances its value as a particularly flexible tool
in the overall administration of justice.'0

9

In addition to punishment and deterrence, two less prominent
functions are served by punitive damages awards. First, they induce
private persons to enforce the rules of law by rewarding them for

bringing malefactors to justice." 0 Second, such awards further compensate plaintiffs whose actual damages exceed those for which the
law allows recovery and whose recovery in any event has likely been
substantially depleted by attorneys' fees."' These four functions
have been assigned varying emphasis in different jurisdictions over
467, 41 Am. Dec. 757, 757-58 (N.Y. 1844). See Demogue, Validity of the Theory
of Compensatory Damages, 27 YALE L.J. 585, 592 (1918) (referring to acts subject
to punitive damages assessments as "quasi crimes").
104. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873); note 22 supra.
105. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
106. See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 369 (5th
ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 448, 449, 511-43; 1
T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 477-78 (1906); Veitch, supra note
102, at 563.
107. Cf. Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA.
L. REV. 886, 897-98 (1967); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 2, at 838-39.
108. See note 41 supra. See generally Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra note
16; Comment, supra note 16.
109. See Demogue, supra note 103, at 592-93: 'The idea of punishment finds
its completest expression in the criminal law, and it might seem that in an ideal
system of jurisprudence the ideas of punishment and compensation would respectively
be limited exclusively to the fields of criminal and civil wrong. But the common
law has never been guilty of the folly of putting theory entirely before practical
ends, and hence we find that the idea of punishment still holds its ground in the
administration of civil justice." See also Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 738 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) ("Punitive damages are allowed because the civil law has long recognized
that in certain situations deterrence can better be achieved through modification of
the civil awards than through a requirement of criminal sanctions"); 1 T. STREET,
supra note 106, at 478; Veitch & Miers, supra note 42, at 139. Cf. Cappelletti,
Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A
Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 793, 800, 881 (1975). But cf. Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: i, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 967, 978 (1943) (the
blending of civil and criminal functions tends to "confuse established distinctions").
110. See text at notes 152-84 infra.
111. See text at notes 185-203 infra.
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time; 112 each merits careful consideration, especially as it pertains
to the products liability context.
1.

Punishment

The punishment of a defendant who has intentionally or
recklessly injured the plaintiff advances several important goals.

First, it helps restore the plaintiff's emotional equilibrium. When
the judicial system punishes a defendant, the injured plaintiff
receives the satisfaction of seeing the defendant suffer. 1' s

It might

be difficult to rationalize private revenge as the sole justification for
punishment in a modem legal system," 4 but at least so long as
punishment achieves some other substantial objective it seems perfectly appropriate to allow a person injured by the wanton misconduct of another to vent his outrage by extracting a judicial fine.'1 5
112. Although the objectives underlying the punitive damages doctrine are divided in this article into four separate functions, it should be noted that the four
functions may conceptually be reduced to the two broad goals of punishment and
compensation. See note 152 intra.
113. The retributive nature of punitive damages is mentioned in some cases. See
King v. Towns, 120 Ga. App. 895, 902-03, 118 S.E.2d 121, 128 (1960); Great Atl.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 600, 136 S.W.2d 759, 768 (1940); Winkler
v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 66 N.J. Super. 22, 29, 168 A.2d 418, 422 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1961); Hansley v. Jamesville & W.R.R., 117 N.C. 565, 571, 23 S.E.
443, 445 (1895) (Clark, J., concurring).
In ancient law, damages were often statutorily prescribed to make the penalty
proportionate to the degree of vengeance deemed appropriate for the particular offense. See I G. DRIVER & G. MILEs, supra note 17, at 500; H. MAINE, ANCIENT
LAw 365-66 (3d Am. ed. 1888); D. PUGSLEY, THE ROMAN LAW OF PROPERTY AND
OBLIGATIONS 32 (1972); note 193 infra. Classical retributive theory in fact requires
that punishment in some fashion "match" the crime. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILrrY 231, 233-34 (1968); see G. HEGAL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT pt.
1, §§ 97-104 (1842); I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW pt. 2, § 29, E (W. Hastie
transl. 1887). English law has reportedly avoided any such compulsion to maintain
a parity between crime and punishment. See A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE
MORAL LAw 92 (1953). But cf. W. MIDDENDORFF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT 52 (1968).
114. Some commentators view revenge as patently inappropriate to a "civilized"
legal system. See, e.g., G. CALABRESr, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 298-99 (1970);
James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Action, in THE
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 35, 37 (U.S. Dept. of
Transp. 1970); K. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 448 (1945), quoted in Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 855, 865-66 (1953)
("mhe scheme of punishment is a barbaric system of revenge, by which society
tries to 'get even' with the criminal"); Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery:
Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 793 (1967); Edgerton, Corporate CriminalResponsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827, 833 (1927).
115. Most modern forms of retributive theory adopt this partial justification rationale. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 235-37. Jeremy Bentham urges plaintiffs to relish the punishment of defendants from whom a damages award has been
extracted:
Every kind of satisfaction, as it is a punishment to the offender, naturally produces a pleasure of vengeance to the injured party.
That pleasure is a gain; it calls to mind Samson's riddle-it is the sweet corn-
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Second, punishment serves as a form of revenge for the public
at large. At an elemental level, society can use judicial punishment
to maintain the public peace by channeling individual retaliation

into the courtroom. 116 But punishment may also restore the emotional equilibrium of society as a whole. A person who intentionally
or wantonly injures another generally violates not only some explicit
tort or criminal law rule of conduct"17 but also a basic norm of social
behavior."18 The failure to punish violations of societal rules weakens the legal and moral fabric of society. 19 The imposition of
punishment by a court expresses society's disapproval of serious misconduct 20 and accordingly reaffirms its commitment to maintaining
ing out of the terrible, it is honey dropping from the lion's mouth. Produced
without expense, a clear gain resulting from an operation necessary on other
accounts, it is an enjoyment to be cultivated, like any other; for the pleasure
of vengence, abstractly considered, is, like every other pleasure, a good in itself.
J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGIs.LAoN 309 (1831).
See generally L. FULLER,
ANATOMY OF THE LAw 27-30 (1968); 0. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 40-41; W. MmDENDORFF, supra note 113, at 51-53; L RnzIMNowicz, IDEOLOGY AND Cmm- 115
(1966); 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF TE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81-83 (1883).
116. See 0. HOLMES, supra note 3, at 41-42 ("If people would gratify the passion
of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law has no choice
but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution"). This function of punitive damages is mentioned with some frequency in early
cases. See, e.g., Alcom v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872); Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng.
Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814) (separate opinion of Heath, J.) (punitive damages serve to
prevent duelling). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(d) (Tent. Draft No.
19, 1973). Indeed this is said to have originally been the primary function of tort
law generally. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901, comment a at 56
(Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). Professor Robert Keeton has suggested that, even when
only compensatory damages are at stake, negligence law still "appeases" the plaintiff
who may receive some real satisfaction in knowing that society, through the law,
approves of his feelings against the defendant, and that this declaration alone may
be sufficient to allay violent retaliations in some instances. R. KEETON, VENTURING
To Do JusncE 152 (1969). See also Franklin, supra note 114, at 810 n.131.
In the area of criminal law, this idea has been most recently recognized by the
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230, 5239 (U.S. July 2, 1976)
("In part, capital punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than
self-help to vindicate their wrongs").
117. See generally 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at 75-81.
118. See Rice, supra note 16, at 311. See generally C. FluED, AN ANATOMY
OF VALUES 183-200 (1970); H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 137-39; A. LINDEN,
CANADIAN NEGLIGENCE LAw 486-89 (1972); Keeton, supra note 107, at 888.
119. "Justice has always been portrayed as a goddess with scales in her hand.
A crime makes one of the scales sink, and punishment is designed to restore the
balance." W. MIDDENDORFE, supra note 113, at 51. The correction of the imbalance
caused by a crime was extremely important in certain cultures. See E. HOEnEL,
THE LAw OF PRiMmvE MAN 239 (1961) (on the Ashanti of Africa); D. BODDE
& C. MOIUs, LAw IN IMPERIAL CHINA 182 (1967), excerpted in Funk, Interstitial
Jurisprudence Illustrated in Teaching Criminal Law, 27 J. LEGAL ED. 53, 64 n.49
(1975) (describing the view in Manchu China). See generally C. FRIED, supra note
118, at 121-26; 2 1. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at ch. 17.
120. See C. FRED, supra note 118, at 125-26; H.LA. HART, supra note 113, at

June 19761

Punitive Damages

1281

its moral and legal standards.' 2 '

Finally, punishment serves two objectives tangential to the notion
of retribution. By punishing the law-breaker, society indirectly
rewards the law-abider. If law-breakers go unpunished, law-abiders

consequently must pay a disproportionate share in a system that purports to require reciprocal sacrifices from each citizen.

The punish-

ment of offenders thus reinforces the confidence of the law-abider
in the basic fairness of the legal system and in the utility of his per-

sonal decision to obey the law.' 22 Additionally, punishment serves
as a reformative device to educate the offender to society's legal
23
values and to allow him to atone for his misdeed through suffering.'

One may inquire whether these general objectives of retribution
and reformation can be served in cases involving serious marketing

misbehavior by manufacturers.

Certainly the outrage incited in the

public and the injured victim by a defective product differs in both
manner and degree from that provoked by a spit in the face. 12 4 But
235; 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 115, at 81; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law,
23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 405 (1958). See generally Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment,49 TH MONIST 397 (1965).
121. Professor Goodhart summarizes this viewpoint well: "[Wlithout a sense of
retribution we may lose our sense of wrong. Retribution in punishment is an expression of the community's disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is not given
recognition then the disapproval may also disappear. A community which is too
ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end by condoning the crime." A. GOODHART,
ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 93 (1953).
122. C. FRIED, supra note 118, at 121-26 (1970). See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193 (1961). An additional rationale for retribution is that it shifts
attention
from the criminal to the honest man. It may seem inhumane and brutal to
inflict a deliberate hurt on the guilty man simply because he has hurt another.
But what of the law-abiding man? Is our compassion for the criminal to leave
the honest citizen with no comparative advantage? Is he to gain nothing by
being willing to accept the restraints of law? . . . So, .

.

. it may be said that

it is necessary to maintain a proper balance of advantage between the criminal
and the honest man, whether this is done by conferring a reward for law observance or by imposing a penalty for violation of the law.
L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 29. See also 10 HALSBURY, supra note 66, at 306.
Cf. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815,
823 (1967).
123. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 24-27 (1968); W. MIDDENDORFF,
supra note 113, at 68; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 53-58
(1968). The theory that punishment provides a means for the wrongdoer to
atone for his offense rings of early Christian dogma. See Williams, The Aims
of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 137, 143 (1951) ("Mhe early Court
of Chancery . . . [theorized] that the conscience of the wrongdoer must be purged
by making restitution, which was exacted for the benefit of the wrongdoer's soul
rather than of the victim's pocket"); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17,

at 452. However, current support exists for the view that punishment in fact
achieves certain psychological benefits for both the individual and society. See C.
FRIED, supra note 118, at 126; L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 27-28. See generally
Veitch & Miers, supra note 42, at 150-51.
124. A spit in the plaintiff's face was the basis for a punitive damages recovery
in Alcom v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872). See note 189 infra.
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this does not mean that there is no place in products liability cases
for public or private vengeance.
Because of the elusive nature of the misconduct of a manufacturer who markets a defective product and because of the remoteness of the misdeed from the product injury, such offenses if discovered at all are apt to appear as mere errors in judgment hardly
deserving of punishment or condemnation.121

Yet the retribu-

tive needs of the aggrieved individual and of society may be
substantial in cases in which a manufacturer has marketed a defec.tive product knowingly or in reckless disregard of a serious risk of
injury to consumers. An award of punitive damages in such cases
should help assuage the victim's feelings of helplessness and frustration over the apparent futility of holding an anonymous corporation
accountable for its damaging misdeeds. 2 ' Further, such awards
would express the public's condemnation of the misconduct and
12
remind manufacturers of -their responsibilities for consumer safety. 7
Finally, the punishment of manufacturers guilty of intentional or
reckless breaches of their safety obligations should tend to diminish
whatever unfair competitive advantages such companies might otherwise have.'
2. Deterrence
In its retributive role, punishment satisfies the individual's and
society's need for vengeance, and thus serves to rectify some of the
125. Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 844-51 (2d Cir.
1967).
126. See generally Heilbroner, Controlling the Corporation,in IN THE NAME OF
PaoFrr 191, 200 (R. Heilbroner ed. 1973) (A "feeling of individual impotence in the
face of massive organizations" is in part "[w]hat fuels the public protest against
corporate misbehavior. . . . It is an aspect of a widely shared frustration with respect to all bastions of power that are immense, anonymous and impregnable, and
yet inextricably bound up with the industrial society that few of us wish to abandon"); A. LINDEN, supra note 118, at 487.
127. Thus, punishment may be of particular importance in the context of business
offenses to serve "the symbolic function of reinforcing the public sense that there
are certain acts that are fundamentally wrong, that must not be done." L. FULLER,
supra note 115, at 28. Although the applicability of the reformative role of punishment to "white-collar" offenses has been questioned, see Rice, supra note 16, at 312,
punishment may have a particularly useful role in this area. The line between legal
and illegal conduct of a business enterprise is often hazy and, partially as a result
of this phenomenon, even serious misconduct frequently goes unpunished. See
Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation,
56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 120-21 (1968); Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer:
Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1107, 1108-09 (1975). See
generally IN THE NAME OF PROFrr,supra note 126.
128. See notes 148-51 infra and accompanying text, indicating the beneficial deterrent effect that punitive damages achieve in eliminating the profitability of the
misconduct.
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negative effects of prior misconduct. But perhaps the predominant
purpose of most punishment, including punitive damages, is the

deterrence of similar misconduct in the future.1 29 While the practical effectiveness of punishment in deterring misbehavior is a source

of constant study and debate, 180 most commentators agree that

punishment does achieve a measure of deterrence in many cases.' " '
The degree of its effectiveness depends upon several recognized fac.tors. First, the potential wrongdoer must know that the particular
132

conduct he is contemplating is both proscribed and punishable. 13 3

Second, he must be able to alter his conduct to avoid punishment. '
Finally, he must have the desire to alter his conduct to avoid

punishment.- 4 Each of these factors must be considered in the
products liability context to determine whether punitive damages can
deter the marketing of defective products.
The first factor raises the question of whether a general standard
creating liability for marketing misbehavior in "reckless" or "fla-

grant" disregard of the public safety will give manufacturers a
sufficiently clear statement of the proscribed conduct to achieve a

significant deterrent effect.'

The terms may well be vague, but

129. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Natl. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 708-09, 496 P.2d
939, 945-46 (1972); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.
2d 488 (1961); L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 34-35. See generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 31, at 9; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (Tent. Draft No.
19, 1973). Deterrence has been characterized as a "utilitarian" goal of punishment.
See H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 128-29. See generally A. GOODHART, supra
note 121, at 93-94; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 18-25 (1973).
130. See, e.g., W. MIDDENDORFF, supra note 113, at 49, 53-67. So too is the
morality of general deterrence. See, e.g., Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 649 (1970) (defending its morality).
The actor's moral inhibitions and fear of censure are additional motivations for
complying with the law. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 961 (1966), reprinted in J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT
Yet corporate decision-makers often need the
AND DETERRENCE 34, 49-50 (1974).
threat of punishment as well to outweigh the drive for profit maximization. But
cf. id. at 959-60.
131. See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 115, at 34-35 (1968).
132. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 142-49 (1973);
Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 963.
133. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 564-54
(1970); J. SALMOND, LAW OF ToRTS 12-13 (6th ed. 1924) in R. HEUSTON, SALMOND
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 20-21 (16th ed. 1973).
134. See text at notes 148-51 infra.
135. It must be conceded that any definition of the punishable conduct, such as
marketing a product in "reckless," "wanton," or "flagrant" disregard of the public
safety will necessarily be quite vague. Therefore a real risk exists that manufacturers
will avoid some lawful activity in their attempt to avoid the proscribed conduct. See
generally P. ATIYAn, supra note 133, at 554; G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
121-25 (student ed. 1970). However, the gap between "negligent" and "reckless"
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once several punitive damages verdicts have been levied and a rule
of responsibility has emerged, most manufacturers will likely be
informed in fairly short order of at least the general purport of the
standard and the consequences of its breach. Moreover, most manufacturers should have an intuitive sense of the general type of gross

misconduct proscribed by the rule despite the difficulty of determining in advance whether any particular conduct is in flagrant disregard
of the public safety.

The second factor concerns the manufacturer's ability to make
the product safer.

Since the recovery of punitive damages requires

a showing of flagrant misconduct, 3 6 a punitive damages judgment
would necessarily reflect the factfinder's conclusion that the manufacturer had the capability to prevent the accident. 3 7 A manufacturer is usually not even liable for actual damages caused by an
unavoidable defect in its products'18 and so a fortiori would not be
liable for punitive damages in such cases. As a general rule, however, a manufacturer is able to market a safer product if it so
desires.' 3 9
behavior is probably wide enough to protect the manufacturer who acts in good faith.
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE 53 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Since many of the manufacturers who are aware of the vagueness of the proscription will recognize and rely
upon the protection of good faith conduct, the chilling effect of the standard's
vagueness should not be too great.
Concededly, however, if punitive damages do have the deterrent effect they are
supposed to have, some products that are in fact "safe enough" under the vague standard of "defectiveness" will be made even safer by manufacturers anxious to avoid
being adjudged "reckless" at some future date, and other similar products will not
be marketed at all. This economic sacrifice, however, should be considerably more
than offset by the decrease in excessive injuries prevented by the threat of punitive
damages awards.
136. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
137. In some circumstances even criminal sanctions are imposed for reckless misconduct, and sometimes for negligent and even innocent behavior. See note 175
infra and accompanying text. The presumption is that even inadvertent conduct can
be controlled and thus deterred:
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an additional motive to take care before acting, to use their, faculties and draw on their
experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some extent, at least, this motive may promote awareness and thus be effective as a
measure of control. Certainly legislators act on this assumption in a host of
situations and it seems to us dogmatic to assert that they are wholly wrong.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 3, at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, comment 2, at 52-53 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959);
H.L.A. HART, supra note 113, at 132-40. But see Hall, Negligent Behavior Should
Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 632 (1963).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k (1965). But
cf. James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1558 (1966). See generally Montgomery
& Owen, supra note 2, at 813-14, 827-28.
139. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 756-57, 1205-06 (1956); Tunc,
Fault: A Common Name for Different Misdeeds, 49 TUL. L. REV. 279, 294 (1975).
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The final factor bearing on whether punitive damages will have
a deterrent effect on marketing misconduct requires a determination
of the extent to which manufacturers threatened with punishment
will want to avoid the proscribed conduct. The intensity of such a
desire in any particular case will depend upon the manufacturer's perception of the likelihood of his being identified and punished140 as
well as on the likely severity of punishment.' 4 ' The availability of
punitive damages in products liability cases should make it far more
likely that offending manufacturers will be exposed and punished since
the remedy supplies an additional financial incentive to both the victim and his attorney to uncover and prove the proscribed behavior. 42
Most manufacturers thus would soon realize that the availability of
punitive damages to injured consumers has reduced their ability to
avoid punishment for the reckless marketing of defective products.
But as in the case of compensatory damages, a manufacturer will
have virtually no idea how large the aggregate of punitive damages
penalties may be 43 because it will rarely be possible to predict accurately the number or extent of injuries likely to be caused by marketing
a product in ,aparticular condition. Furthermore, the method of
measurement used for punitive damages introduces additional imponderables1 44 that make it virtually impossible for a manufacturer
to forecast accurately its total liability for punitive damages. Thus,
depending on such factors as the gravity of wrongdoing, the number
and seriousness of the resulting injuries, and the financial status of the
manufacturer, the punitive damages assessments that might flow
from wantonly marketing a defective product could range from nothing to millions, or even hundreds of millions, of dollars. 145 Such
a manufacturer will probably have a good idea of the potential
profitability of marketing the defective product but no idea of its
potential liability. It may well be, then, that in cases of this type,
no form of potential liability will be likely to influence its behavior
appreciably.146 Nevertheless, in most cases a manufacturer well140. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 77-78 (1972); Andenaes, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 949, supra note 130, at 949, 963; Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Hav.
L 11Ev. 1089, 1124-27 (1972); Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road
Safety Act of 1967, 2 J.LEGAL STUDIES 1, 67 (1973).
141. See, e.g., Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, supra note 130, at 970; Ehrlich,
The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J.LEGAL STUDIES 259 (1972).
142. See text at notes 185-203 infra.
143. See generally DuBois, supra note 9.
144. See notes 277-99 infra.
145. See note 278 infra and accompanying text.
146. The management of the manufacturing enterprise, for example, may be un-
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advised by counsel and acting rationally should be influenced to

some extent in its decision-making by the possibility of the largely
open-ended liability of a punitive damages verdict. 4
Punitive damages, therefore, should have the greatest deterrent

effect in cases in which the marketing of an excessively hazardous
product is profitable for the manufacturer even after the payment

of claims for actual damages.' 48 The greater the product's profit
potential and the less the likelihood that individual victims will seek

recovery, the greater the need for a strong deterrent to reckless marketing decisions.. 49 Illustrative is the case of a manufacturer who
aware of the potential for liability. See note 135 supra. It may even be unaware of
the misconduct. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842, 84344 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d
689, 711-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 414-15 (1967).
147. One, of course, may question the hypothesis that all activity within the enterprise is rationally directed toward the maximization of profits. See P.
AmrYAH, supra note 133, at 597; J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967);
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS:

THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

(1975). But cf. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 583. Some juries, however, apparently do assume that a large punitive damages verdict will effectively deter misconduct perceived as particularly dangerous and reprehensible. Thus, a jury in one of
the MER/29 cases, Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.L.J. Jan. 11, 1967,
at 21, col. 3 (Super. Ct. N.Y. 1967), assessed $850,000 punitive damages against
the defendant because, in the words of one juror, "the company 'had to be punished
not only for what they had done, but also as a warning to all drug companies, that
they could not do things like this.' Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1966, at 12, col.
." Rheingold, supra note 127, at 134 n.46.
148. Punitive damages are widely considered to be useful in preventing wrongdoing from being profitable for the malefactor. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 94
Idaho 683, 691, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (1972) ("Clearly in such cases the award of
punitive damages should aim at making the cost of such repetitive anti-social conduct
uneconomical"); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499, 223
N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961) ("In the calculation of his expected profits, the wrongdoer
is likely to allow for a certain amount of money which will have to be returned
to those victims who object too vigorously and he will be perfectly content to bear
the additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing his illicit business. It
stands to reason that the chances of deterring him are materially increased by subjecting him to the payment of punitive damages"); Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 19,
70 A. 953, 954 (1908) (punitive damages allowed where defendant conducted blasting operations in a manner likely to shatter plaintiff's buildings "because it was
cheaper to pay damages . .. then to do the work the usual way"). See Morris,
44 HARV. L REV. 1173, supra note 16, at 1185-88 ("While 'compensatory' damages
provide a financial smart for a defendant who has not gained anything by his wrong,
they may merely result in the payment of a bargain sale price for an advantage
when the defendant has acted to further his own interests." Id. at 1185); Stoll,
supra note 17, at 20 ("The sense of justice which demands extraction of a calculated
profit is based not only upon the concept of deterrence, but equally upon an appraisal
of the very deed itself, regardless of whether repetition is likely or not. Justice demands in every instance that violation of the law shall not pay"). Cf. Barth v.
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 240-41, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968)
(products liability case). Even England retained an exception for this type of case
in its judicial restriction of the punitive damages doctrine. See note 23 supra.
149. A case in point was the marketing of MER/29 by Richardson-Merrell in
the early 1960s. For a discussion of this case, see text at notes 336-51 infra and
Rheingold, supra note 127.
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knowingly markets a product particularly apt to cause minor injuries

of a type that will be uneconomical for injured consumers to litigate.
The availability of punitive damages in such cases would make litiga-

tion economically feasible for such persons, and the manufacturer's
potential liability would accordingly be increased substantially.
Since the deterrent effect of a penalty is generally thought to vary

directly with its size, 150 punitive damages should be particularly effective in these cases.' 51
3.

Law Enforcement

Closely tied to the other goals of punitive damages, especially

deterrence, is a distinct objective which may be termed law enforcement.15 2

Detractors of the punitive damages doctrine, minimizing

its role in punishing wrongdoers and deterring misconduct, frequently criticize the doctrine for allowing the plaintiff a "windfall"

in addition to any compensation for losses he may actually have sustained.1 53 But this criticism of the doctrine invariably overlooks the
important fact that this prospective windfall motivates many reluctant

plaintiffs to press their claims. And as the litigation of such claims
increases, misconduct is increasingly punished and deterred.

The use of punitive damages as a law enforcement tool is socially
beneficial in two respects. First, serving as a kind of bounty, the
prospect of punitive damages recoveries induces injured plaintiffs to
150. See, e.g., Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L Rav. 949, supra note 130, at 970.
151. See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAvffINs, supra note 129, at 194-209. "Increased penalties are probably more or less significant depending on the size of the
penalty increase relative to the size of base penalty." Id. at 202. Thus, punitive
damages should be most effective as a deterrent in cases in which the injuries are
relatively minor or infrequent, such as some forms of allergic reactions to drugs,
and should be less effective in cases in which the frequency and severity of injuries
are expected to be greater. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,
841 (2d Cir. 1967); Childres, Remedies, 1965 AM. SURvEY AM. L. 289, 291 (1966).
152. It will be recalled that four objectives for the imposition of punitive damages
have been identified: punishment, deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation.
See text at notes 100-12 supra. It has also been noted that deterrence is actually
a sub-goal of punishment. See note 101 supra. Similarly, law enforcement is clearly
a sub-goal of deterrence. In so far as law enforcement includes inducing private
parties to sue for misdeeds, see text at notes 154-57 infra, law enforcement is also
a sub-goal of compensation. Thus, as has been noted, the objectives of punitive
damages may be reduced to the two broad categories of punishment and compensation. See note 112 supra. However, the isolation of law enforcement, as with deterrence, clarifies analysis.
153. See, e.g., Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 409, 179 N.E.2d 497, 501,
223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (1961) (dissenting opinion); Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d
65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965). Even some proponents of punitive damages
suggest that such damages ought properly to go to the state. Hodgin & Veitch, supra
note 23, at 132; cf. 13 P. JAMES, supra note 102, at 402.
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act as "private attorneys general"'154 and thereby helps to increase
the number of wrongdoers who are properly "brought to justice."' 155
This assistance is important, for many serious misdeeds deserving of
punishment are beyond the reach of the criminal law and the public

prosecutor. 15 6 Thus, a shortcoming in the administration of criminal
justice is partially remedied, and the "private prosecutor" is rewarded with a "private fine" "for his public service in bringing the
157
wrongdoer to account.'

Second, punitive damages awards help to implement the various
154. Until recently the private attorney general concept of encouraging public
interest litigation through awarding attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs was enjoying growing acceptance, particularly in the federal courts. See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1975). See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees In
Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973). However, in Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Supreme Court severely restricted this development in holding that attorneys' fees may be awarded
to a prevailing party only where expressly provided by statute, except "when the
losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons
.... " 421 U.S. at 258-59. For an application of this exception, see Doe v. Poolker, 515 F.2d 541, 546-49 (8th Cir. 1975).
This standard of liability for attorneys' fees is remarkably similar to the showing
that must be made for the recovery of punitive damages, and is based on a similar
rationale. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 15 (1973). Thus, despite the Court's
general disapproval of awarding attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory authorization, the Court has acknowledged their appropriateness where the defendant has displayed a gross disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. Cf. 412 U.S. at 15.
155. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 347 (1873); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 522; Morris, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730, supranote 16.
156. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 276; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND,
supra note 17, at 522; Freifield, supra note 24, at 7-8; Tunc, A Little-Noticed Theory
in the Law of Torts: Boris Stark's Theory of Guarantee, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 618,
621 (1973). With the possible exception of such limited areas as the food and drug
industries, legislators and prosecutors have generally avoided any serious attempt to
punish manufacturers guilty of acts detrimental to the public safety. Cf. Rice, supra
note 16, at 312 (noting the "public and prosecutorial abhorrence of 'white-collar'
.. . criminal prosecutions . . ."). The National Commission on Product Safety
noted the ineffectiveness of existing criminal sanctions in promoting adequate product
safety. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 95. See generally C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1972).
In recent years, the Consumer Product Safety Commission has initiated criminal
proceedings against both manufacturers and their executive officers for violations of
the various product safety statutes under its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Current Developments, 3 PROD. SAF. & LIAB. REP. 814 (Aug. 22, 1975). However, there have been
few such prosecutions, in part because of the Commission's "extensive, unexplained
and unnecessary delay .. .in developing and forwarding its cases to the prosecutors." In the Matter of a CPSC Recommendation for Criminal Prosecution for Certain Violations of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act and the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act, BCMI No. 1862 (concurring opinion of Commissioner Franklin)
(Jan. 27, 1976); see Current Developments, 4 PROD. SAP. & LIAB. REP. 112 (Feb.
6, 1976). For a compilation of recent prosecutions under the federal product safety
statutes, most of which have been brought under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, see M. BENDER, FED. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY SERVICE, CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS § 601.1[hl].
157. Neal v. Newburger Co., 154 Miss. 691, 700, 123 S.861, 863 (1929).
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rules of substantive law.1 58 No doubt few, if any, rules of law are
obeyed or enforced in all instances.!5" Violations are apt to be

especially prevalent, however, when the unlawful activity is profitable

for the violator, 160 when violations are difficult to detect 6 ' or to

prove, 6 2 when violations are "morally neutral,"' 63 when the rules are
vague,'

when enforcement of the rules is infrequent, 165 or when pun-

158. Many economists have recognized the advantages of private, "victim" enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance,
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.LEGAL STUDIES 1, 6 (1974). They suggest
that it is a most, and in some cases the only, effective means of enforcing the law
of private transactions "precisely because the incentives to the enforcers are as large
as the incentives to prospective violators." Id. at 13. "The amount of victim enforcement would be optimal if successful enforcers were paid the amount they had
suffered in damages, excluding their enforcement costs, divided by-the probability
that they are successful." Id. at 14. See R. POSNER, supra note 140, at 360. Posner
suggests that punitive damages could be used in appropriate cases to achieve the correct multiple of actual damages for optimal enforcement and deterrence. See id.
But cf. id. at 78. The law will be obeyed, in other words, only ifthe sanctions
for its breach are large enough to make the breach uneconomical. Id. at 320.
Some commentators have recently rebelled against the extensive intrusion of
economics into the law of torts. They claim that "the law has 'gone a-whoring after
False Gods' and that all of the raving about loss absorption has blinded lawyers
to the obvious concern of tort law with right and wrong . .. [and] the symbolic
function of tort law." Veitch & Miers, Assault on the Law of Tort, 38 MODERN
L. REV. 139, 142-43 (1975). See Veitch, Book Review, 22 N. IRE. L.Q. 560, 563
(1971) (complaining that tort theorists as a group "have been led by the nose by
economists" too long). See also Buchanan, Good Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L.
REV. 483 (1974); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.REV. 451 (1974); Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posners Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv.
L. REV. 1655 (1974). Nevertheless, the economists' ideas on private enforcement
have some useful implications for damages rules in product liability law. Particularly
relevant is the conclusion that "rewards" such as punitive damages efficiently enforce
compliance with the rules of law. For even if the Consumer Product Safety Commission accelerates rule promulgation and enforcement in the years ahead, optimal
achievement of product safety will probably require that the victims of product accidents be encouraged to enforce common-law, and perhaps even statutory, rules of
product safety. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in Products Liability-DesignDefect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CoRNELL L.REV. 435, 538 & n.104 (1976). The possibility of punitive damages awards
in products liability litigation should encourage victims to seek enforcement in particular cases, which in turn should induce manufacturers to comply with the rules
of product safety.
159. See, e.g., Becker &Stigler, supra note 158, at 2.
160. See generally R.POSNER, supra note 140, at 77-78, 357-62.
161. Id.
162. See notes 178-80 infra and accompanying text.
163. "inhere is evidence that the lack of enforcement of penal laws designed
to regulate behavior in morally neutral fields may rapidly lead to mass infringements.
* * The individual's moral reluctance to break the law is not strong enough to
secure obedience when the law comes into conflict with his personal interests." Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L REy.-949, supra note 130, at 961. See also Hamilton, Corporate CriminalLiability in Texas, 47 TExAs L. REV. 60, 69 (1968).
164. See P. ATrYAH, supra note 133, at 554.
165. See Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The bite of the law is in its enforcement"); W. MiDDENDO".F, supra note
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ishment is light. 166 By financing the detection, proof and punishment
of willful and wanton violations of the rules, punitive damages increase
the likelihood that wrongdoers will be identified in the first instance
and more severely punished thereafter. To the extent that potential
wrongdoers perceive this increase in the probability and size of

penalties 6 7 and the commensurate reduction in the profitability of
their misconduct, violations should be deterred and enforcement of
68
the rules of substantive law improved.1
Perhaps the most fundamental substantive rule of products
liability law is that products marketed in a condition generating more
accident costs than social utility are "defective" and, accordingly,
that the manufacturer should pay for whatever costs are occasioned
by the defective condition. 1 9 Since this is a rule of tort rather than
113, at 50; L. RADJINOwXCZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 122 (1966); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 160-63; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, J. LEGAL STUDIES, 29, 41 (1972): "Punishment-an exaction that exceeds the costs to society (here,
accident costs) imposed by the particular violation being punished-is necessary
where the violator is frequently not apprehended, because a rational lawbreaker will
discount the gravity of any legal sanction by the probability that it will be imposed."
166. See generally, F. ZIMPING & C. HAWKINS, supra note 129, at 194-209.

Sev-

eral of these conditions are generally present in products liability cases. Cf. Green
& Moore, Winter's Discontent: Market Failure and Consumer Welfare, 82 YALE
L.J. 903, 909-10 (1973).
167. "The decisive factor in creating the deterrent effect is, of course, not the
objective risk of detection but the risk as it is calculated by the potential
[offender]." Adenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, supra note 130, at 963. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972).
168. One detrimental side effect of allowing punitive damages is that their availability will undoubtedly encourage counsel in some cases to pursue unmeritorious
claims, and manufacturers will sometimes have to settle such claims in excess of
their fair value because of the risk, however remote, of large jury awards. See
DuBois, supra note 9, at 350. This general type of risk, however, inheres in all
litigation regardless of the type of damages sought.
169. See note 3 supra. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th
Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087 (5th Cir.
1973); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a/fd., 474
F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Helicoid Gage Div. of Am. Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell,
511 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Metal Window Prod. Co. v. Magnusen,
485 S.W.2d 355, 357-60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); G. CALABRESI, supra note 135; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 37-39
(1973); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ.
825, 835-38 (1973); R. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JusTcE 159 (1969); R. POSNER,

supra note 140, at 88-92. Some, of course, would argue with this definition of product defectiveness for purposes of determining a manufacturer's liability. See, e.g.,
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055 (1972); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1113
(1974). But the notion that product manufacturers should internalize the accident
costs of defective products is generally accepted. See note 177 infra and accompany-
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criminal law, it is cast in terms of post-accident loss distribution rather
than as an absolute prohibition. This does not mean, however, that
a manufacturer should be permitted to abuse the rule flagrantly and
with impunity by treating the payment of accident costs merely as
a "'license fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business.' "170 Yet
absent the punitive damages remedy, many manufacturers may be
tempted to maximize profits by marketing products known to be
defective and to absorb resulting injury claims as a cost of doing
business. 7'
Such flagrant breaches of the law exposing others to risks of
personal injury violate basic principles of fairness and morality.17 2

When conduct seriously endangers not merely property but

human life, special efforts must be made to enforce the rules
strictly.'17 This nation has criminalized many forms of conduct that
pose particular dangers to the public safety,174 in some cases even
ing text. And few would argue with the proposition that such products are "defective" from a broader, socioeconomic perspective.
170. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1943), quoted in
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 669 (1975). Consumers should have more
than a naked right to be compensated for injuries caused by defective products. The
rules of products liability might be profitably construed as establishing a consumer
right in the first instance not to be injured at all by defective products. In the
Preamble to the Joint Resolution in 1967 that established the National Commission
on Product Safety, Congress declared that "the American Consumer has a right to
be protected against unreasonable risk of bodily harm from products purchased on
." Pub. L. No. 90-146
the open market for the use of himself and his family ....
(Nov. 20, 1967), reprinted in NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 124.
171. This tendency on the part of manufacturers led the National Commission
on Product Safety to propose that consumers injured by "knowing or willful" violations of safety standards be awarded treble damages and attorneys' fees. See Proposed Consumer Product Safety Act § 30, NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, App.
at 29 ("Such statutory redress will add powerful private support to public safety
programs"). Congress omitted this particular proposal from the Consumer Product
Safety Act enacted in 1972. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (Supp. V 1975).
172. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in Is LAw DEAD? 168, 170 (E. Rostow ed. 1971); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. Rnv.
537, 563-64 (1972). See generally C. FRIED, supra note 118, at 66-74.
173. Cf. P. ATIYAH, supra note 133, at 590.
174. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §
135a (Supp. 1975) prohibiting sale of "economic poisons" under certain conditions
including inadequate labeling); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1192 (1970)
(prohibiting the manufacture or sale of fabrics failing to meet applicable safety standards); Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1263 (1970) (prohibiting the
sale of misbranded or banned hazardous substances); Consumer Product Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2068 (Supp. H 1973) (proscribing the manufacture or sale of products
violating applicable safety standards); Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 331 (1970) (prohibiting the sale of adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs,
devices or cosmetics). There reportedly has been an increase in recent years in the
criminalization of particular forms of accident-producing behavior. See Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 169, at 1074-75.
In addition to federal statutes, there are an "infinite variety" of state statutes
criminally proscribing various forms of hazardous conduct. Among the more com-
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providing for strict criminal liability without regard to the defendant's
state of mind or degree of fault or care. 1 75 The enormity of the
danger to society posed by defective products would thus seem to

require as a minimum the development of rules designed to improve
compliance with the common-law rules of product safety.
But is there any reason to believe that manufacturers knowingly
or recklessly breach the common-law rules of product safety? To
the extent that the manufacturer acts as a rational economic entity,
it should recognize that the strict pursuit of profit maximization will
often dictate that safety be traded for cost reduction substantially
beyond the point where a product becomes legally "defective" and
the manufacturer becomes obligated to compensate persons injured
by the defect. The expectation of future profits is probably strong
enough in many cases to allay any moral conjunctions the manufacturer may feel in breaching some vague common-law rule of
product safety.

It may be profitable for a manufacturer to choose to market a
defective product for at least three reasons. The first two reasons
derive from the fact that manufacturers are not generally called upon
to pay for all of the injuries caused by their products. First, in many
mon are prohibitions against the sale of impure food, the sale of firearms to minors,
the failure to fence railroads, swimming pools, and other hazardous locations, and
the failure to guard elevators, machinery, and other dangerous devices. See W. PRosSER, supra note 31, § 36.
175. In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of the president of the Acme Markets food store chain for causing
the adulteration of food stored in unsanitary warehouses in violation of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The Court in Park reaffirmed its prior construction
of the Act in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), which had held
that the Act "dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conductawareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden
of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible
relation to a public danger." 320 U.S. at 281. It should be noted that section 11
of the Consumer Food Act of 1976, S. 641, passed by the Senate on March 18,
1976, and now pending action by a House Committee, effectively overrules the holding in Park by amending the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §
333(a), to provide that negligence at a minimum must be established for a criminal
conviction under the Act. Still, the following observations made by the Court in
Park have significance for the awarding of punitive damages in products liability
cases:

Thus Doetterweich and the cases which have followed reveal that in providing
sanctions which reach and touch the individuals who execute the corporate mission . . . the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures
that will insure that violations will not occur. The requirements of foresight
and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public
has a right to expect of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority
in business enterprises whose services and products affect the health and wellbeing of the public that supports them.
421 U.S. at 672.
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cases, the product's "defectiveness" is invisible to the injured con-

sumer who frequently is unaware that his injury may be attributable
to a violation of law by the manufacturer and who thus may never
discover, much less assert, his legal right to compensation.' 7" This
is especially true when the defect is an inadequate design or warning.
Manufacturers are thereby relieved of the burden of paying for a large

proportion of the accident costs that the rules of liability presume they
will shoulder."'

Second, even if an injury victim is conscious of his legal rights,
the assertion of those rights is expensive, largely because of costly
attorneys' fees. 17 The total costs of preparation and litigation tend

to be especially high in product cases because of the technical and
complex nature of the issues and the resulting difficulties of dis-

covery and proof. Expert witnesses, such as chemists, metallurgists,
and toxicologists, are frequently indispensable for establishing liability, and their fees for consulting, testing, and testifying add substan-

tially to the total cost of litigation." 9 Even in cases in which liability
176. Whitford, Products Liability, in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, 3 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES-PRODUCT SAFETY LAW

& ADMINISTRATION:

FEDERAL,

STATE, LOCAL AND COMMON LAW 221, 223 (1970) [hereinafter NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL
STUDIES]. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 74 ("Small wonder that some
manufacturers do not even respond to letters claiming compensation for injuries;
they know that more than two-thirds will never pursue the claim"); Rheingold, supra
note 127, at 141. But see BUREAU OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE--ASSESSMENT OF RELATED PROBLEMS AND

ISSUES 7, 14, 53, 57, 89 (1976) [hereinafter DOC, PROD. LIAB. INS. STUDY] (finding
an "increasing consumer awareness of 'legal rights' regarding product liability claims"
evidenced in part by growing number of lawsuits).
177. See note 169 supra and accompanying text. A fundamental principle of
enterprise liability theory is the notion that manufacturers should pay for the costs
reasonably associated with the manufacture and sale of their products, including the
costs of accidents caused by any defects the products contain. If a manufacturer
were not to pay for the injuries caused by its defective product, the product would
fail to "pay its way" within the economy and would in a sense consume more resources than it generated. Professor James perhaps has summarized it best: "The
optimal allocation of resources in a free enterprise system requires each enterprise
to pay its own costs." James, supra note 138, at 1550, 1551 n.6 (1966). See P.
ATiYAH, supra note 133, at 565-600; G. CALABRESI, supra note 135, at 68-94 (theorizing that the general deterrence of market forces helps to optimize safety decisions
and thus minimizes total accident costs); R. KEETON, supra note 169, at 159; Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961); Ross, Book Review, 84 HARv. L Rv. 1322 (1971). See generally 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at 1375-76, 1385; J. O'CoNNELL, ENDIG INSULT
TO INJURY-No-FAuLT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SmvicES 76-77, 85 n.26
.
(1975); Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAw & CoNTEMi
PROB. 445 (1950); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial
Process-TheInsignificance of Foresight,70 YALE LJ.554, 595 (1961).
178. See Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 125, 139 (1973).
179. See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL.STUDIES, supra note 176, at 229 ("Costs, including both filing and witness fees may sometime be a substantial deterrent to initiating
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is fairly clear, the vagaries of the litigation process insure that some
valid claims will go completely or partially unpaid. s0 An alert
manufacturer, insensitive to moral arguments for obeying the law,
may recognize and take advantage of these practical shortcomings
in the legal system.

Third, manufacturers may choose to market products known to be
defective because safety measures often cause a decrease in profit
margins and sales. 8' The addition of safety devices to a product
will usually increase both the cost to the manufacturer and the price to
the consumers; 8 1 sales may then decline because of the higher price.
Sales may also decline because safety measures reduce the product's
practical utility or its psychological appeal. Thus, while the cost of
affixing adequate warnings to a product is usually minimal, sales may
be lost not only because of higher prices but also because consumers
are frightened away by the warning. 8 " Similarly, in some cases the
litigation. In a significant percentage of the cases in this survey, the costs exceeded
$1,000, and the plaintiff is usually expected to absorb these costs if the litigation
is unsuccessful").
In regard to the unreported case of Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 711661-Civ-JLK (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971) see notes 484-92 infra and accompanying text, the plaintiff's principal attorney makes the following report concerning the
expenses of preparation and trial of the case:
Our out of pocket expenses for such things as despositions, transcripts, photographs and experts ran to approximately $50,000.00. We took over one hundred and ten depositions; had twenty-two motions to produce and eleven sets
of interrogatories. The case took thirty days to try; I had anywhere from three
to five lawyers assisting me and the defense had two local attorneys, plus house
counsel for OMC, plus their corporate representative, who was also an attorney,
so they had four attorneys on their side. I have been told that their defense
bills approached $100,000.00.
Letter from Jon E. Krupnick to David G. Owen, August 7, 1975, on file at Michigan
Law Review. Mr. Krupnick reports that he and his associates devoted more than
3000 hours in preparation and trial. Id. He concludes that it is virtually "impossible
for a sole practitioner to effectively handle a major products liability case and, needless to say, without serious injury or death, the economics make it impossible for
major products liability cases to be tried." Id. See also Lloyd, supra note 9, at
1. See generally Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50.
180. Cf. Keeton, supra note 169, at 30. And it is probable that in some substantial proportion of products liability actions, the defendant manufacturers "employ
a variety of litigative tactics to discourage meritorious claims." Green & Nader,
Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J.
871, 885 (1973).
181. Indeed, this is an important step in the optimal reduction of accident costs
within the Calabresian system of general or market deterrence. See note 177 supra.
182. See Morris, supra note 177, at 585.
183. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962) ("had
the warning been in a form calculated . . . to convey a conception of the true nature
of the danger, this mother . . might not have purchased the product at all"). See
also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1968). The
remarks of the President of Fairchild Hiller Corporation in a letter to the National
Transportation Safety Board reflect this concern: "I must emphasize here the potentially disastrous consequences to an aircraft manufacturer of a statement by the safety
board reaching a fatigue failure conclusion-the public image of the plane model
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cost of redesigning a product to eliminate defects may be inconsequential as compared with the impact on profits from lost sales caused by

the consumer's failure to appreciate the need for the safer design' 84 and
his frustration with its inconveniences.

Faced with situations such as

these, manufacturers may rationally choose to increase sales by marketing the product in its defective condition and simply to absorb
ensuing injury claims.

Regardless of what actually motivates a manufacturer to market
a product known to be defective, such conduct amounts to a con-

scious flaunting of the law. If public confidence in the legal system
is to be maintained, remedies must be developed that will punish
and deter flagrant breaches of the rules of behavior. This is particu-

larly so when violations expose consumers to unreasonable risks of
personal injury and are motivated solely by the manufacturer's desire
for increased profits. The doctrine of punitive damages well serves
this purpose in the products liability context. If manufacturers are

punished for such conduct by punitive damages assessments, compliance with the safety rules should be increased as profits are reduced.
As manufacturers market safer products to avoid increased penalties,

managerial determinations of optimal product safety should begin
more nearly to approximate that determination embodied in the

common-law rules of products liability.
4.

Compensation

Although it is frequently said that the purpose of punitive
damages is to punish the defendant and deter misbehavior, not to

compensate the plaintiff,"8 ' punitive damages do indeed play an
is severely damaged, future sales of the aircraft are hurt, . . . and our relationships
with existing operators are sorely tried." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement at 8, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,
Civil No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971); see text at notes 424-31 infra.
See generally, Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of
Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. Rnv. 495, 501-05 (1976).
184. See NCPS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 69. It is probably quite infrequent that the ordinary consumer will be aware of, much less appreciate, the importance of the safety aspects of a particular design. Moreover, "[C]onsumers generally have no way of knowing how much more they would have to pay to obtain
a comparable product as serviceable and less hazardous. Even when aware of a
risk in a product, consumers cannot predict the frequency, severity, or probability
of injury." Id.
185. See, e.g., Grefe v. Ross, - Iowa - 231 N.W.2d 863 (1975); Prince v.
Peterson, - Utah -, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975). It is for this reason, and on the
assumption that the plaintiff has already received full recompense for his injury by
an award of compensatory damages, that many courts say that there is no "right"
to punitive damages, REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908, comment d at 81
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important-even if usually residual-compensatory role.""0 Such
awards to some extent reimburse the plaintiff for losses not ordinarily
recoverable as compensatory damages, such as actual losses the
plaintiff is unable to prove or for which the rules of damages do not
provide relief, including the expenses of bringing suit.
Many punitive damages cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries involved "ungentlemanly" behavior of the defendant that
was particularly humiliating to the plaintiff.18 7

Since damage to

emotional stability was at that time generally damnum absque
injuria,18 punitive damages awards assuaged a plaintiffs loss of
honor resulting from a seduced daughter or a spit in the face."8 "
Even today the law for various reasons does not fully protect emotional tranquillity through compensatory damages; requiring defendants guilty of flagrant misconduct to make full compensation for such
injuries helps to fill this void. 9 When one person is injured by the
malicious actions of another, "the human spirit is bruised by the
knowledge of another's ill-will or contempt .

. . ."I"

The legal

revenge provided by punitive damages helps restore the plaintiffs
emotional equilibrium 9 2 and in this way compensates him for the
93
psychological harm caused by the defendant's malicious act.

(Tent. Draft No. 13, 1973), and that such damages are a windfall. See, e.g., Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1974).
186. See, e.g., Hicks v. Herring, 246 S.C. 429, 437, 144 S.E.2d 151, 155 (1965);
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1963).
In Michigan and New Hampshire, punitive damages are limited to an amount that
will fully compensate the plaintiff. See Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich. App.
288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1965); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71,
289 A.2d 66 (1972). In Connecticut, punitive damages are limited in amount to
the plaintiff's litigation expenses. See Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver,
154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (1966). See also Cox v. Stolworthy, 94
Idaho, 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972).
187. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872) (spitting in plaintiff's face);
Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814) (shooting at game
on plaintiff's estate and use of intemperate language); Tullidge v. Wade, 3 Wils.
K.B. 18, 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (C.P. 1769) (seducing plaintiff's daughter under plaintiff's
roof after securing confidence of plaintiff's family).
188. See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HAmv. L. REv. 1033 (1936).
189. The spit in the face has, in one instance at least, been replaced by a pie
in the face. The perpetrator settled in the amount of $5,000. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1976, at 33, col. 1 (late city ed.).
190. See Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103 N.H. 426, 442, 174 A.2d 825,
835-36 (1961). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 31, § 54.
191. Kelly, supra note 42, at 283.
192. See notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
193. Thus, the derivation of the phrase "smart money" "as indicating compensation for the smarts of the injured person, and not, as now [assumed], money required by way of punishment, and to make the wrong-doer smart." Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 355 (1873).
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Punitive damages also help restore the plaintiff to the financial
position he occupied prior to the injury by providing a fund for the

payment of litigation expenses.

94

Since at least a third of the plain-

tiff's recovery ordinarily is spent for legal fees, a verdict that does

not include a sum for attorneys' fees almost always leaves the plaintiff substantially worse off financially than he was before the acci-

dent. Yet the severely criticized195 but firmly established "American
rule" unequivocally prohibits awards of attorneys' fees in the absence
of statutory authorization.' 9 6 In cases of flagrant misconduct, awards
of punitive damages tend to alleviate, however imprecisely, 19 7 the
rigors of the American rule.19 8 Surely this result is desirable, since
a defendant who has maliciously injured another may fairly be
required to make the plaintiff truly whole again. 99
Both of these compensatory purposes of punitive damages

awards are applicable in the products liability context. Plaintiffs
injured by product defects are as deserving of full compensation
for their losses as any other class of plaintiffs. It is true that persons
injured by defective products do not usually suffer the personal
The practice of matching damages to the amount of vengeance reasonably aroused
by the defendant's offensive act, and thereby giving the plaintiff both actual and
legal "satisfaction" for his injuries, is traceable from the Code of Hammurabi, see
G. DrIVER & J. MILES, supra note 17, at 500, through the law of ancient Rome,
see note 113 supra, into the early English common law, cf. 2 Blackstone Commentaries 438, and the Prussian Code of 1794, see F. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL
LAW 184 (1950, corrected ed. 1968), to present day common law,-see Kelly, supra
note 42, at 279, and civil law, see Stoll, supra note 17, at 3.
In view of this clearly compensatory aspect of punitive damages, it becomes apparent that characterizing aggravated damages as either exclusively punitive or
compensatory overlooks their dual nature. See Stoll, supra note 17, at 6-13; cf.
Kelly, supra note 42, at 287-88. Thus, although the choice of a theory for such
damages may have implications for some matters including the amount of such verdicts, for most purposes the debate over the legitimacy of punitive damages may
have been nothing more than a tempest in a teapot. See note 22 supra.
194. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 277. See generally J. O'CONNELL,
THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INsURANcE 37-53 (1971).
195. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 792 (1966). Criticisms of the rule are noted, and the critical
literature is collected, in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 270
n.45 (1975).
196. Sillinger v. Freeway Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 110 Ariz. 573, 521 P.2d 119
(1974) (en bane); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973). Certain, carefully circumscribed exceptions do exist in the federal version
of the rule. See note 154 supra.
197. See C. MCCORMICm, supra note 16, at 277; cf. Peck, Compensation for Pain:
A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1355, 137374 (1974).
198. See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 540 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Schlein v. Smith, 160 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
199. See, e.g., Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 235 (1842); C. McComICK,
supra note 16, at 277.
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humiliation and embarrassment caused by the dignitary torts that
sparked the punitive damages remedy in -the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2 0 "Satisfaction" for malicious, insulting behavior
simply is not called for.20 ' Yet many, perhaps most, personal injury
victims are inadequately compensated under the present system. It
has been estimated, for example, that "in big damage cases very few
victims get as much as twenty-five per cent of their real economic
loss. ''2° 2 Further, accident victims often suffer damage to emotional
tranquillity, family harmony and employment security that is particularly difficult to prove and generally not compensable anyway.
Moreover, the use of a large portion of the recovery for attorneys' fees
is probably more burdensome to the personal injury victim, who may
need the entire verdict to pay for medical, rehabilitation and special
living expenses, 03 than to the victim of a dignitary tort, whose only
200. Stoll, supra note 17, at 15-16.
201. But see note 126 supra and accompanying text.
202. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774, 780 (1967), citing CONRAD, MORGAN, PArr,
VoLrz & BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS COSTS AND PAYMENTS 197 (1964),
and Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 913, 917 (1962).
203. A substantial portion of the verdict may of course represent compensation
for pain and suffering, and so in many cases attorneys' fees can be paid from this
part of the judgment without intruding upon amounts available to the plaintiff for
his "hard" expenses. No doubt there are sound doubts concerning the logic and
expedience of allowing awards for pain and suffering. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, supra
note 177, at 121-22; Peck, supra note 197. But so long as courts continue to consider this type of loss worthy of compensation, the ability of a plaintiff to apply
his pain and suffering award to the payment of his litigation expenses is no remedy
for the glaring defects in the American rule prohibiting awards of attorneys' fees.
Jury awards of punitive damages and those for wounded feelings and pain and
suffering are often difficult to distinguish. Magruder, supra note 188, at 1034 n.4;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment c at 81 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973). For this reason and upon the assumption that "[tihe theory of punitive damages (without the name) is built into the average juror's value system .

.

. " Morrig,

supra note 16, at 226, some commentators have speculated that the availability vel non
of the punitive damages remedy may be of little consequence, since a jury, whether or
not it is expressly instructed on punitive damages, will always award an amount it
deems appropriate in light of all the circumstances of the case. See id.; Note, 70
HARV. L. REv. 517, supra note 16, at 521 (1957). These commentators point to Bass
v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 36 Wis. 450 (1874), 39 Wis. 636 (1876), 42 Wis. 654, 67172 (1877), in which three separate juries awarded an identical sum, $4,500, in three
separate trials of the same case in different counties, "twice with punitive damages allowed and once without .

. . ."

Id. See also Bauer, The Degree of Defendant'sFault

as Affecting the Administration of the Law of Excessive Compensatory Damages, 82
U. PA. L. REV. 583 n.* (1934). Yet in most cases, jurors very probably do make a
sincere effort to follow the charge of the court, and the presence or absence of a
punitive damages instruction should often prove to be of substantial importance. For
example, in Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13851 (C.P. Dorchester County,
S.C., Nov. 26, 1974), an action against the bottler of a soft drink for injuries resulting from contamination due to the presence of a rusty nail in the beverage, "the
jury went out and brought back a question for the Judge as to whether or not they
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sacrifice in paying such fees may be to relinquish part of his retaliatory
"satisfaction." Punitive damages thus can serve a valuable compensatory function in products liability cases as they have in more traditional tort litigation.
III.

COMPLICATING FACTORS IN ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

The preceding section examined the utility of extending the
punitive damages doctrine to products liability litigation and concluded that such an extension is desirable. Present in virtually every
products liability case involving punitive damages, however, are the
three complicating factors raised by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell,Inc.2 4 First, there is the dubious fairness or utility of punishing the innocent shareholders of a product manufacturer
for the misconduct of individual employees of the company. Second,
there is the probability that the manufacturer has insured itself against
the risk of a punitive damages assessment and consequently may be
neither deterred nor punished by such a verdict. Third, there is the
difficulty of properly determining and controlling the amount of the
punitive damages award. Each of these complicating factors is
intertwined in products liability litigation with the various goals
served by the punitive damages doctrine, and thus attention must
focus on each factor to determine whether it impairs the achievement
of -those goals.
A.

VicariousLiability and the Innocent Shareholder

/The logic and fairness of assessing punitive damages against a
corporation for the misconduct of its employees has long been questioned by both courts and theorists.20 5 In the final analysis it is the
shareholders who feel the sting of a verdict against the corporahad to segregate the $10,000.00 they had decided on into X number of dollars actual
and Y number of dollars punitive." The judge advised the jury that he had stricken
the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages for insufficient proof of malice; the jury
retired for another few minutes and returned with a verdict for $3,500 compensatory
damages. Letter from Reese I. Joye, Jr., to David G. Owen, July 16, 1975 (on file
at Michigan Law Review).
204. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967). See text at notes 10-11 supra.
205. See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 16, §
80; 1 T. SEDGWvicK, supra note 16, at 738-43; Collier, Exemplary Damages in Actions
Against Corporations,55 CENT. L.J. 105 (1902); Morris, 44 HAsv. L. REv. 1173,
supra note 16, at 1199-205; Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16; Note, Exemplary Damages Against Corporations,30 GEo. L.J. 294 (1942); Note, 70 YALE
L.J. 1296, supra note 16. Cf. Edgerton, Corporate Crfmfnal Responsibility, 36 YALE

L.J. 827, 836-40 (1927).
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tion, 20 6 yet in most instances they are not only innocent of personal
wrongdoing but also incapable of exerting any effective control over
the actions of corporate employees.207 Why then should the shareholders be punished? This is perhaps the most difficult question
concerning the appropriateness of punitive damages awards in
products liability litigation.
A minority of courts, following the 1893 Supreme Court decision
in Lake Shore & M.S.R.R. v. Prentice,20 has adopted a narrow rule

of enterprise liability for punitive damages arising out of malicious
acts of corporate employees. 20 9 This doctrine, which Professor
Clarence Morris named the "complicity rule, ' '210 imposes liability for
punitive damages upon a corporation only when a superior officer
is shown to have ordered, participated in, or ratified the misconduct.21 The rule permits corporate liability on proof of such direct
206. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir.
1967). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c), comment at 148 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); Hamilton, supra note 163, at 70-71. Others may also feel the
bite of a punitive damages judgment against a business enterprise, even if less directly, including its empolyees, suppliers, customers and creditors. See Morris, supra
note 177, at 585-87. A particularly heavy punitive damages verdict that results in
layoffs of employees might well have repercussions throughout the entire community.
See DuBois, supra note 9, at 349. .

207. See

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.07(1)(C), comment at 148 (Tent. Draft No.

4, 1955).
208. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
209. See 10 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4906, at 371 (rev. vol.
1970); W. PRossER, supra note 31, at 12; Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517, supra note
16, at 526. But see Note, 70 YALE LJ. 1296, supra note 16, at 1300 (asserting
courts equally divided); C. McCoRmicm, supra note 16, at 282 (asserting it
to be a majority view).'
The narrow rule of enterprise liability has been accepted by the American Law
Institute:
§ 909. PuNrrnv DAMAGES AGAINST A PRINCIPAL
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c)the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved
the act.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 909 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). An identical
section is found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C (1958). Yet even
the drafters of these sections were unenthusiastic about the rule. In a "Note to Institute" following section 909, the reporter of the Restatement of Torts indicated
that "some of the Torts group, on sober second thought, were in doubt whether
the position taken was the right one .. ." and that the Torts Advisers voted
9 to 2 to strike the section. The section was retained, however, because of the reference to section 909 in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C, Comment a
(1958). Apparently neither the tort law nor the agency law scholars wished to take
credit for the rule.
210. Morris, 21 Omo ST. L.I. 216, supra note 16, at 221.
211. Id. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d
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involvement by a superior officer because "the imposition of punitive
damages serves as a deterrent to the employment of unfit persons

in important positions.12

2

The rationale of courts following this

narrow rule of responsibility is the supposed inequity of punishing
a blameless corporation and its shareholders 213 whose interests are

in fact often undermined by malicious acts of low-level employees.
Another group of courts has adopted the so-called vicarious

liability rule, 214 which holds a corporation liable for punitive damages
for the wanton misconduct of all employees acting within the general
scope of their employment. Supporters of this rule, which appears
to represent the majority position in this country, 215 assume that strict
enterprise liability for wanton misbehavior of low-level employees
will encourage care in the selection and supervision of such personnel. 210 The continuing debate 21 7 between supporters of the com-

damages is beginning
plicity and vicarious liability rules of punitive
2 18
litigation.
liability
products
into
to spill over
Cir. 1967). Some courts have permitted ratification to be established by a showing
that the corporation retained the employee after discovery of his misdeed. See Morris, 44 HAPv. L. Rnv. 1173, supra note 16, at 1203-04. But apparently this is no
longer accepted practice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C, comment
b (1958). See Sullivan v. Matt, 130 Cal. App. 2d 134, 278 P.2d 499 (1955).
212. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRis § 909, comment a at 86 (Tent. Draft
No. 19, 1973). It is interesting to note that this is the same justification used to
support the broader vicarious liability rule. See note 216 infra and accompanying
text.
213. See W. PRossER, supra note 31, at 12; Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra
note 16, at 1166-67; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1306-07.
214. See Morris, 21 Onto ST. L.J. 216, supra note 16, at 220.
215. It has been called the "better rule." 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 209, §
4906, at 371.
216. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 284-85; W. PRossER, supra note 31,
at 12. The classic expression of this reasoning was set forth in Goddard v. Grand
Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202, 224 (1869):
[U]nder cover of [the corporate] name and authority, there is in fact as much
wickedness, and as much that is deserving of punishment, as can be found anywhere else. And since these ideal existences can neither be hung, imprisoned,
whipped, or put in the stocks . . . the doctrine of exemplary damages is more
beneficial in its application to them, than in its application to natural persons.
.. . There is but one vulnerable point about . . . corporations; and that is,
the pocket of the monied power that is concealed behind them; and if that is
reached they will wince. When it is thoroughly understood that it is not profitable to employ careless and indifferent agents, or reckless and insolent servants,
better men will take their places, and not before.
Two other considerations support the broad rule. First, "the practical difficulty of
proving employer authorization necessitates a presumption conclusive of such conduct." Note, 70 YALE IJ. 1296, supra note 16, at 1301. See C. McCoRmCK, supra
note 16, at 285. Second, "the rule of unrestricted corporate liability has the great
merit of workable simplicity." Id. But see Note, 70 YALE L.I. 1296, supra note 16,
at 1301-04.
217. See authorities cited in note 205 supra.
218. Compare Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir.
1967) ("[A] sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life
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The law of corporate criminal responsibility raises many of the
same questions concerning the fairness and utility of punishing shareholders that are raised in the debate over the appropriate limits of
corporate punitive damages liability. 219 The criminal law generally
imposes vicarious criminal liability upon a corporation only for
220
limited acts of gross misconduct by high managerial personnel.
This limitation on enterprise responsibility closely parallels the complicity rule of punitive damages law. 221 In some instances, however,

particularly in cases involving certain regulatory and public welfare
offenses detrimental to the public health, vicarious criminal liability
is imposed on the corporation without regard to the offending employee's managerial rank.222 An understanding of the reasons for
imposing criminal fines upon corporations, penalties ultimately borne
by shareholders, should help determine whether the complicity or
vicarious liability rule of punitive damages should be applied in prod-

ucts liability litigation.
The principal justification for imposing criminal liability upon a
corporation is, simply, its deterrent effect. 22 1 Corporations are just
of a concern that has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have
continued to do so in the future, with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single management sin"), with Pease v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427 (1974) ("No sufficient
reason appears why shareholders should be seen as captive innocent hostages to the
inhuman management of a corporate juggernaut").
219. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217C, D (1958) (corporate punitive and criminal liabilities respectively). On the general topic of corporate criminal responsibility, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 146-55 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955); Edgerton, supra note 114; Hamilton, supra note 163; Mueller, Mens Rea and
the Corporation,19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21 (1957).
220. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); REsTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 D, comment d (1958).
221. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, at 151 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); REsrATnMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 D, comment d (1958).
222. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07, at 147 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 217 D, comment b (1958).
223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, at 148 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Hamilton,
supra note 163, at 69. See also A. GoODHART, supra note 121, at 86 ("Fear of
criminal prosecution significantly improves the general level of compliance with regulatory statutes, and particularly where acquisitive acts . . . are involved, the criminal
sanction may be absolutely essential if the system is not to break down"). The
deterrent effect is derived primarily from the prospect of a depletion in corporate
assets that would result from the imposition of a criminal fine or a punitive damages
judgment. Deterrence is also achieved in other ways. An adjudication of criminal
guilt or wanton misbehavior against the corporation may indicate mismanagement
and accordingly may lead either to a proxy fight or to a stockholder's derivative
suit against the responsible persons in their individual capacity. Although the risk
of either is slight, the mere possibility of either should serve as an added incentive
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as capable as individuals of engaging in conduct intolerably detrimental to the public welfare, and their aggregation of resources

magnifies their potential for inflicting harm. For example, the sale
of food and drugs involves a significant risk of causing serious injury

to many persons if those products are impure. Thus, the criminal
law requires in these situations that the shareholders be punished to
achieve the greater good of protecting the public health and welfare.2 24
Consumers necessarily rely on the ability and willingness of enterprises to market only safe foods and drugs, and the threat of criminal

penalties for failures that pose a substantial risk of public harm will
arguably encourage greater care in the operation of such enterprises. 22 r
Since many product manufacturers have a degree of control over
the well-being of the consuming public equivalent to that of food
and drug producers, the prevention of needless injury necessitates

the use in all products liability litigation of sanctions similar in effect
to those used in food and drug cases. Food and drugs are not the

only products whose purity is of fundamental concern to society, for
thousands of other products must also be consumed on a daily basis.

It thus seems as important to deter the marketing of insufficiently
fire-retardant clothes and "uncrashworthy" automobiles as it is to
hinder the marketing of impure food and drugs. If a broad rule of

corporate punitive damages liability can indeed avert significant

numbers of product accidents, 2

6

perhaps some blameless share-

holders should occasionally have to shoulder the burden of penalties
resulting from the flagrant misconduct of their corporation's
employees.
to management to avoid questionable conduct. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at
73-75.
224. One commentator has argued that
[tIhe only serious harm which [corporate responsibility] can do, consists in
the injury to those really innocent stockholders who have nothing to do with
the crime and no real opportunity of preventing it. This injury is regrettable;
but . . . the balance of advantage seems to require subordinating their interest
to the general interest. However "innocent" the owners of the corporate enterprise may be, the general interest requires that . . . corporate representatives
be deterred, so far as corporate responsibility can deter them, from conducting
the business in criminal ways.
Edgerton, supra note 114, at 836-37. See Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra note
16, at 116. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLTrM. L. REV. 55
(1933).
225. See note 175 supra; cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Similarly, the general compensatory damage rule of vicarious liability of employers for
the misconduct of their employees arose at an early date because of the confidence
consumers necessarily repose in their suppliers. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAw 16 (1881). See generally 10 W. FLETCHER, supra note 209, § 4906, at 371
(vicarious liability rule for punitive damages is "the only rule compatible with public
policy and safety").
226. See notes 129-51 supra and accompanying text.
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Yet shareholder liability may be justified on grounds other than
stark social necessity. It is, of course, the supposed innocence of
the shareholders that makes the punishment of a corporation seem
unjust.227 But this concept of shareholder innocence needs to be
examined.

Certainly the shareholders of a publicly held corporation

are rarely blameworthy in a moral sense for the misconduct of its
employees. Punitive damages are consistent with this view, for they
do not assign blame to shareholders personally, but, as a practical
matter, merely deplete the corporate treasury. This distinction is
important, for in most cases the decisions of employees to market
defective products in flagrant disregard of excessive dangers spring

from the intensity of the profit motive rather than from animus
toward consumers. 228 To the extent that such products are excessively dangerous, however, the profits resulting from their sale are
in a very real sense "excessive profits."
Thus, the recovery of these excessive profits through punitive
damages awards can be viewed as the recoupment of an unjust

enrichment of the corporation and its shareholders rather than as the
punishment of either the corporation or its shareholders. 220 Punitive damages admittedly are an imprecise mechanism for achieving
227. Of course to the extent that punitive damages are compensatory rather than
punitive, holding the corporation strictly responsible for them under the vicarious
liability rule should be acceptable according to traditional notions of respondeat superior and enterprise responsibility. See Edgerton, supra note 114, at 836-37; Lambert, supra note 16, at 179.
228. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955):
inhere are probably cases in which the economic pressures
the corporate body are sufficiently potent to tempt individuals to hazardwithin
personal liability
for the sake of company gain, especially where the penalties threatened are moderate and where the offense does not involve behavior condemned as highly immoral by the individual's associates. This tendency may be particularly strong
where the individual knows that his guilt may be difficult to prove ....
iThe violation may have been produced by pressures on the subordinates
created by corporate managerial officials even though the latter may not have
intended or desired the criminal behavior and even though the pressures can
only be sensed rather than demonstrated.
See also Andenaes, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949, supra note" 130, at 959-60. Even some
commentators who oppose responsibility for punitive damages upon corporations for
malicious conduct of low-level employees concede that it may be justified in cases
in which the misbehavior was pursued in furtherance of corporate objectives. See
Morris, 21 OHIO Sr. L.J 216, supra note 16, at 218-19 ("Their superiors might
secretly applaud their misplaced zeal-if it cost the corporation nothing this time and
might protect its special interests in the future"); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra
note 16, at 1301 & n.7, 1307-08 n.60, 1310.
229. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75. One drawback in relying upon criminal fines to
accomplish this recoupment is that the economic benefit to the corporation from the
law violation in many cases will exceed the maximum fine prescribed by statute.
See id. Punitive damages assessments, however, have a flexibility peculiarly suited
for effectively achieving a complete recoupment of all "excess" profits.

June 19761

Punitive Damages

1305

this objective, and shareholders will in fact be penalized when punitive damages awards exceed excessive profits.2 8 Yet this penalty

may be viewed as a fair assessment against both the manufacturing entity for its willingness to gamble recklessly with the public
safety23 1 and the shareholders for whose benefit the marketing deci-

sion was made.
The weakening of -the blameless shareholder argument under-

mines the reasons for adhering to the restrictive complicity rule.
Moreover, application of the complicity rule in products liability cases
would largely impede the objectives of punitive damages. Only the
most extreme forms of manufacturer misconduct would ever be
punished under the complicity rule, 32 and then only when the manu-

facturer was imprudent enough to create, preserve and relinquish evidence of participation by its upper-level management in some improper
conduct. 233 Documentary evidence of flagrant misconduct by managerial employees rarely exists and, when it does, it may never be
located by even the most diligent discovery and investigative procedures. Thus, while upper-level management is probably frequently
aware, if sometimes only intuitively, of seriously improper safety

decisions made lower down the corporate ladder, the complicity rule
230. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75; cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
231. See Hamilton, supra note 163, at 75. Indeed, punishment over and above
recoupment must, in each case, be proportionate to the probability that the violation may go undetected, so that a manufacturer will not view the "fine" as a "license
fee for the conduct of an illegitimate business." See notes 158-71 supra and accompanying text.
232. See Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 803, 22 S. 53, 58
(1897) ("If corporations-artificial beings who can act only through agents and
servants . . .- can never be held liable in punitive damages for the acts of their servants unless expressly authorized by them, no matter how gross and outrageous the
wrongful act of the servant, we feel perfectly safe in declaring that no recovery for
more than mere compensatory damages will ever again be awarded against corporations"). Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842-50 (2d Cir. 1967),
is clear proof that the complicity rule permits manufacturers guilty of the most
egregious forms of anti-social conduct to escape liability for punitive damages. See
text at notes 336-51 infra.
233. In one instance, an incriminating test report "was concealed from plaintiffs
and the FAA until after plaintiffs discovered the nature of this report from reading
other reports and specifically demanded its production." Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4, Engebreth v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., Civ. No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971). See text at notes 42431 infra. In another case, Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591,
131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976), discussed in text at notes 403-06 infra, counsel for
the plaintiff reported that the defendants admitted under oath "that between 25
and 50 rolls of test film (each 50 feet in length) had been destroyed prior to
the taking of their testimony." Letter from Daniel E. Wilcoxen to David G.
Owen, July 16, 1975).
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as a practical matter will often shield even the most culpable manufacturers from liability for punitive damages.23 4
.,.Most product safety decisions are made by middle- and lowermiddle management. 3 ' For example, engineers and scientists make
frequent decisions on the design, composition and testing of
their products, including the ascertaining of acceptable levels of
product impurity or "defectiveness. '2 6 These employees, or their
supervisors, also decide how much time they should devote to staying
abreast of recent developments in their fields. Similarly, production managers make crucial decisions on assembly-line procedures,
and quality control personnel decide both how many "bad" products
should be allowed to slip through to consumers and the degree of
defectiveness required before such products are screened out.
Marketing managers make decisions, first, on how informed they
should become on dangers associated with their products and,
second, on how much of this information should be passed along to
consumers. Sales personnel decide how much information on
product failures should be solicited from customers and how much
should be passed back to the engineering, production, and marketing departments. Finally, the engineering, production, and marketing personnel receiving such information on failures in the field must
decide whether and what remedial action may be necessary.
All of these decisions are largely made by middle management.
Upper-level management can inject itself however much it wishes
into this process of product safety decision-making. If high-level
management learns that one sure way to avoid punitive damages
judgments is to remain ignorant of product safety problems, the
message will clearly go down at many organizations that product
safety is to be the exclusive concern of middle management. Application of the complicity rule in products liability litigation thus would
encourage the creation of an information gap between middle and
upper management.
However, a perceptive court or jury in a complicity rule jurisdiction might find that the conduct of corporate officers in shielding
themselves in this manner from important product safety problems
234. Members of upper management are in fact implicated on rare occasions.
See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1975) (president); Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) (Director of the company's Biological Science Division).
235. See generally I. GRAY, PRODUCT LIABILITY-A MANAGEMENT RESPONSE ch.
6 (1975); G. PETERS, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY 57-98 (1971).

236. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50, at 430-33 n.11,
447. "Since all products are flawed at some technological level, the decision must
still be made as to when a flaw emerges as a defect." Id. at 430-31.
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amounts to a flagrant disregard of the public safety. Alternatively,
upper management's creation or even toleration of such an information gap might be construed as blanket authorization or even ratification of all product safety decisions made below, so that the reckless

safety decisions of middle management could be imputed to the
manufacturer in any event.2

7

Such twisting of legal concepts should

be avoided, however, since a more direct solution is available.
Probably the best solution is to reject the complicity rule of punitive damages in products liability litigation altogether and to adopt
instead the broader rule of vicarious liability.2 38 Since manufacturers would then be responsible for the reckless activities of employees

at all levels, the deterrent effect of potential punitive damages
awards would be considerably increased.

Upper-level management

of well-counselled enterprises could then be expected to respond by
participating in major product safety decisions at all stages of the
manufacturing and marketing process. As ultimate responsibility for
important safety decisions is thereby shifted to upper management,
many manufacturers would probably adopt improved procedures for
gathering, transmitting, and using product safety information. Eventually, safety would become routinely considered in decisions concerning profit maximization and thus become institutionalized within the
manufacturing enterprise.

While competing goals of particular enterprises will undoubtedly
impede this development in some cases, the vicarious liability rule
of punitive damages should substantially promote the broad objec-

tives of punitive damages in the products liability context.

The

complicity rule, on the other hand, serves this purpose inadequately.
237. This could be achieved procedurally by shifting the burden of proof on the
issue of authorization or ratification to the manufacturer, see Note, 70 YALE L.J.
1296, supra note 16, at 1301 n.37, or even by creating an irrebuttable presumption
of corporate approval, cf. id. at 1301, 1307-08 n.60. See generally Cohen, Book
Review, 62 VA. L. Rv. 259, 262 (1976).
238. It might be desirable to modify the usual "scope of employment" test of
the vicarious liability rule to a somewhat narrower "scope of employment in behalf
of the corporation" test.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comment at 147 (Tent.

Draft No. 4, 1955). See also Western Coach Corp. v. Vaughn, 9 Ariz. App. 336,
338, 452 P.2d 117, 120 (1969) ("in furtherance of the employer's business and acting
within the scope of employment"). Thus narrowed, the vicarious liability rule would,
for example, hold a manufacturer responsible for harm resulting from fabricated test
results submitted to the FDA by a company scientist but would shield an enterprise
from punitive damages arising out of the insertion of a razor blade into a bar of
soap by a psycopathic assembly line employee. The line is easily and logically drawn
at this point since management could take reasonable steps to prevent the misconduct
in the first case but probably could do very little to prevent the truly malicious form
of misbehavior in the second.
An employee's failure to act appropriately upon receipt of apparently important
information concerning a product danger presents other problems. See note 495 inIra.

1308

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1257

That blameless shareholders will be punished in some cases is unfortunate, but it is a price that must be paid in the pursuit of optimal
product safety.
B.

Liability Insurance for PunitiveDamages

Just as the complicity rule frustrates the achievement of punishment and deterrence, so also do rules -thatpermit manufacturers to
insure against the risk of punitive damages liability. It is axiomatic
that these objectives can be attained only in so far as the wrongdoers are in fact punished.

To the extent that wrongdoers can use

indemnification agreements to shift punishment to third parties, both
the retributive and deterrent effects of the punishment will be shifted
away as well. Thus, if manufacturers are permitted to insure against
punitive damages awards, such verdicts will only minimally achieve
their objectives.

The adverse effect of liability insurance on the deterrent function
of tort law in general is well established.2" Several years ago, a
study by Professor William Whitford indicated that insurance may
impede deterrence in the products liability context.2 4 He found
that some manufacturers relied heavily upon their insurance to protect themselves from liability for compensatory damages resulting
from inadequate safety decision-making 241 and concluded that be-

cause of this, "products liability litigation usually has little direct
impact on product design or warning decisions. '242 Similarly, one
insurance expert asserted that at least some manufacturers regard
liability insurance as a cost-saving substitute for product safety
243
programs.
239. In one commentator's view,
The deterrent function of the law of torts was severely, perhaps fatally, undermined by the advent of liability insurance. . . . The basic assumption of the
penal theory had always been that the financial impact of an adverse verdict
would serve to warn the tort-feasor and others against the consequences of substandard conduct. But it could have such an educative effect only so long
as he would feel that deterrent lash. Liability insurance cushioned him against
its impact in advance, and thus removed the primary incentive toward the observance of care ....
Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modern Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815, 82324 (1967). See generally James, supra note 177.
240. The research, conducted for the National Commission on Product Safety,
revealed that insurers for a number of manufacturers handled all products liability
claims. "In some instances, the manufacturers apparently do not even inform themselves of the final resolution of the claims, and for these manufacturers it is obvious
that a court decision will have no direct effect on product design or warning decisions."

NCPS SUPPLEMENT STUDIES, supra note 176, at 228.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 264.
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A recent Department of Commerce study, however, casts
44
considerable doubt on the continuing validity of these conclusions.

Noting the dramatic increases in recent years in products liability
claims,2 45 the average loss per claim, 246 insurance premiums, 47 and
policy cancellations, 248 the study reveals a crisis in the field of products liability insurance that is "extensive and. . . increasing in scope
and severity at a rapid rate"2 49 as manufacturers find it more difficult to obtain adequate and affordable coverage. The study even

offers the distressing conjecture that "[piroblems associated with
product liability are potentially more formidable than in medical
malpractice insurance."

50

The contemporary deterrent impact of compensatory and punitive damages awards in products liability litigation must be evaluated
in light of the specific findings of the Commerce Department study.

First, and perhaps most importantly, researchers found that many
manufacturers are attempting to cope with the insurance problem by
adopting such "risk control techniques" as improving both the design
of their products and their quality control procedures. 251 Second,

products liability insurance generally is written on a retrospective or
"loss-rated" basis in which premiums are calculated primarily on the
manufacturer's past loss experience.2 52 Deductible provisions are
more frequently being required by insurers, and the amount of such
deductibles is increasing.2 58 Moreover, insurance companies are
244. See DOC, PROD. LIAB. INS. STUDY, supra note 176.
245. Id. at 8.
246. Id. (from $11,644 in 1965 to $79,940 in 1973-an increase of 686%'0 in
eight years versus a 60% increase in the general price index).
247. Id. at 9, 10, 15, 50, 53, 55, 68, 72. "Increases reported [to the Small Business Administration] in 1975 ranged from 100 percent to over 800 percent ...
Cumulative increases over the past 7 years have been reported to be in excess of
5,000 percent." Id. at 72. The liability insurance premium of one mechanical power
press manufacturer, for example, is reported to have risen from $3000 in 1968 to
$168,000 in 1975. Id. at 53.
248. Id. at 10, 47, 68.
249. Id. at ii.
250. Id. at 13.
251. Id. at 9, 11, 35-36, 56. "Many types of risk management approaches are
being used by companies to deal with product liability. They include both risk control and risk finance techniques. Risk control involves risk avoidance (e.g., product
redesign), loss prevention (e.g., quality control), and loss reduction (e.g., product
recall)." Id. at 9.
252. Id. at 32-33. To the extent that a manufacturer's insurance rates are based
upon its prior products liability loss experience, it should indeed feel the punch of
a damages verdict over time. See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 176,
at 261. See generally Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight,70 YALE L.J. 554, 560-74 (1961).
253. DOC, PROD. LIAB. INS. STUDY, supra note 176, at 37, 47, 55, 73-74.
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increasingly cancelling the coverage of manufacturers with poor
records.2 54 The study reports that some companies are even operating with no products liability insurance at all, because of the high
cost or because insurers have refused to underwrite either the particular company or the industry as a whole.2 5 And some manufac26
turers are simply giving up, by dropping lines of high risk products
257
In
or, in some instances, by going out of business altogether.
combination, these developments compel the conclusion that products liability litigation is increasingly forcing manufacturers to improve product safety even when they are insured against claims for
product injuries.2 5 8
Yet products liability insurance does to some extent diminish the
retributive and deterrent effects of damages judgments. This disincentive to improve product safety is generally a necessary sacrifice
that assures compensation for victims of product accidents and permits manufacturers guilty only of inadvertant errors to protect themselves against unpredictable future losses. It is an entirely different
matter, however, when a manufacturer guilty of an aggravated act
of misconduct has insured against a punitive damages award. The
accident victim, it may be assumed, has already received substantial
compensation for his injuries,2 5 9 and so the principal question that
remains is whether public policy should prevent an insured from
obtaining indemnity in such cases.
Faced with this question, usually in cases involving reckless driving,26 0 courts in recent years have split into two opposing camps.
One line of cases follows Judge Wisdom's 1962 Fifth Circuit decision
254. Id. at 36, 47, 55, 68. See also NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, supra note
176, at 261, 263.
255. DOC, PROD. LIAB. INS. STUDY, supra note 176, at 15, 36, 46-47, 55, 68, 72,
81-85.
256. Id. at 56.
257. Id. at 84 (Havir Manufacturing Company in St. Paul, Minnesota). See
Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
258. An additional factor that diminishes the manufacturer's ability to shield
itself from liability is a standard provision in the insurance contract itself "which
requires a corporation, after it becomes aware of its defective product, to take steps
to correct it or recall it. If the company (insured) doesn't take such reasonable
steps, the insurance carrier may deny liability on subsequent claims." T. KEA INO,
in COMPANY PROGRAMS To REDUCE PRODUCTS LIABILITY HAzARDS: A T"ANSCUPT OF
A MAPI SEMINAR 103 (June 15-16, 1972).
259. See note 265 infra.
260. For a collection of the cases, see Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968). See
generally Gonsoulin, Is an Award of Punitive Damages Covered Under an Automobile or Comprehensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968); Lambert, supra
note 16, at 180-86, 194 n.72; Long, Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages,
32 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1965); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive Damages,
14 Mo. L. Rav. 175 (1949).
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in NorthwesternNational Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 261 which held that
automobile liability insurance provisions covering punitive damages
awards 2

2

contravene public policy and thus should not be en-

forced.20 3

The McNulty court's reasoning was cogent: "Where a

person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains a free-

dom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanctions
against such misconduct."20 4 Certainly a jury returning a punitive
damages verdict against a defendant for an aggravated act of misconduct will usually contemplate that the bite of the verdict will be felt
by the wrongdoer, not by some unknown insurance company that

may in turn increase its rates and thereby pass the punishment along
to consumers.

Thus, McNulty and its progeny stress the negative

impact of insurance on the punitive and deterrent purposes of punitive damages awards and accordingly minimize their compensatory
role.

20 5

A contrary line of cases, led by the 1964 Tennessee decision in
emphasizes

Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 206

261. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
262. If the insurance policy does not expressly or impliedly cover punitive damages losses, the public policy issue of course need not be addressed. See, e.g., D.
DOBBS, supra note 16, at 216. If the manufacturer's conduct manifests a wilfully
unlawful exposure of consumers to a known defect, there may even be an express
exclusion in the insurance contract for compensatory as well as punitive damages.
See NCPS SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 176, at 260 ("The products liability
policy covers only occurrences which are neither 'expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured'"); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1296, supra note 16, at 1309 n.66.
See note 258 supra.
263. 307 F.2d at 434.
264. The court further reasoned as follows: "It is not disputed that insurance
against criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent." 307 F.2d at 440.
265. See, e.g., Smith v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 211 Kan. 397, 405, 507
P.2d 189, 196 (1973):
Where exemplary damages are awarded for purposes of punishment and deterrence, as is true in this state, public policy should require that payment rest
ultimately as well as nominally on the party who committed the wrong; otherwise they would often serve no useful purpose. The objective to be obtained
in imposing punitive damages is to make the culprit feel the pecuniary punch,
not his guiltless guarantor. Compensatory damages, we might add, would not
be affected by such a policy. They stand to be paid as any actual damages
are cared for.
id. See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967).
In McNulty, Judge Wisdom noted the paradox of allowing a defendant to pass the
punishment to his insurance carrier who then, in the form of higher premiums, passes
it to the public: "Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed
by the insured." 307 F.2d at 441. Professor Morris once made the colorful suggestion that contracts insuring against punitive damages "could be declared illegal and
put in the same category as assistance in a jail break." Morris, 24 ILL. L. REV.
730, supra note 16, at 560-74.
266. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
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instead an insurer's usual contractual obligation to compensate the
insured for "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages."20 7 These cases stress the inequity of allowing an insurer to reap a windfall by denying coverage it has not
expressly excluded from the contract at the expense of the insured
who expects to be protected against all liability. The courts following Lazenby thus seek to protect a presumed contractual right, but
they have never addressed the anomaly of allowing a defendant to
insure against the risk of judicial punishment. 08
In the cases following Lazenby, only the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Donaldson of the Idaho supreme court in Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance
Co.2 69 has attempted to analyze the functional impact of punitive
damages insurance. Justice Donaldson recognized the logical difficulty of reconciling the objectives of punishment and deterrence with
a rule permitting a defendant to insure against punitive damages.
Nevertheless, he reasoned that insurance coverage of punitive damages verdicts should not be considered repugnant to public policy
because it promotes law enforcement by encouraging plaintiffs to sue
defendants guilty of particularly antisocial conduct.2 70 This analysis,
however, fails to recognize that private enforcement of the law is
desirable principally because of its punitive and deterrent impact on
serious misbehavior. Thus encouragement of litigation is not itself
a primary goal but rather a means of achieving these more fundamental goals. 171 From this perspective, 'the logical inconsistency of
Justice Donaldson's argument is readily apparent: A rule allowing
insurance coverage for punitive damages is adopted'in part because
it promotes the sub-goal of encouraging litigation of wantonly
inflicted injury; litigation of these claims is desired to advance the
primary goals of punishment and deterrence; yet punishment and
267. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Thornton, 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) (en bane); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile
Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
268. See notes 264, 265 supra.
269. 95 Idaho 501, 509, 511 P.2d 783, 791 (1973) (special concurring opinion
of Donaldson, CJ.).
270. 95 Idaho at 509, 511 P.2d at 791.
271. It is also a means of achieving the additional goal of compensation. See
notes 112 & 152 supra. Justice Donaldson himself recognized deterrence as "the
predominant public policy purpose" supporting the punitive damages doctrine. See
95 Idaho at 509, 511 P.2d at 731,
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deterrence are themselves largely defeated by application of the
rule.

The punitive damages objectives of punishment and deterrence
should clearly be permitted to prevail over the wrongdoer's expecta-

tion of contractual protection against liability for acts of aggravated
misconduct. 27 1 This is especially true in the products liability field

for several reasons. First, a rule prohibiting insurance coverage of
punitive damages is more likely to deter the potential misconduct
of manufacturers attempting to maximize profits than that of drivers

whose capabilities are impaired by intoxicants.27 s Second, a business enterprise that wantonly endangers hundreds or thousands of
consumers will usually be beyond the reach of the criminal law,

whereas an intoxicated driver who causes an accident faces a substantial risk of criminal punishment.17 4 Finally, the expectations of
the manufacturer who knowingly markets a defective product are
probably less deserving of protection than the expectations of the

intoxicated driver. Probably few drivers purchase liability insurance
deliberately so that they can drive around in an intoxicated condition

free of financial risk. Yet manufacturers probably quite often view
insurance as a means of avoiding the burdens of legal safety obliga27
tionsY.
Thus, at least in the context of products liability litigation,
insurance coverage for punitive damages assessments should be pro276
hibited as contrary to public policy.

272. See W. PRossER, supra note 31, at 13; Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, supra
note 16, at 527; Note, supra note 203, at 1049.
273. Cf. Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir.
1962) (special concurring opinion of Gewin, J.).
274. Cf. 307 F.2d at 444; Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz.
485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524 (1972) (en banc).
275. See note 243 supra and accompanying text. There is one final reason for
prohibiting manufacturers from insuring against punitive damages. Such a policy
would help to moderate the liability insurance cost spiral that is increasingly plaguing
manufacturers. See notes 244-58 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, the Department of Commerce study concluded that one of the causes of the current insurance
crisis is "[i]ncreasing awards for . . . punitive damages ....
"
DOC, PROD. LIAR.
INS. STUoY, supra note 176, at 14.
276. The McNulty rule prohibiting the insurance coverage of punitive damages
is generally said to except situations in which punitive damages are imposed vicariously upon a defendant. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404
F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968); Schwab v. First Appalachian Ins. Co., 58 F.R.D. 615
(S.D. Fla. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 S.2d 545, 549 (Fla. Ct. App.
1972); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 II. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
There are only a few decisions on point, however, and the commentators have generally accepted the proposition uncritically. See, e.g., D. DoBBs, supra note 16, at
216; W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 13; Gonsoulin, supra note 260, at 4346-37; Long,
Insurance Protection Against Punitive Damages, 32 TENN. L. RaV. 573, 577 (1965).
The courts that developed the exception borrowed the reasoning of the punitive damages cases espousing the narrow "complicity" rule. See, e.g., Northwestern NatI. Cas.
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Measurementand Control of Punitive
Damages Assessments

The third major complication in the use of punitive damages in
products liability litigation is in its administration. There are considerable difficulties in measuring and controlling punitive damages
awards in all tort cases, but products liability litigation adds a particularly high risk that excessive verdicts will be levied against defendant
manufacturers. A jury in one recent products liability case, for
example, rendered a punitive damages assessment against the manufacturer of $17,250,000.277 Multiple lawsuits compound the problem. For example, more than five hundred separate actions, seekping punitive damages totaling more than $200 million, have been
filed against A. H. Robins Company for its marketing of the Dalkon
Shield.2 78 When the stakes are this high, tools for measuring and
controlling such awards must be chosen and refined with great care.
1. Measurement
Punitive damages have been repeatedly attacked over the years
on the ground that the standards used to measure them are excesCo. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 n.16 (5th Cir. 1962), relying in part upon Lake
Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). Just as the complicity
rule was seen to subvert the objectives of punitive damages in the general context
of enterprise responsibility, see text at notes 205-38 supra, so does the application
of its reasoning to the issue of insurance coverage of punitive damages do violence
to the goals of punishment and deterrence. Courts would do well, therefore, to prohibit insurance coverage of punitive damages in products liability litigation regardless
of the vicarious nature of the liability.
Nevertheless, even if courts should refuse to invalidate punitive damages insurance contracts in product liability cases, punitive damages should still be imposed.
While insurance will reduce the punitive and deterrent effects of punitive damages,
these goals will still be realized to some degree. See text at notes 251-58 supra.
First, the insured manufacturer will eventually feel the effects of a punitive damages
verdict to the extent that loss experience is reflected in future insurance rates. See
note 252 supra. Secondly, a manufacturer publicly punished for marketing an excessively dangerous product will suffer a loss of reputation in excess of the amount
normally resulting from a plaintiff's verdict in a products liability suit. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the publicity given to a punitive damages verdict will alert
the legal community to the clear defectiveness of the particular product and to a
fertile source of information on both the product's defectiveness and the manufacturer's reckless conduct. "More actions will then be brought and tried against the
manufacturer, whose total punishment will be multiplied by the number of resulting settlements and plaintiffs' verdicts.
277. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 2d 450, 133 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974).
278. Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1976, at 6, col. 2 (midwest ed.); see notes 395-96 inIra
and accompanying text. Punitive damages claims totaling "hundreds of millions"
of dollars were similarly made against the defendant in the MER/29 litigation.
Rheingold, supranote 127, at 135; see text at notes 336-51 infra.
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sively vague. 279 The trier of fact is generally instructed to determine
a proper amount for such damages upon a consideration of "the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to
the plaintiff which the defendant caused or intended to cause, and
the wealth of the defendant. 2 820 These standards are indeed general and vague, but the trier of fact is also informed of the principal
purposes for which punitive damages are assessed-to punish the
offender and to deter him and others from similarly misbehaving in
-the future. While this knowledge of the objectives of punitive damages does little to assure certainty of measurement, it does at least
give some direction and purpose to the deliberations of the factfinder. Yet direction and purpose are not enough; with -the potential liability as high as it is, further guidelines must be developed
to improve the accuracy of measurement and to check the potential

for abuse.
A means of improving the accuracy and fairness of punitive
damages awards is to consider the relevance of the goals of punishment, deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation to the facts
of any particular case. The difficulty of determining the appropriate
amount for such awards springs largely from the difficulty of determining a proper sum to achieve optimally each of these varied objectives. Thus, a consideration of the punitive damages functions in
the products liability context can aid in the measurement of fair and
accurate punitive damages awards.
Our analysis begins in inverted fashion with a consideration of
the goal of compensation. This approach is inverted because the
compensation function has traditionally been viewed as the tag-along
little brother of the "primary" functions of punishment and deterrence. 2 '- However, as discussed earlier,2 82 compensation should be
considered a central goal. Once it has been established that a defendant's misconduct was sufficiently flagrant to warrant punitive
damages liability, the plaintiff should at the very least be reimbursed
for his costs of litigation. This then should generally represent the
minimum award.28 3 In many cases involving serious injury, a punitive damages award equal to the plaintiff's compensatory damages
279. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 16, at 296; Morris, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173,
supra note 16, at 1189.
280. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
281. Cf. Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra note 16, at 1162-63. But cf. notes
112, 152 supra.
282. See text at notes 185-202 supra.
283. See Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 710, 496 P.2d 939, 947 (1972);
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 691-92, 496 P.2d 682, 690-91 (1972).
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would at least roughly cover the depletion of the plaintiff's judgment
from litigation expenses and other noncompensable losses. The
starting point for the measurement process then, without regard to

the other functions, should be to make the plaintiff truly whole.218
The accurate measurement of punitive damages can also be

promoted by examining the effects of awards of particular amounts
on the related goals of deterrence and law enforcement. Thus, if
the plaintiff's injuries are relatively mild, he should be awarded a

sufficient sum in addition to litigation expenses to encourage him to
sue. 285

Moreover, as the magnitude of the hazard to the public

increases, so too does the need to deter such behavior and therefore
the need to increase the penalty.288 In addition, and more importantly in most products liability cases, punitive damages should be

used to attack directly the profit incentive that generated the marketing misconduct.

The award should not only extract the profit real-

ized from the particular sale in question, but also the profits from all
other sales of the product in its dangerous condition. Further, the
manufacturer's probability of avoiding liability altogether should be
factored in as well. Thus, the profits from the misconduct should be
multiplied several times to optimize the deterrent effect.

Of course any specific evidence bearing on whether the particular
defendant or other manufacturers might repeat the misbehavior should

be carefully considered.

If, for example, the defendant can demon-

strate that it voluntarily terminated the misbehavior, especially if the

termination occurred prior to the litigation, the need for specific
deterrence would be correspondingly diminished.28 7 Measures such

as disciplining or discharging employees responsible for the miscon284. See text at notes 185-203 supra.
285. See also text at notes 154-57 & note 158 supra.
286. See note 150 supra and accompanying text. The primary consideration will
be the magnitude of the risk, and to a lesser extent the amount of harm, to which
the public at large was exposed by the behavior, rather than the extent of harm
to the particular plaintiff. See notes 291, 530 infra and accompanying text. But
see Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 264 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856-57 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
In Hoffman, the plaintiff sought to argue to the jury that the amount of punitive
damages assessed against the defendant should reflect the defendant's wrong to the
public at large. 374 F. Supp. at 856. The court disagreed: "Applying the plaintiff's
rationale, each injured consumer of Aralen, using identical evidence regarding testing,
notice, etc., could individually recover on behalf of society to punish the affront.
Such a result would be ludicrous. Instead, we view the law to be that each Aralen
consumer showing a bona fide injury may, if the evidence warrants, collect his reasonable proportion of the punitive damages the defendant owes 'society.'" 374 F.
Supp. at 856.
287. This is particularly true if the voluntary termination was accomplished by
new management immediately after discovery of the misconduct. See, e.g., Drayton
v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081, 1098 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
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duct 2 8s and substantially improving the relevant operating procedures
might also demonstrate a reformed attitude that would similarly
reduce the need for specific deterrence. Recalcitrance and coverup by the manufacturer, on the other hand, either prior to or during
the litigation,28 9 would indicate an excessive concern with profits and
reputation"' at the expense of the public safety. In, the latter case,
the deterrent and law enforcement functions of punitive damages

require that assessments be tailored to teach the lesson soundly that
knowingly or recklessly marketing defective products will not pay.
The punishment function is the final factor to be considered in
developing a standard for the measurement of punitive damages.
The defendant manufacturer's attitude toward consumer safety is again

important but in this context what is crucial is its scienter at the time of
the misconduct.

A manufacturer's punishment should correspond to

its degree of awareness both of the presence of an excessive risk
in its product and of the seriousness of the risk of injury presented.

Thus, the more certain the manufacturer that its product was excessively hazardous, and the more dangerous the particular hazard of
which it was aware,2 91 the more serious its misconduct and the more
severe should be its punishment. Also bearing on the seriousness
of the offense and hence on the amount of punishment needed are

the number and level of employees whose action or conscious

29 2
inaction contributed to the marketing misconduct or its cover-up.

288. Cf. note 211 supra.
289. See note 478 infra and accompanying text. Cf. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 385 F. Supp. 598, 602-03 (D.D.C. 1974), revd. on other grounds,
518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
290. See note 478 infra and accompanying text.
291. The amount of harm actually caused the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's misconduct has some minor relevance to the determination of the amount
of punitive damages properly to be assessed in a given case "by analogy to the doctrine of the criminal law by which the seriousness of a crime may depend upon
the harm done . . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment e at 82
(Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). However, the more relevant considerations are the magnitude of the risk of harm to the public created by the misbehavior and the extent
of the defendant's awareness that the misbehavior might generate such a risk. See
Morris, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, supra note 16, at 1181; notes 286 supra, 530 infra
and accompanying text.
Many jurisdictions purport to limit punitive damages assessments by a "ratio rule"
that requires such awards to bear a reasonable relation to the actual damages awarded
in the case. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856-57
(M.D. Pa. 1974); Morris, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, supra note 16, at 1180. The rule
is a poor one since it ties the measure of punitive damages to a factor that is usually
unrelated to the primary reasons such damages are assessed against the defendant.
See id. at 1180-81; Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1158, supra note 16, at 1170-71.
292. Thus the level of the guilty employees within the corporate hierarchy will
properly bear upon the amount of punitive damages to assess while not upon the
prior determination of whether such damages should be awarded at all. See note
238 supra and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, since the number of consumers potentially harmed by
a defect increases with time, a manufacturer's culpability and the
need for greater punishment commensurately increase as it fails to
remedy the problem.29 3
2 4
The penalty ordinarily should not only match the misconduct
but also should be tailored to the wealth of the particular defendant
to optimize punishment and deterrence: 299 "The theory is that a
penalty which would be sufficient to reform a poor man is likely to
make little impression on a rich one; and therefore the richer the
defendant is the larger the punitive damages award should be. ' '2 6
The financial condition of a manufacturer thus should be ascertained
293. Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 385 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.D.C.
1974), revd. on other grounds, 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
294. See notes 113, 193 supra.
295. This principle is rooted in logic and justice and is accepted by most courts
today. See, e.g., Herman v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 524 F.2d 767, 772 (3d
Cir. 1975); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 908(2) & comment e (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). In
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Congress made the following provision concerning civil penalties assessed under the Act: "In determining
the amount of such penalty, or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the business of the person charged and the
gravity of the violation shall be considered ......
U.S.C. § 1398(b) (1970). However, the rule has been criticized. See Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp.
850, 856-57 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ('The plaintiff . . . wishes to admit into evidence
the defendants' net worth. Accounting problems aside, such a gratuitous gesture by
the court would be immaterial in a unique case such as this and would mislead the
jury"); Morris, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, supra note 16, at 1191; note 305 infra and
accompanying text; cf. Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 690-91, 496 P.2d 682, 68990 (1972).
In the case of a corporation, wealth has generally been considered provable by
a showing of the institution's net worth. See, e.g., Richards Co. v. Harrison, 262
S.2d 258, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev.
447, 453, 514 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1973). Other financial data have also been accepted
as relevant to the determination of wealth. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389
F. Supp. 1348, 1352 (D. Hawaii 1975) (authorized or stated capital; net worth; gross
income; and net income); Herman v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1268,
1277 (D. St. Croix), affd., 524 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975) (net worth and net
income; balance sheet and income statement both admitted into evidence); Wisner
v. S.S. Kresge, 465 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Mo. App. 1971) (gross sales, net income, and
net worth); Parrott v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Say. Assn., 97 Cal. App. 2d
14, 25, 217 P.2d 89, 96 (1950) (capital surplus and undivided profits).
Any information concerning the manufacturer's financial affairs that bears on
the effect a punitive damages award will have on the company's financial standing
should logically be admissible, see Jones v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 219-20, 166 N.W.
2d 175, 181 (1969), and discoverable, see Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348, 1352 (D. Hawaii 1975); Holliman v. Redman Dev. Corp., 61 F.R.D. 488
(D.S.C. 1973); Coy v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 210, 222-24, 373 P.2d 457, 46364, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399-400 (1962). While such evidence may thus be discovered
and introduced into evidence, the plaintiff may not have the burden of producing
it. See, e.g., Tri-Tron Intl. v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1975); Rogers
v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 575-76, 106 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1958).
296. Morris, 44 HeRv. L REv. 1173, supra note 16, at 1191; see Richards Co.
v. Harrison, 262 S.2d 258, 263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).

June 1976]

Punitive Damages

1319

together with the probable impact thereon of a proposed punitive
297
damages assessment.
Finally, the punitive damages assessment should reflect other
"punishment" already imposed, or likely to be imposed, upon the
manufacturer as a result of its marketing misconduct. This other
punishment includes compensatory damages awards to the plaintiff
and other injured consumers,2 98 punitive damages awarded to other
plaintiffs, and any criminal penalties. 299
In summary, proper measurement of a punitive damages award
in a products liability case should be furthered by careful consideration of the following factors:
(1) the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses;
(2) the seriousness of the hazard to the public;
(3) the profitability of the marketing misconduct (increased by
an appropriate multiple);
(4) the attitude and conduct of the enterprise upon discovery
of the misconduct;
(5) the degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard
and of its excessiveness;
(6) the number and level of employees involved in causing or
covering up the marketing misconduct;
(7) the duration of both the improper marketing behavior and
its cover-up;
(8) the financial condition of the enterprise and the probable
effect thereon of a particular judgment; and
(9) the total punishment the enterprise will probably receive
from other sources.
Precise measurement of a punitive damages award will never be
possible because of the general nature of the several goals it serves.
Yet the careful use of these factors in products liability cases should
help considerably to reduce the risk of capriciously determined
awards and to assure that awards are more consistent with their
underlying objectives.
2.

Control

While the factors developed above should assist a conscientious
judge or jury in determining the proper punitive damages assessment
297. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
298. See Morris, 44 HAv. L. REV. 1173, supra note 16, at 1188.
299. See Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.LJ. Jan. 11, 1967, at 21,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). See also Morris, 44 HAav. L REv.
1173, supra note 16, at 1187-88, 1195-98.
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in any particular case, the factors themselves cannot prevent occasional abuses in the form of excessively large verdicts. Particularly in "mass disaster" cases such as the MER/29 litigation in the
1960's °° and the Dalkon Shield litigation now in progress, 30 1 there
is a significant risk that a manufacturer will be severely over-punished

by scores or even hundreds of judgments for both compensatory and
punitive damages. Indeed, it was within this very context that Judge
Friendly offered his celebrated critique of punitive damages awards
in products liability litigation. 0 2
a. Judicial control over excessive awards. The best protection
against excessive punitive damages awards would probably be to shift

the responsibility for their measurement from the jury to the trial
judge once the jury has determined that such damages should be
assessed. 03 This scheme offers several advantages over the traditional method of allowing the jury to determine such awards. First,

it would reduce the probability that punitive damages awards might
be unduly influenced by emotion, since most judges are presumably
more detached in their deliberation and therefore more likely to render
objective damages assessments. 30 4 Additionally, evidence of the de-

fendant's wealth that could prejudice the jury on the issue of liability30 5 could then be excluded from jury consideration. Further,
judges would be able to call upon their experience in criminal sentencing, unavailable to jurors, in evaluating the need for punishment
300. See text at notes 336-51 infra.
301. See text at note 278 supra & notes 395-96 infra.
302. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
303. See DuBois, supra note 9, at 352-53; cf. Morris, 44 HARv. L. Rav. 1173,
supra note 16, at 1179-80.
304. See DuBois, supra note 9. An overlooked twist of irony exists within the
law of punitive damages. According to traditional learning, the jury cannot award
such damages unless it concludes that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous."
See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). But
outrage is undoubtedly an emotion of passion and, therefore, if the jury is outraged
by the defendant's conduct the verdict will have to be reversed as the product of
passion. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 296. Thus the basis for
punitive damages comes perilously close to being the basis for their reversal as
well.
305. See Silliman, supra note 9, at 92; DuBois, supra note 9, at 351 ("There
is usually great disparity between the parties' financial status which can create a
Robin-Hood-like state of mind in the jury room"). But see Thomas v. American
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Properly limited
instructions. . . we think eliminate the potential for prejudice"); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 241, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 313 (1968) ("It is
doubtful whether the admission of evidence of Goodrich's financial condition . . .
affected the judgment in this case since Goodrich is universally recognized as a large
and prosperous corporation").
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and deterrence in particular cases.306 Finally, trial judges usually
have a more sophisticated appreciation than jurors of the often farreaching effects that punitive damages awards may have on the
operations of particular corporate defendants.

Yet even if the responsibility for measurement remains with the
jury, both trial and appellate judges can exercise considerable control
over excessive punitive damages verdicts. In the past, judges were

most reluctant to tamper with punitive damages awards that, by their
nature, are supposed to reflect the jury's communal outrage over the
defendant's misbehavior. 0 7 But those were the days when punitive
damages verdicts of more than a few hundred dollars were rare,
when verdicts of thirty or forty thousand dollars were "startlingly
large,"3 08 and when multi-million dollar verdicts were simply unthinkable. Today, judicial control has tightened in many jurisdictions, and

verdicts for punitive damages are generally being scrutinized at least
as closely as verdicts for compensatory damages. 30 9 Generally, a

trial judge can attempt to reduce excessive awards by requiring the
plaintiff to choose between remitting the objectionable portion of the

verdict or submitting to a new trial, 10° which may be limited solely
to the issue of damages.

Similarly, an appellate court faced with

a clearly excessive verdict can order remittitur or a new trial. 8 "
Despite the limited number of products liability cases to date in
which juries have awarded punitive damages, there are already solid

indications that at least the trial bench will closely scrutinize such
3 12

awards.

306. See Note, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1158, supra note 16, 1171; Note, 70 H~Av.
L REv., supra note 16, at 530.
307. See Note, 70 HAv. L. Rsv. 517, supra note 16, at 530.
308. C. McCoRMIcK, supranote 16, at 298.
309. See, e.g., Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972). This
change in attitude concerning the proper scope of review of punitive damages is reflected in the differences between the first and second torts Restatements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, comment d at 81-82 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973).
310. See, e.g., Herman v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 379 F. Supp. 1268 (D. St. Croix),
a!fd., 524 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100,
213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) ("Even in the absence of passion or prejudice,
the trial court should not hesitate to adjust a verdict where it is felt that the
evidence does not justify the amount").
311. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972); Jones
v. Fisher, 42 Wis. 2d 209, 166 N.W.2d 175 (1969); cf. Lanfranconi v. Tidewater
Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1967).
312. See Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416 (1974) (affirming trial court's order granting new trial on $17,250,000 punitive
damages verdict); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967) (affirming trial court's remittitur of punitive damages award from
$500,000 to $250,000); Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202,715 (Super. Ct.
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Although punitive damages verdicts should be closely scrutinized, a court must exercise its discretion with particular care and
disturb such awards only upon clear evidence that the verdict as a
whole is excessive. Careful use of judicial discretion is important
because juries not infrequently include some or all of the plaintiff's

general compensatory damages in the punitive damages award.3 13
Thus, reversal or excessive remittitur may improperly reduce the
composite award intended by the jury to compensate the plaintiff for
his actual injury.
ft b.

Control over total punishment in mass disaster litigation.

One of the most troublesome aspects of punitive damages awards
in products liability litigation is their potential not only to punish an
offending enterprise but also to damage its finances severely or even
to bankrupt it."14 If a product is dangerously defective because of inadequate warnings or design, or because of a recurring flaw in manufacture, hundreds or thousands of similar injuries may result from the
single defect in the product line.

Such a result would be a "mass

disaster" for both the consuming public and the manufacturer. In
such situations, defendant manufacturers may be overwhelmed by
the resulting liability for compensatory damages alone; massive additional awards of punitive damages to each plaintiff3s1 may virtually
ensure the manufacturer's bankruptcy. If the purpose of punitive
damages is to punish a defendant and not to bankrupt him, to sting
Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972) (unpublished opinion, June 7, 1972),
affd., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Cal.
(1976) (motion for new trial granted on punitive damages verdict of $10.5 million
in an unpublished opinion, June 7, 1972); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell Co.,
N.Y.LJ. Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.) ($850,000
punitive damages verdict remitted to $100,000).
313. See note 203 supra. For example, in Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d
102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), the trial court rendered a j.n.o.v. setting aside verdicts against the manufacturer of $100,000 in
punitive damages and $50,000 in attorneys' fees, but left intact a compensatory
damages verdict of $125,000. Plaintiff had incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses
to the date of trial amounting to $128,000 and would require medical expenses including full-time nursing care for the remainder of her life, costing $13,624 annually,
523 F.2d at 105. Since there was no real issue on liability in the case, at least
for compensatory damages, it appears quite likely that the jury arrived at a total
amount intended to compensate the plaintiff for her actual damages, past and future,
and then divided this amount between the compensatory and punitive damages awards
and perhaps the award for attorneys' fees as well. See 523 F.2d at 105 n.2.
314. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-41 (2d Cir.
1967).
315. Moreover, the magnitude of the financial disaster for the manufacturer will
be multiplied if its products liability insurance carrier denies liability upon finding
that the manufacturer violated its obligation under the insurance contract to remedy
known defects. See notes 258, 262 supra,
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a wrongdoer but not to kill him, 16 and if the manufacturer indeed
is punished by substantial liability for compensatory damages, are
not the punitive and deterrent functions of punitive damages already
satisfied and the raison d'tre for punitive damages thereby extinguished?
While such reasoning may have superficial appeal, there are
several reasons for awarding punitive damages anyway. The vital
role played by such awards in augmenting the incomplete reparation
of compensatory awards was discussed above.317 Also discussed
earlier was the fact that compensatory damages alone in cases of
flagrant misbehavior inadequately satisfy the retributive needs of the
injured consumer and society."'
Furthermore, the conclusion that manufacturers will be sufficiently
punished in every mass disaster case without the payment of punitive
damages is subject to question. For instance, a manufacturer's liability for compensatory damages may be insured, and to this extent the
punitive and deterrent effects of such verdicts will be at least partially avoided.319 Even if the manufacturer's insurance is insufficient
to cover all potential compensatory claims, it probably will never be
required to pay the bulk of such claims anyway. This is most apt
to be true when a defective product typically causes relatively slight
injuries, because of the small number of such cases taken to lawyers
in the first place, and because few of these can be economically pursued for compensatory damages alone. 2 0 Even in situations where the
injuries are usually serious, many potential claims against the manufacturer are settled for a fraction of their value, and many are never
made at all.32' These are the "forgotten plaintiffs" who are left without redress under a system that only permits compensatory damages.
These are precisely the plaintiffs helped by punitive damages awards,
for such awards make litigation of minor claims economical and, as the
number of substantial recoveries are increasingly publicized, they
help to inform both injured consumers of their rights and lawyers
of the desirability of litigating such claims. Thus, even when many
consumers are injured by a manufacturer's flagrant marketing mis316. See, e.g., Hoy v. Poyner, 305 S.2d 306 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Nevada
Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 452, 514 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1973); Ostopowitz
v. William S. Merrell Co., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Super. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.).
317. See text at notes 178-79, 185-203 supra.
318. See text at notes 113-28 supra.
319. See text at notes 239-76 supra.
320. See text. at notes 148-51 & note 151 supra.
321. See text at notes 176-80, 202 & note 176 supra.
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conduct, the manufacturer may escape just punishment if punitive
damages are not allowed.
Even in mass disaster litigation, then, punitive damages may play
a vital role. But the role must be carefully shaped to fit this context.
The substantial risk of over-punishment in the mass disaster situation
requires that punitive damages awards be measured and controlled
with special care as litigation progresses.
It has been suggested that the ideal solution to the problem
would be first to litigate all compensatory damages claims arising out
of a mass disaster, thus fixing the manufacturer's liability in this
regard, and then to measure and assess a single punitive damages
award against the manufacturer for equitable distribution among the
plaintiffs. 22 Apart from its obvious impracticability, 23 such a plan
rests upon two dubious premises.3 24 The first is that the defendant's
coffers will quickly be depleted if both compensatory and punitive
damages are awarded in initial litigation, leaving nothing with which
to pay later compensatory claims. 25 Yet a contrary conclusion can
be drawn from the MER/29 litigation, the only mass disaster
products liability litigation that has run its course.326 While some
1500 claims were filed against the manufacturer in that case, only
eleven were tried to a jury verdict. Out of these, only seven were
decided for the plaintiff, and only three of these included awards
of punitive damages, one of which was reversed on appeal.3 2" No
doubt many claims were settled out of court. Yet if this is an
example of the most crushing punishment that will befall a manufacturer guilty of flagrant marketing misbehavior-and it is difficult
to imagine a more extreme case of such misbehavior than that of
Richardson-Merrell in marketing MER/29-then the threat of bank322. "See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.11 (2d Cir.
1967); cf. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
323. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 n.11 (2d
Cir. 1967); cf. de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231-32 (10th
Cir. 1970).
324. See Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975);
Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1967).
325. See, e.g., Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii
1975) ("It would appear most inequitable to foreclose effective monetary relief to
some injured persons because extensive punitive damages were granted to those who
happened to obtain judgments earlier").
326. There has been at least one products liability "mini-disaster" that has run
its course, involving the drug Aralen marketed by Sterling Drug, Inc. See Hoffman
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 857 (M.D. Pa. 1974); text at notes 446-51
infra.
327. See note 339 infra.

Punitive Damages

June 1976]

1325

rupting a manufacturer with punitive damages awards in mass disaster litigation appears to be more theoretical than real.
The second questionable premise is the supposed unfairness of
rewarding the initial plaintiffs to a greater extent than subsequent
claimants. 28 This conception ignores the enormous diligence,
imagination, and financial outlay required of initial plaintiffs to
uncover and to prove the flagrant misconduct of a product manufacIn fact, subsequent plaintiffs will often ride to favorable
turer. 09
verdicts and settlements on the coattails of the firstcomers.
Thus, while courts must be especially vigilant to control the very
real, but by no means certain, risk of excessive punishment in mass
disaster cases, the initial plaintiffs in appropriate cases should receive
punitive damages awards that reward their efforts. Plaintiffs following soon thereafter, whose successful prosecutions of punitive damages claims confirm the first award, should be permitted to recover
enhanced punitive damages awards for similar reasons. Thereafter,
however, punitive damages recoveries should probably be limited to
reasonable costs of litigation. And once the bankruptcy of the
defendant manufacturer appears to be a real and imminent possibility, punitive damages should no longer be available at all. This
approach to controlling punitive damages awards in mass disaster litigation should appropriately balance the various objectives of punishing the guilty manufacturer, rewarding the initial claimants, protecting the latecomers, and minimizing the risk of bankruptcy for the
defendant.
The risk that defendants may be excessively punished is very
real. But so too is the need for the punitive damages remedy in
certain products liability cases. And the risk of excessive punishment can be reduced to an acceptable level through responsible
measurement and effective judicial control. On occasion, punitive
damages awards will unfortunately over-punish a manufacturer. But
the benefits that will result from the general use of such awards will
greatly outweigh the total of all such occasional harms.
IV.

DEVELOPING A STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR THE RECKLESS
MARKETING OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS

A.

Classificationof RecurringForms of Flagrant
Misconduct of ProductManufacturers

Sections II and III concluded that punitive damages can serve a
328. See Roginsky v. Richardson-MerreU, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir.
1967); cf. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975).
329. See note 179 supra.
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useful purpose in products liability litigation despite recurring difficulties involving vicarious liability, liability insurance, and measurement and control. The necessary task that remains is to develop an
analytical framework to assist in identifying cases in which the assessment of punitive damages is appropriate. The standard of punitive
damages liability to be proposed will center on the extent to which the

marketing conduct of a manufacturer exhibits a conscious or reckless
indifference to the risk that its product may be excessively dangerous
to consumers. The problems encountered in developing such a
standard are considerable,"' and competing considerations frequently clash.

For example, the standard must be defined broadly

enough to permit flexibility in its application, yet with sufficient
specificity to provide manufacturers with adequate notice of the type
of conduct for which they will be subject to quasi-criminal punishment.3 ' Indeed, adequate notice is essential if punitive damages
awards are to be effective in deterring the marketing of excessively

hazardous products. 3 2 Vague as it necessarily will be, a standard
must first be developed and articulated that can be refined through
subsequent judicial experience.

The first step in designing such a standard involves the identification and examination of the various recurring forms of marketing
misbehavior that judges and juries have considered most deserving
of punishment.

Since there are only a few reported decisions con-

sidering punitive damages in the products liability context, 33 and
330. The difficulty is similar to that encountered in developing a definition for
the basis of liability for compensatory damages in strict tort for the sale of defective
products, which includes such imprecise terms as "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous." See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 169, at 31; Montgomery & Owen, supra note
2; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
833 (1973).
331. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. But see Thomas v. American
Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed,
No. 76-1830, 3d Cir., June 21, 1976 ("The allowance of punitive damages does not
convert a civil action into a quasi-criminal proceeding").
332. See notes 132-35 supra and accompanying text.
333. The first reported products liability case involving punitive damages is apparently Fleet v. Hollenkamp, 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852), which involved
the sale of an adulterated drug. The court upheld the trial court's charge on exemplary damages and affirmed a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Other reported
decisions involving personal injury claims for punitive damages in a products liability
context and in which either the trial or appellate court decided in favor of the plaintiff include the following: Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1976)
(asphyxiation from fumes emitted by charcoal briquets that were inadequately labeled) ($212,500 punitive damages verdict reversed, $212,500 compensatory damages
verdict affirmed); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (reversing j.n.o.v. and ordering entry of judgment to plaintiff of $100,000 for punitive damages and $50,000 for attorneys'
fees); Ussery v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH PROD.
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since some of these cases incompletely report the pertinent facts, the
following analysis of marketing misbehavior will also draw on several
7084 (4th Cir. 1973) (punitive damages award, remitted from
RPTR.
$425,000 to $350,000 by trial court, vacated on other grounds without discussion
of punitive damages award) (opinion withdrawn, order, filed March 31, 1975); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) (compensatory damages
verdict affirmed and remanded for trial of punitive damages), on remand, 374 F.
Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff not entitled to argue magnitude of defendant's
harm to society nor to present evidence of defendant's net worth) (settled after five
weeks of retrial for $600,000, $163,000 in excess of original compensatory damages
verdict. 18 AM. TAL LAWYERS AssN. NEWS LETrER 120 (1975) [hereinafter
A.T.L.A.N.L.]); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967) (reversal of $100,000 verdict for punitive damages); Vollert v. Summa
Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (despite assertions of confidentiality, defendant designer-manufacturer of helicopter that crashed ordered to
answer interrogatories of financial worth relevant to punitive damages claim);
Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (denial of defendant's motion to dismiss punitive damages claim; settled for $65,000); Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976) (reversing $1,254,000 punitive damages verdict and affirming $600,000 compensatory damages verdict); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218
(1975) (reversal of trial court's overruling of defendant's demurrer to punitive damages claim); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968) (no verdict on punitive damages, but punitive damages charge held
proper); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967) (punitive damages award, remitted from $500,000 to $250,000 by trial court,
affirmed); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 S.2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974) (reversal of compensatory damages award of
$70,000 and of punitive damages award of $500,000); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116
Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), affd., 46 Il. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970) ($10,000 punitive damages award affirmed without discussion); Ostopowitz
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.) ($850,000 punitive damages verdict remitted to $100,000).
See also Griswold v. The Lange Co., CCH PRoD. LiAB. RPT. 1 7634 at 14,685
(D. Colo. 1976) (motion to dismiss punitive damages claim under Colorado survival
statute denied); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (punitive
damages recoverable in, and "deadman's" statute inapplicable to, action under Texas
constitution and wrongful death act).
Reported products liability decisions involving personal injuries that have discussed punitive damages, in which all rulings were against the plaintiff include: Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming refusal of
trial court to submit punitive damages issue to jury); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1830,
3d Cir., June 21, 1976 (granting defendant's motion for j.n.o.v. on plaintiff's
$200,000 punitive damages verdict); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
1081, 1097-98 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (punitive damages claim disallowed in nonjury
trial for insufficient evidence of "actual" malice); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974) (affirming trial court's order
granting new trial on $17,250,000 punitive damages verdict).
Reported products liability decisions involving personal injuries that have, without
discussion, found the evidence insufficient to support a punitive damages award include the following: Ollier v. Lake Cent. Airlines, Inc. 423 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1970)
(directed verdict for defendant on punitive damages claim affirmed); Crews v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 Mo. App. 993, 995, 225 S.W.2d 812, 815 (1949)
(trial court order granting new trial on punitive damages award of $900 affirmed);
Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1970)
(reversal of $8,000 punitive damages verdict affirmed); Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 690, 146 S.E. 805 (1929) (reversal of punitive damages verLAB.
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unreported cases384 and additional information gathered on reported
cases.
dict). See Oxman v. Hellene Pessl Inc., 279 F. Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (punitive
damages claim dismissed). Cf. Commercial U. Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F. Supp.
453 (W.D. La. 1976) (punitive damages claim dismissed as unavailable under Louisiana law).
In addition, punitive damages awards have been held proper in a number of deceit
actions based upon the fraudulent sale of "defective" products. These cases have
involved property and economic losses rather than personal injuries. See, e.g., Boehm
v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1973); Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598,
176 S. 332 (1937); Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969);
Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Craig v. Spritzer Motors,
109 Ohio App. 376, 160 N.E.2d 537 (1959). Cf. Fritz v. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 349 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
334. In the following unreported products liability cases, punitive damages claims
have figured prominently: Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 74-462
(D.S.C., March 18, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1920, 4th Cir., Aug. 24, 1976
(hand injuries from windshield broken by collapse of roof when automobile overturned; verdict for $65,000 compensatory and $250,000 punitive damages); Wallace
v. General Motors Corp., No. WPB-75-65-Civ-CF (S.D. Fla. 1975) (death caused
by hood of automobile penetrating windshield and striking driver's neck in headon collision; manufacturer failed to warn or correct despite knowledge of approximately 120 "instances of hood penetration through the windshield resulting in decapitation, paralysis, disfigurement, etc.") Letter from plaintiff's attorney, Edward M.
Ricci, to David G. Owen, March 8, 1976; settled, after trial court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss punitive damages claim for $400,000, the amount of plaintiff's
final settlement demand. "It is our firm belief that the punitive damages claim in
the suit was a substantial factor leading to such a favorable settlement . . .. General Motors paid the full amount without any debate." Letter from Edward M. Ricci
to David G. Owen, Dec. 16, 1975; Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., No. A-971 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971) (deaths from plane crash caused by defective wing
design and insufficient inspection process; settled for $2,070,000 which included
$750,000-$1,000,000 for "punitive damages question." Letter from plaintiff's attorney, Bernard P. Kelly, to David G. Owen, June 24, 1975; punitive damages claims
allowed under survival statute and denied under wrongful death statute (unpublished
opinion, Nov. 20, 1972)); Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., No. 71-1661 Civ JLK
(S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971) (one death and one loss of leg attributable to failure
to warn or recall for repairs boat with defective steering; compensatory damages settlement after trial of $250,000 for death and $650,000 for loss of leg; verdict for defendant on punitive damages); Schaller v. Sterling Drug, Inc., No. W-3792 (D. Kan.,
filed March 5, 1970) (visual impairment from use of Aralen, side effects of which
had not been adequately warned of; settled during trial for $315,000 after ruling that
punitive damages issue would be submitted to jury); Ornelas v. F.H. Langenkamp Co.,
No. 238260 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1973) (loss of leg attributable to failure of agricultural machine to have warning or safety devices as required by state regulations; settled immediately prior to trial for $250,000); Domich v.
Jee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., filed Aug. 28,
1972) (burn injuries from flammable article of child's clothing; settled for $458,000,
reported in Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 3); Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., No. 202715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972),
noted in 15 A.T.L.A.N.L. 103 (1972) and 16 JuRy VRDicrs WEEKLY 49 (Feb.
18, 1972) (deaths of four passengers and serious injuries to another from plane
crash caused by defectively overhauled engine; motion for new trial granted
on punitive damages verdict of $10,500,000) (unpublished opinion, June 7,
1972, affd., No. 32,999, Cal. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup.
Ct. Cal. (1976)); Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civil No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir.
St. Clair County, Ill., filed April 30, 1970) (injuries from accident caused by swaying
of trailer attributable to inadequate hitch; verdict for $225,000 compensatory damages
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An analysis of these sources reveals five types of manufacturer

misbehavior recurring with some frequency: (1) fraudulent-type
misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety standards; (3) inadequate testing and manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of

known dangers before marketing; and (5) post-marketing failures
to remedy known dangers.
sidered in turn.
1.

Each form of misconduct will be con-

Fraudulent-TypeMisconduct

Several products liability cases in which punitive damages were

recovered have involved attempts by manufacturers to conceal
known defects from consumers.

While in some circumstances the

mere failure to warn of a known danger could be regarded as fraudulent-type misconduct, the cases discussed in this section all involve

affirmative conduct by a manufacturer designed to mislead the
public. The phrase "fraudulent-type" is used to describe a form of

conduct that is calculated to deceive yet may not be provable fraud
in some jurisdictions because of the difficulties in establishing all the
elements of the rather intricate common-law action of fraud and
deceita 1s
An appropriate starting point is an examination of a trio of
and $5,000,000 punitive damages, settled-amount not disclosed); Deemer v. A.H.
Robins Co., No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County Kan., filed Oct. 1972,
appeal filed, No. 48504, Kan. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 1976 (defectively designed IUD
failed to prevent pregnancy and perforated uterine wall requiring surgical removal;
verdict for $10,000 compensatory and $75,000 punitive damages); Hawes v. General
Motors Corp., No. 76 CP 1551 (C.P. Hampton County, S.C., filed March 12, 1976)
(injuries in automobile accident from defective tie rod; denial of defendant's motion
to strike punitive damages claim from strict tort cause of action) (unpublished Order,
June 10, 1976); Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13851 (C.P. Dorchester
County, S.C., Nov. 26, 1974) (illness from ingesting contaminated beverage; jury
reduced verdict from $10,000 to $3,500 when instructed that evidence was insufficient
to support punitive damages verdict); Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 70-9255-L
(193d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 26, 1972), noted in 16 A.T.L.A.N.L.
30 (1970) (deaths and bum injuries to occupants of "uncrashworthy" private airplane; verdict for $374,332, including punitive damages of $180,000); In re Stein,
File No. 463-718 (Milwaukee County Ct., Wis., Nov. 21, 1973) (failure to recall
promptly contaminated intravenous fluid that caused death). See also Stumpenhorst
v. Sterling Drug Co., No. Law 12207 (Cir. Ct. Arlington County, Va., June 16,
1970), noted in 13 A.T.L.A.N.L. 284-85 (1970) (visual impairment from ingestion
of Aralen due to inadequate warning of side effects; $175,000 settlement after trial
judge allowed plaintiff to amend complaint during trial to include punitive damages
claim).
335. In some jurisdictions, the plaintiff must establish as many as nine separate
elements in order to recover upon an action brought in deceit, see, e.g., O'Shields
v. Southern Foundation Mobil Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50 (1974),
and a mass of technical rules and exceptions surrounds each of these elements, see,
e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 706-08, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 410-12 (1967). See generally 1 F. HARPE & F. JAMES, supra note 139, ch. 7.
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MER/29 cases, Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.,3 3 6 Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 337 and Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrell

Co.338 These were among the more than 1500 actions brought against
Richardson-Merrell for the manufacture and sale of the drug
triparanol, marketed under the trade name MER/29, between
April 1960 and April 1962.3 39 MER/29 was purported to reduce
the level of blood cholesterol to aid in the treatment of arteriosclerosis and thus reduce the incidence of heart attacks and strokes.
Regardless of whether the drug actually worked,34 ° it did in fact
cause serious injury to thousands of persons. 34 1 The most serious
of the drug's side effects was its propensity to cause cataracts, and
by 1967 some 490 reported cases of this condition had been

attributed to use of MER/29. 342

Punitive damages were awarded by the juries in these three

cases because Richardson-Merrell was shown to have acted in a
manner calculated to deceive the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the medical profession, and consumers concerning the
safety of MER/29. The particularly hazardous nature of the drug
must have been apparent to the defendant from the outset since in

the first animal test of MER/29, conducted in 1957, all female rats
given a high dosage of the drug died. Nevertheless, to obtain FDA
approval of the drug and to improve its marketability within the
medical profession, the director of the defendant's Biological Science
336. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
337. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), revg. in part 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
338. N.Y.LJ., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.).
339. See Rheingold, supra note 127, at 121. Only 11 of the 1500 MER/29
claims resulted in jury verdicts, and 7 of the verdicts were rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs in amounts ranging from $20,000 to $1.2 million. Id. at 133. The 3 cases
of these 11 in which decisions were published discussing the punitive damages awards
were Toole, Roginsky and Ostopowitz. The Toole jury awarded the plaintiff
$175,000 general damages and $500,000 punitive damages. The trial judge remitted
the punitive damages verdict to $250,000, and the appellate court affirmed. 251 Cal.
App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 418. The jury in Roginsky rendered a compensatory
damages verdict of $17,500 and punitive damages of $100,000. 254 F. Supp. at 430.
Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in a 2-1 decision of the Second Circuit,
affirmed the compensatory damages award but reversed the award of punitive damages. 378 F.2d at 851. The Ostopowitz jury awarded $350,000 in compensatory
damages and $850,000 in punitive damages to the injured party and $5000 to her
husband for loss of services. On a motion to set aside the verdict, the trial judge
approved the compensatory damages verdict and ordered a reduction in the punitive
damages award to $100,000. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, cols. 3-4.
340. There was some doubt that it did. See 251 Cal. App. 2d at 694, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 403.
341. The trustee of the MER/29 litigation group, Paul D. Rheingold, estimates
that the drug caused a minimum of 5000 injuries. Rheingold, supra note 127, at 121.
342. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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Division ordered the falsificati~n of data in a test conducted on
monkeys in 1959 and actually fabricated data for a nonexistent
monkey. In its July 1959 new drug application to the FDA,
Richardson-Merrell included the falsified monkey data and other significant misrepresentations, including a claim that only four of eight
rats had died in one study when in fact all eight had died. Even
so, the FDA still concluded that the drug appeared to be excessively
hazardous and insisted that the manufacturer run additional tests.
Richardson-Merrell responded with further falsifications of prior tests
to encourage the FDA to relax its conditions. In January and
February of 1960 the defendant completed three additional animal
tests on rats and dogs. Nine of ten rats in one test developed eye
opacities, as did twenty-five of thirty-six in another, and one of the
dogs went blind. All of this information was deleted from the reports
submitted to the FDA. Based upon the false and misleading information in its possession, the agency granted the defendant approval to
market the drug in April 1960.1" 3
From the initial marketing until sales were terminated in 1962,
evidence mounted rapidly that MER/29 could cause eye damage
and other harm to both test animals and humans. Despite its
knowledge of this increasing evidence of the drug's dangerous side
effects, Richardson-Merrell continued to advertise its product as "a
proven drug, remarkably free from side effects, virtually non-toxic
• . . and completely safe," 344 and assured its salesman that "[tihere
is no longer any valid question as to its safety or lack of significant side effects. 34 5 Moreover, in response to inquiries from doctors concerned that MER/29 might be responsible for the hair
loss or eye problems of their patients, the company falsely claimed
to be unaware of such side effects or similar complaints. 346 When
urged in late 1961 by both the FDA and the British government
to remove the drug from the market, the defendant stubbornly
refused. It was only after the FDA seized all of the company's
animal experiment records during an unannounced visit to Richardson-Merrell laboratories in April 1962 that the company finally suspended sales of the drug. Permission to market the drug was forin May 1962 on the ground that it was
mally withdrawn by the FDA
3 47
use.
intended
unsafe for its
343. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 695-97, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
344. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416.

345. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 699, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
346. Rheingold, supra note 127, at 119.
347. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 700-01, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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During the two years that it was on the market, MER/29 was
administered to approximately 400,000 persons. Several thousand
users suffered eye injuries, hair loss, and skin disorders, even though
most of them had been taking the drug for less than three months.
There was also evidence that most of the 400,000 users would have
3 48
developed cataracts had they continued taking it.

Had Richardson-Merrell been truthful with the FDA from the
start, MER/29 might never have been marketed. However, this
obviously dangerous and defective drug did reach the market and

stay there long enough to do substantial harm because its manufacturer actively deceived the public. Undoubtedly RichardsonMerrell acted so irresponsibly because the drug promised to be
especially profitable.149 The juries in Toole, Roginsky and Ostopowitz
determined that this fradulent-type behavior needed to be punished
and discouraged and so awarded large verdicts of punitive dam-

ages,350 thus initiating the era of such awards in modem products
liability litigation. 5

In E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 5 2 a drug company was
again alleged to have engaged in fraudulent-type misconduct in

order to market a product of potentially great profitability.3 13 The
product in this case, "Boplant," a bone grafting material made of calf
bone and marketed for use in humans, was used by an orthopedic
surgeon in a grafting operation on the plaintiffs injured spine in

1966. The plaintiff's graft ultimately failed because of an antigenantibody response to the implanted material that caused it to be

encircled by fibrous membrane and "practically eaten away," thus
necessitating its removal in 1969. a 4 Discouraged by many similar
failures, the defendant had discontinued the sale of Boplant in 1966,

shortly after the plaintiff's initial operation. A jury found the product defective and the defendant's related promotional activities

fraudulent, and awarded the plaintiff $70,000 in compensatory
348. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
349. "In its first year at large it contributed $7,000,000 to appellant's gross
sales." 251 Cal. App. 2d at 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 408. "Vice President Woodward
declared that MER/29 was '. . . the biggest and most important drug in Merrell history. . . ."' 251 Cal. App. 2d at 700, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
350. See Rheingold, supranote 127, at 132-34 n.46.
351. The only previous reported products liability case in which a punitive damages award had been upheld in a case involving personal injuries was Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 13 B. Mon. 219 (1852); see note 333 supra.
352. 274 S.2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).
353. Plaintiff's counsel estimated the potential market at $15 million per year.
Appellee's Petition to Vacate Appellate Decision at 67 (1st Dist. Fla. Ct. App., filed
Aug. 1974) [hereinafter Petition to Vacatel.
354. 274 S.2d at 900.
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damages and $500,000 in punitive damages, upon which judgment

was entered." '

The appellate court reversed, however, ruling that

the product was not defective

56

and that the defendant's conduct

was neither fraudulent nor even grossly negligent.357

The plaintiff's evidence in Stickney 5 8s revealed certain details of
the defendant's conduct not mentioned in the appellate decision that
help to account for and justify the jury's large punitive damages
award. For example, Squibb had advertised to the medical com-

munity that "[n]o evidence of an immune response or inflammatory
reaction was reported in any animal studies"; 5 9 that the product had
experienced an eighty-five per cent success rate in a four-year clini-

cal study involving 452 human operations; 3 0 that there had been "no
clinical evidence of foreign body reaction, sensitivity or an undesir-

able immunologic response in the entire 452 operations"; 361 and that
Boplant was as satisfactory as autogenous bone taken from other

areas of a patient's body. "62 The plaintiff's evidence persuasively
demonstrated, however, that these representations were based upon
grossly manipulated test procedures and interpretations. For ex-

ample, an experimenter for Squibb testified he had "rigged" the
company's transplant studies on dogs so that "he would have gotten
'success' even if he had used nothing at all, or even if he used plaster
of paris instead of Boplant." s 3 Further evidence contrary to

Squibb's representations revealed that patients in many of the 452
operations studied experienced substantial adverse reactions to the
implanted material, '6 4 and that the results in only nineteen per cent

of the operations justified claims that Boplant had been successfully
grafted to the patient's bone. 65,

355. 274 S.2d at 900.
356. 274 S.2d at 906-07.
357. 274 S.2d at 907.
358. The representations concerning the plaintiffs evidence are based upon the
Petition to Vacate. The facts in this case and in many of the cases that follow
are stated as they have been represented by plaintiff's counsel, either in pleadings
and briefs filed with a court or in letters sent and questionnaires returned to the
author.
359. Petition to Vacate at 7.
360. Id. at 8-9. However, the court refers to a clinical success rate in excess
of 90 per cent in a study involving 400 patients. 274 S.2d at 901.
361. Petition to Vacate at 9.
362. 274 S.2d at 906. The defendant also represented in both the Physician's
Desk Reference and the drug data package insert that "no sensitization reactions
have been reported in its use." Petition to Vacate at 40.
363. Petition to Vacate at 8.
364. Petition to Vacate at 37 (reactions including drop in blood pressure, shock,
cardiac collapse, swelling at graft site and unexplained disappearance of graft itself).
365. Id.
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Furthermore, after Squibb's initial study, independent research
by the United States Navy Bone Bank, the Naval Medical Research
Laboratories, and the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology concluded
that "50% of the Boplant specimens demonstrated unacceptable
reaction. . .

."-1

In addition, a team of four orthopedic physicians

from one medical school published a study indicating that Boplant
was the least satisfactory of all nine substitute bone graft materials
they had tested, that failures were experienced in ninety per cent
of the cases in which Boplant was used, and "that its performance
approximated [that of] their controls where nothing was used in the
empty bone gaps. 38 7 The plaintiff further demonstrated that
Squibb had been informed by a leading bone transplant specialist
at the beginning of the Boplant project that its testing methods and
criteria were unreliable. 68 Finally, the plaintiff proved that by the
time the product was removed from the market in 1966, Squibb had
received more than 1000 complaints from physicians around the
country. 19 It was upon this evidence of manufactured animal test
results and seriously misleading human test interpretations that the
jury awarded punitive damages.
The MER/29 cases, Stickney, and other products liability cases
involving fraudulent-type misconduct by manufacturers all reveal a
particularly serious form of misbehavior: a conscious and active
effort to conceal a product danger that the manufacturer knows
presents a substantial risk of injury. Consumers are entitled to
assume that they are not being intentionally decieved by manufacturers concerning the safety of their products. When a plaintiff can
attribute his injury to a manufacturer's intentionally deceptive practices, an award of punitive damages is highly appropriate.
Institutional "fraud" of this type, however, will often be particularly difficult for a plaintiff to uncover and to prove. 7 The jury
must therefore be given considerable latitude in. determining
366. Id. at 69.
367. Id. at 65-66. "In essence, Boplant was found by them to be worthless . . . ." Id. at 66.
368. Id. at 71.
369. Id. at 69. This evidence contradicted the finding in the appellate decision
that Squibb received a total of approximately 150 complaints. See 274 S.2d at 902.
370. The difficulty in proving this type of institutional "fraud" is mitigated somewhat, however, by the fact that the manufacturer's conduct in such cases will often
reflect in addition a reckless failure to test, redesign, warn, or recall. This type
of misconduct will usually be easier to prove and may also support a punitive damages award. For example, prior to its fraudulent-type activities, Richardson-Merrell's
initial misconduct concerning MER/29 was its failure to run additional tests to discover the nature and severity of the hazard once early tests had revealed adverse
reactions produced by the drug.
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whether a manufacturer's marketing conduct, when viewed as a
whole, demonstrates a conscious attempt to conceal a product's
Punitive damages have long been
dangers from consumers.
awarded in cases in which a defendant's fraudulent misbehavior has
caused financial loss to the plaintiff.3 "1 Surely cases in which a

manufacturer causes personal injury to consumers ought to be treated
similarly.
2.

Knowing Violationsof Safety Standards

Thousands of standards prescribing minimally acceptable safety

characteristics for many types of products have been issued by vari7
ous legislatures, regulatory agencies and private organizations.1

1

Sometimes a plaintiff is able to establish that he was injured by a
product marketed in violation of such a standard and that his injury
3
might have been averted had the standard been followed.

73

If the

plaintiff can further demonstrate that the manufacturer knew that its
product failed to meet the requirements of a particular safety stand-

ard, yet marketed it anyway, an inference may be raised that the
manufacturer acted in conscious disregard of the product's defective

condition. In this way a manufacturer's knowing violation of a safety
standard has figured prominently in several cases in which juries have
assessed punitive damages verdicts.

One case involving a breach of a safety regulation promulgated

by a federal agency is Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div.,3 74 a consoli371. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Gunn, 234 Ala. 598, 176 S. 332 (1937); McAroy v. Wright, 25 Ind. 22 (1865); Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d
497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1961).
372. The federal government and every state with the possible exception of Utah
have statutes regulating product safety. See E. SCHWARTZ, HAZARnoUS PaoDucTrS
LITGATION § 2:6 (1973); 1974 U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCr SAFETY COMMISSION ANN.
REP. 53-56. Thousands of product safety standards have been promulgated by various federal agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Many product safety
standards have also been issued under the authority of various state commissions.
Private standards-making organizations, coordinated by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), are responsible for many thousands of additional stand-

ards. See generally 1 L. FRJMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LImILITY § 5.04
(1975); D. Ron, H. PHILO & R. GOODMAN, LAwYERS DESK REFERENCE-TEcHNICAL
SOURCES FOR CONDUCTING A PERSONAL INQUIRY ACTION chs. 17 & 18 (5th ed. 1975);

Philo, Use of Safety Standards, Codes and Practices in Tort Litigation, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 1 (1965); Note, Products Liability Based upon Violation of Statutory
Standards,64 MICH. L. REv. 1388 (1966).
373. See, e.g., McComish v. DeSoi, 42 NJ. 274, 200 A.2d 116 (1964).
374. No. 202,715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972), noted
in 15 A.T.L.A.N.L. 103 (1972), and 16 JuRY VERDICTS WEEKLY 49 (Feb. 18, 1972),
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dated action for the deaths of four persons and injuries to a fifth
caused by the crash of an executive jet due to engine failure in 1967.
The airplane's engine was first manufactured by the defendant in
1957 and then "remanufactured" and resold by the defendant in
1960 and again in 1963. On each occasion that the "remanufactured" engine was resold it was ostensibly "zero timed"; the new
owner was given a new warranty and a certificate stating that the
engine complied with "all Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]
regulations concerning zero timing engines. '3 75 Strict federal regulations governed the quality of zero-timed engines represented to
be "rebuilt"; apparently only the defendant called its reworked
engines "remanufactured." Nevertheless, the defendant's service
manager conceded that the 1963 resale violated existing FAA regulations because the company had "remanufactured" its engines with
secondhand parts that met only the lower tolerances permitted by
the FAA for "overhauled" engines rather than the safer tolerances
required for genuinely "rebuilt" zero-timed engines. The testimony
also indicated that the defendant had ignored the regulations governing "rebuilt" engines because it considered them too stringent
and too expensive, and that it may even have used the term
"remanufactured" to deceive purchasers that their engines had in
fact been "rebuilt" while avoiding the more expensive reconditioning
required by the FAA for engines so represented.37 Upon this evidence of an intentional breach of a regulatory safety standard,
together with some evidence of a fraudulent-type effort to mislead
consumers, the jury awarded substantial compensatory damages to
each plaintiff and $10.5 million in punitive damages to the sole
77
survivor,
affd., Civil No. 32,999, Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., June 23, 1976, cert. denied,
Sup. Ct. Cal. (1976).
375. Brief for Plaintiffs at 11-13, Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note
374 supra. "In effect, the certificate said that the engine had been remanufactured
or rebuilt, that it could be treated as a zero-timed engine and could have a new
record without previous operating history as provided in the [FAA] regulations."
Id. at 13. Plaintiffs further argued that "owners and mechanics rely on these log
book entries when an engine is rebuilt .. .and it is important whether an engine
is zero-timed or whether it has a previous history." Id. at 14-15.
376. Id. at 10-12. "Lycoming adopted a semantics scheme to avoid compliance
in a manner which constituted a fraud on the public." Id. at 5.
377. The jury awarded approximately $2.8 million compensatory damages to the
representatives of the pilot and three passengers killed in the crash and approximately
$1.1 million compensatory damages in addition to the punitive damages to the permanently disabled survivor. In an unpublished opinion dated June 7, 1972, the trial
court denied the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for a new trial on compensatory damages but granted its motion for a new trial
on punitive damages, ruling that the verdict was excessive and that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish their reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent conduct. The
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In other cases, manufacturers have admitted intentionally ignoring safety standards promulgated by private organizations. In one
case brought against U-Haul Company and a related affiliate, the jury
awarded $5 million in punitive damages to the plaintiff who was
injured when her U-Haul trailer swayed into another automobile. 1 8
Contending that the accident was caused by the manufacturer's use
of an inadequate trailer hitch, the plaintiff introduced evidence that
the trailer's design precluded use with the hitch recommended for
safe towing by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and the
major automobile manufacturers. 79 In defense, U-Haul asserted
that it had intentionally disregarded the SAE recommendations
because it did not agree with them.3 80 Similarly, in a case involving
an automobile that crashed when a defective tire blew out,38 ' General Motors representatives testified that their company had intentionally disregarded the maximum carrying capacity standards of the
Tire and Rim Association because they considered the standards too
88 2
stringent.
Evidence demonstrating that a manufacturer knowingly marketed a product in violation of a safety standard is clearly pertinent
to whether the factfinder should award punitive damages. However, whether such a defendant further ought to be liable for
punitive damages as a matter of law is another question.38 3 There
is substantial initial appeal to reasoning that an intentional violation
of a product safety standard, especially one promulgated by a legislative body, that injures a consumer is ipso facto an intentional violation of the consumer's rights protected by the standard, and that
therefore the manufacturer should automatically be liable for punitive damages. This reasoning is similar to that used to justify a strict
application of the negligence per se rule in some jurisdictions. 4
Furthermore, a "malice per se" rule for punitive damages is to some
decisions were affirmed on appeal. Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note
374 supra.
378. Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., Civ. No. 70-3226 (20th Jud. Cir. St. Clair County,
Ill., filed April 30, 1970).
379. Brief for Plaintiff at 20, Hayman v. Arcoa, Inc., cited note 378 supra.
380. Id. at 11.
381. Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306

(1968).
382. 261 Cal. App. 2d at 238, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
383. A rule of punitive damages liability as a matter of law would conflict with
the oft-repeated rule followed in most jurisdictions that punitive damages are always
awarded in the jury's discretion and are never a matter of right. See note 26 supra
and accompanying text.
384. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at § 17.6; W. PROSSER, supra
note 31, at § 36.
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extent even more compelling than the negligence per se doctrine
since liability for compensatory damages may result under the latter
rule in a case in which the breach of the safety standard was not
itself a negligent act, 8 5 whereas liability for punitive damages under
the malice per se test would result only on proof the manufacturer
consciously or recklessly breached a product safety standard.
The analogy between the negligence per se rule and a malice
per se rule weakens, however, upon closer analysis. Violation of
a. criminal safety statute is generally considered negligence as a
matter of law because enactment of the statute, establishing both the
standard of conduct and criminal penalties for its violation, is in most
cases clear evidence that the community considers the proscribed
conduct unreasonably dangerous to some class of persons. A
defendant's breach of such a statute can thus be viewed as a violation of an important societal standard of responsibility that may fairly
give rise to an obligation to compensate persons injured by the
breach. That is, liability flows from proof of the defendant's breach
of the statute; proof that the defendant acted negligently or with due
care is thus unnecessary and irrelevant.38 0 Similarly, under the
malice per se rule postulated above, proof that a manufacturer knowingly breached a safety statute would be determinative of its liability
for punitive as well as compensatory damages. Yet a manufacturer's
decision to violate a product safety standard may be far less culpable
than a decision to expose consumers to an unreasonable risk of harm.
A rule imposing strict liability for punitive damages thus would be
palpably unfair, for a manufacturer should always be permitted to
show that its actions were innocent or at most inadvertent.
In some cases, for example, the safety standard may be more
stringent than is actually required for the public safety. Both U-Haul
and General Motors made this argument in the cases discussed
earlier.38 7 In other cases, a particular safety standard may be essentially worthless or may even create more hazards than it eliminates.388 Punishment, and perhaps deterrence as well, seems singularly inappropriate in these situations, especially if the standard was
formulated by a private organization not authorized to act on the public's behalf. Moreover, in many such cases, punishment and deterrence are achieved anyway by judgments for compensatory damages
for which manufacturers are generally strictly liable. Although the
385.
386.
387.
388.

See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, § 17.6, at 999, 1008-09.
See id. at 1009-10. But see W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 198-99.
See notes 378-82 supra and accompanying text.
Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 31, at 200.
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harshness of a malice per se rule could be tempered by allowing the
defenses of justification or excuse, as in the context of negligence
per se, the seriousness of imposing judicial punishment on a manufacturer in addition to compensatory damages suggests that a per se
rule for punitive damages is inadvisable. 8 '
Instead, a jury should be permitted to consider proof of an intentional breach of a safety standard as evidence that the manufacturer
marketed the product in flagrant disregard of the rights or interests
of consumers. A number of factors should be considered in determining the weight given to such evidence in particular cases: the
authoritativeness and expertise of the body promulgating the standard; the clarity of the standard; the defendant's certainty that the
product as marketed violated the standard; the nature of the danger
the standard seeks to prevent; its apparent effectiveness in averting
such dangers; the degree of increased danger resulting from its violation; the economic and practical feasibility of complying with the
standard; and, finally, any possible benefits that may have accrued
to consumers from its violation.
In Rosendin, for example, the breached federal standard was
designed to control the quality of rebuilt aircraft engines and thus
to prevent serious hazards to aircraft users. A breach of such a regulation for the purpose of increasing the profitability of the company's
engine overhaul operations clearly is conduct deserving of a punitive
damages award. On the other hand, whether a jury could reasonably
conclude that the refusal of U-Haul and General Motors to adhere
to privately established trailer hitch recommendations and maximum
capacity standards demonstrated a conscious disregard of the public
safety would depend upon a closer evaluation of all the evidence.
Proof that a manufacturer marketed a defective product knowing
it to be violative of a product safety standard should always be highly
relevant in determining whether the manufacturer acted in flagrant
disregard of consumer safety. This approach is reasonable since the
standard puts the manufacturer on notice that the particular product
falls below a safety norm and thus may be excessively hazardous.
If a defendant chooses to ignore this notice at the expense of
the public safety, a punitive damages assessment may well be
appropriate.
3.

Inadequate Testing or Quality Control

When negligence was the predominant theory of liability for
389. See id. at 197-201.
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defective products, injured plaintiffs frequently claimed that the manufacturer failed to conduct adequate tests or inspections. 390 MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. 9 ' firmly established a manufacturer's duty of

ordinary care to consumers to search for and to remedy whatever
unreasonable dangers might be hidden in its products. Ordinary
care requires that the diligence of the search reflect the product's

potential for harm.392 The rationale behind such searches, of
course, is that defects uncovered by tests and inspections will be
remedied by the manufacturer prior to the marketing of the product
so consumers will not be used as unsuspecting subjects for market3 93
place safety test programs.
The formulation of strict products liability principles for compensatory damages, however, shifted the crucial determination from
whether a manufacturer had diligently searched for concealed
defects to whether the product itself was marketed in a defective
condition.394 The analysis. of punitive damages claims requires that
attention be shifted back once again to the manufacturer's diligence
in searching for defects in its products. The inquiry here is whether
the manufacturer's testing and examination procedures were so
inadequate as to manifest a flagrant indifference to the possibility
that the product might expose consumers to unreasonable risks of
harm.
In Deemer v. A. H. Robins Co., 95 for example, the jury awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages

for injuries sustained when the defendant's intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD), the Dalkon Shield, both failed to prevent the
390. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at § 6.01; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence
of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
391. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
392. 217 N.Y. at 395, 111 N.E.at 1055. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 395, Comment e (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388, Comment m (1965); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIAILITY

§ 2:14 (2d ed. 1974).
393. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 52 (1953) (Jackson, J.,dissenting); text at note 422 infra; Morris, Negligence in Tort Law-With Emphasis on
Automobile Accidents and Unsound Products, 53 VA. L. REV. 899, 909 (1967) ("Pernicious products should be scrapped in the factory rather than dodged in the home").
394. But cf. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 2 at 808-09, 839.
395. No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct. Sedgwick County, Kan., filed Oct. 1972), appeal
filed, No. 48,504, Kan. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 1976. This is the first action against A.H.
Robins for the marketing of the Dalkon Shield to go to judgment. No doubt it
will not be the last. As of February 1976, 547 such actions had been filed against
the company. Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1976, at 2, col. 3. The Dalkon Shield litigation
is thus destined to become the next MER/29-type mass disaster products liability
litigation.
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plaintiff's pregnancy and perforated her uterine wall, thereby requiring the device's surgical removal. The complaint alleged inadequate testing and fraudulent promotion and advertising. Testi-

mony before a congressional committee investigating the cause
of the many injuries and deaths from IUD's revealed that A. H. Robins

had marketed the Dalkon Shield after clinically testing the product
for a "pathetic" average insertion time of only 5.5 months. 96 Considering the delicacy and importance of the human organ into which
the device was to be inserted for extended periods, such evidence
seems sufficient to demonstrate a flagrant disregard for consumer
39 7

safety.
Despite significant authority to the contrary, a majority of
courts considering the issue have held manufacturers liable for
aggravated harm resulting from a failure to design their products in
a manner reasonably calculated to minimize likely injuries from
foreseeable accidents.3 98 In Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,39 for
example, the jury rendered a substantial punitive damages award

against the manufacturer of a private airplane 00 upon a
that the defendant had been grossly negligent in failing to
fuel system for "crashworthiness." The pilot had aborted a
after one of the airplane's doors popped open, and the plane

finding
test the
take-off
crashed

through a fence at the end of the runway at a speed of twenty-five

to thirty miles per hour. 40 1 While no one was injured in the crash
itself, the fire that soon erupted, fed by a steady stream of fuel pour-

ing into the cabin, burned three passengers to death and seriously
396. Hearings on Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive
Devices) Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations
61, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1973) (testimony of Russell J. Thomsen, M.D.). In
addition to the inadequate testing, the company had engaged in a fraudulent-type
promotional campaign based upon the results of the deficient tests. "Mhe Dalkon
Shield and its promotion provide the classic example of the misuse of statistics to
market an item." Id. See Note, The Intrauterine Device: A Criticism of Governmental Co'mpliance and an Analysis of Manufacturer and Physician Liability, 24
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 247, 287-90 (1975). See generally M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT
LiAnarry § 11.43 (1975).
397. Similarly, in the MER/29 cases, Richardson-Merrell clearly had been put
on notice that further pre-marketing testing was absolutely necessary when the results
of its animal tests revealed that the drug might well cause damage to the user's eyes.
398. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968);
Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 NE.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973);
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED MAN, supra note 372, at § 7.01(3); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 2, at 833-36.
399. No. 70-9255-L (193d Jud. Dist. Ct. Dallas County, Tex., Nov. 26, 1972),
noted in 16 A.T.L.A.N.L. 30 (1973).
400. The jury awarded approximately $200,000 in compensatory and $180,000
in punitive damages. See 16 A.T.L.A.N.L. 30 (1973).
401. Id.
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injured a fourth.402 Cessna was properly held liable in this case
for compensatory damages for failing to design a "crashworthy" airplane. However, the jury's punitive damages award perhaps can
be better explained by the tragic circumstances of the accident than
by any sound determination that Cessna had flagrantly disregarded
passenger safety. The costs and dangers of thoroughly crash-testing
all Cessna airplanes, some models costing millions of dollars, would
most certainly be prohibitive. Thus, the company's decision to
rely instead upon drawing-board engineering estimates of safety performance and rigorous flight-testing short of actual crashes seems
reasonable, and, absent other evidence of disregard for passenger
safety, does not warrant punishment beyond liability for compensatory
damages.
On the other hand, when a particular product can be economically crash-tested, the manufacturer's failure to do so may well
demonstrate a flagrant disregard for public safety. Thus, in Sabich
v. Outboard Marine Corp.,4°3 a passenger on a "trackster" snow

vehicle manufactured by the defendant was seriously injured when
the vehicle traversed a rock and rolled over while descending a slope
varying in grade from twenty-four to thirty-eight degrees. Despite
promotional representations that the vehicle could be operated on
slopes of up to forty-five degrees and that it would run smoothly over
rocks and stones, the manufacturer admitted that it had never tested
the trackster on inclines to determine the point at which the vehicle
would overturn.4 °4 Accordingly, the jury awarded large compensatory damages and more than $1 million in punitive damages.40 5 The
punitive damages award in this case appears appropriate in view of
the manufacturer's reckless failure to subject its potentially lethal yet
relatively inexpensive product to simple crash-testing, and its misrepresentations of the vehicle's performance capabilities-represen402. See Second Amended Original Petition of Joyce Smith at 2-3, Smith v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., cited note 399 supra.
403. 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976).
404. Letter from plaintiff's attorney, Daniel E. Wilcoxen, to David G. Owen,
July 16, 1975.
405. The jury returned a verdict for $600,000 compensatory and $1,254,000 punitive damages. 60 Cal. App. 3d at -, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 705. On appeal, the court
emphasized that the defendant had knowingly designed the vehicle to climb slopes
steeper than those that it could descend, as ivell as the defendant's failure to warn
consumers adequately of this hazard. 60 Cal. App. 3d at -, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 70709. The court nevertheless reversed the punitive damages award because of the trial
court's erroneous instruction on the burden of proof required to sustain the underlying fraud cause of action. 60 Cal. App. 3d at -, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 709-11. See note
443 infra.
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tations calculated to deceive consumers who would naturally assume
there was a reasonable basis to support them. 40 8

In another recent case, settled prior to trial, the four-year-old plaintiff was seriously injured when her nightgown caught fire and burned

quickly and intensely.

The- defendant manufacturer of children's

clothing admitted that, despite its knowledge of a large number of
similar injuries and deaths occasioned by flammable fabrics, 40 7 it had

nevertheless selected and used the fabrics in the nightgown without
regard to flammability 4 8 and had further failed to subject them to

any meaningful tests. 409 A punitive damages verdict might have
been appropriate in this case because of the manufacturer's appar-

ently flagrant indifference to consumer safety.410
Besides the hidden dangers in a product's design that may be
discovered by testing prototypes, physical flaws in individual products

may crop up at various pointi in the manufacturing process.4 11 The
effectiveness of a manufacturer's quality control procedures will
determine both the type and number of flaws permitted to remain

in a product line.412 A manufacturer may make an erroneous riskbenefit judgment by spending too little for quality control in view
of the injuries likely to result. The manufacturer would then be
liable in negligence for any actual injuries to consumers resulting from

its erroneous decision.413 On occasion, however, a manufacturer may
fail to establish adequate quality control procedures in flagrant dis-

regard of the possibility that consumers may be excessively injured as a
406. Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County,
Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1972). The case was settled prior to trial for $458,500. See
Sacramento Bee, Aug. 28, 1975, § B, at 2, col. 3.
407. Brief for Plaintiff at 10, Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, cited note 406 supra.
408. Id. at 2, 11.
409. See id. at 516, 11-13.
410. In this section, it is assumed that the excessive hazard present in the product,
which resulted either from defective design or production processes, is in fact
hidden from the manufacturer. In some cases, however, the manufacturer will design
a product in a manner that it knows will expose consumers to an excessive risk of
harm. For example, in Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), discussed in notes 474-80 infra and accompanying text, the Project Manager "admitted at trial that at the time that he
designed the transformer he had anticipated that it might catch fire in customers'
homes." 523 F.2d at 105. The conduct in this type of case may be characterized
as the design of a product in conscious disregard of a serious risk to consumers.
This of course is substantially more culpable than a manufacturer's reckless failure
to discover a product hazard, the more typical form of misbehavior that may also
appropriately support a punitive damages judgment.
411. See G. PETERS, supra note 235, at 59-60.
412. See Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, supra note 50, at 447; note 236
supra and accompanying text.
413. See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 372, at § 6.01[l].
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result.414 If a consumer is injured as a consequence of this sort of
quality control misbehavior, punitive damages would be in order.
Juries have awarded punitive damages in several reported cases
involving impure drugs, food, and beverages that were marketed as a
result of inadequate quality control, but these have all been overturned
by the trial or appellate court for inadequate evidence of reckless
418
or intentional misconduct. 415 In one unreported case of this type,
the jury tentatively decided 417 to assess a local Pepsi-Cola bottling
company $6,500 in punitive damages when the plaintiff became ill
after drinking from a bottle of Pepsi-Cola that contained a rusty nail.
The jury had heard evidence on the frequency with which the bottlecleaning solution and brushes were changed, and the manager of the
bottling plant had admitted that an electronic scanning device, equipment the defendant did not own, would have detected the.rusty nail.
The trial judge, however, instructed the jury that punitive damages
could not be awarded because the plaintiff had not shown that the
defendant knew the nail was in the bottle or had intended to harm
the plaintiff. 418 This instruction reflects a very narrow view of the
conduct for which punitive damages may be awarded. Instead, the
jury should probably have been allowed to determine from all the
evidence whether the manufacturer's purity control procedures
demonstrated a reckless disregard of consumer safety.419 Particularly compelling evidence under this standard would be the manufacturer's failure to make relatively inexpensive quality control improvements after learning that existing procedures were inadequately
detecting impure products that were causing consumers substantial
harm.

42 0

The manufacturer alone has the ability to screen out many
product hazards that are hidden from the consumer. 42 1 A plaintiff
414. For example, to cut costs, a manufacturer may choose to omit a finishing
process and then structure its "quality" control procedure to let such "unfinished"
products through. Costs will indeed be cut; so too may be the fingers and hands
of thousands of consumers whose injuries will rarely be serious enough to make litigation economically feasible unless punitive damages are recoverable.
415. See, e.g., Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 690, 146 S.E.
805 (1929); Crews v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 Mo. App. 993, 225 S,E.
2d 912 (1949).
416. Brown v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., No. 13,851 (C.P., Dorchester County,
S.C., Nov. 26, 1974).
417. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
418. Letter from Reese I. Joye, Jr., to David G. Owen, July 16, 1975.
419. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
420. See notes 458-94 infra and accompanying text.
421. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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who can successfully attribute his injuries to prototype testing or
quality control procedures so grossly inadequate in view of the
known risks as to constitute a reckless indifference to the public
safety should be permitted to recover punitive damages.
4.

Failureto Warn of Known Dangers

The assumption underlying the requirement that a manufacturer
test the design of its products is that the manufacturer will take whatever steps are reasonably necessary to correct or to minimize hazards
discovered by such tests. For example, if initial tests identify a
potential defect, further tests may be required to determine the
nature and extent of the danger presented. 22 Ideally, such tests
would reveal whether the product needs to be redesigned or merely
labelled with a suitable warning to help reduce the particular risk. 23
In a fairly large proportion of the cases studied, punitive damages
claims were based at least in part on a theory that the manufacturer
had recklessly failed to warn consumers adequately of a known and
serious hazard in its product.
Consumers themselves can often most efficiently monitor the
safety performance of products inclined to develop dangerous weaknesses during their useful lives, and manufacturers of such products
thus should be allowed to shift this responsibility to them. However,
when a manufacturer delegates this responsibility, it should also
inform users of the procedures necessary to test the product for
developing failures. This is particularly true when the product is
as complex and potentially dangerous as an airplane. In Engebreth
v. FairchildHiller Corp., 4 for example, the defendant manufacturer
of the F-27 aircraft had been informed by its designer of tests in
which fatigue cracking of the outer wing had caused catastrophic
wing failures.42 5 Claims for compensatory and punitive damages
were brought against the defendant for the wrongful deaths of four
persons killed when apa in-flight wing failure of this type resulted in
a crash. Perhaps the most serious allegation of misconduct was Fairchild's failure to provide information and assistance necessary to
enable owners properly to inspect wing surfaces periodically for
422. See note 393 supra and accompanying text.
423. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in Product Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CoRNELL L. R v. 495 (1976).
424. No. A-9-71 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1971).
425. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 2-4, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., cited note 424 supra.
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developing fatigue cracks. The defendant admitted that an ownerinspection process was necessary to help prevent catastrophic wing
failure; that accordingly it had assured the FAA that Fairchild would
instruct and assist F-27 owners in establishing proper X-ray structural
inspection programs; and that the aircraft's owner had specifically
informed Fairchild that his employees were "not very experienced
at reading X-rays. ' 426 Nevertheless, Fairchild failed to so instruct
owners until after the accident,4 2 7 and there was even some evidence
that Fairchild had used a particular X-ray technique because it tended
to conceal the full extent of fatigue cracking in the wing.425 Infact,
the revised inspection program ordered by the FAA after the crash
revealed serious fatigue cracking in the wings of at least nine of
the first sixty-five F-27s sold.420 Most of this evidence was admitted
by the defendant and, after the trial judge had ruled that the punitive
damages claim was proper,43 0 the case was settled prior to trial for
more than $2 million. This large settlement probably reflected the
likelihood of a large punitive damages award. 43 '
In several cases that have proceeded to trial, juries have returned
punitive damages verdicts for a manufacturer's reckless failure to
warn adequately of a serious known defect in the product. One such
case, Johnson v. Husky Industries, Inc.,4 ' - was an action for the

wrongful death of a family of four by asphyxiation from carbon
monoxide fumes emitted by charcoal briquets that the defendant had
manufactured and packaged. The only warning on the bag of
briquets stated: "CAUTION-FOR INDOOR USE-COOK ONLY
IN PROPERLY VENTILATED AREAS." The plaintiffs contended that before the bag of briquets at issue was marketed, Husky
had learned that its product could be lethal when used indoors without sufficient ventilation.4 3 Finding that the failure to provide an
426. Id. at 7.
427. Id. at 8.
428. Id. at 9.
429. Id.
430. Unpublished Memorandum and Order, Engebreth v. Fairchild Hiller Corp.,
cited note 424 supra, Nov. 20, 1972.
431. One plaintiff recovered $760,000, two recovered $600,000 apiece, and the
fourth recovered $110,000 for a total settlement of $2,070,000. Id. The plaintiffs'
lawyer speculated that the case would have been settled for "at least $750,000 to
$1,000,000 less had it not been for the punitive damages question or the case might
have gone to trial." Letter from Bernard P. Kelly, attorney for plaintiffs, to David
G. Owen, June 24, 1975.
432. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1976). See note 445 infra for another case against
Husky on similar facts.
433. An officer of the defendant testified that he knew of the general risk prior
to the accident. On appeal, however, the court ruled that the evidence was insuffi-
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adequate warning was grossly negligent under these circumstances,
the jury found for the plaintiffs on both compensatory and punitive

damages claims. 4
A comparison of two unrelated wrongful death actions against
Beech Aircraft Corporation, 48 5 both involving claims that the manufacturer had recklessly failed to warn of a known danger, may further

assist in determining when a failure to warn warrants a punitive damages award. In both cases the persons were killed or injured when
a Beech Baron aircraft crashed after engine failure caused by fuel

starvation. Beech Aircraft knew from a March 13, 1968, test report
that a defect in the aircraft's fuel system design would cause fuel

starvation ("unporting") 4s8 if the aircraft engaged in certain maneuvers when its fuel level was low. 48 7 The plane involved in Pease

v. Beech Aircraft Corp.418 crashed on June 25, 1968, before its
owner had been warned of the defect. The plaintiffs brought their
action in fraud, and the jury awarded them substantial compensatory

and punitive damages.4 "9
Corp.4 10

The plane in Kritser v. Beech Aircraft

crashed on October 25, 1968, after the defendant had

added the following warning to its flight manual: "Flight Operation
'CAUTION' To prevent fuel flow interruption, avoid prolonged
operation in a slip or skid attitude under low fuel conditions."'441 The
jury awarded compensatory damages after finding that the warning
was inadequate to protect the plaintiff pilot who had unsuccessfully
cient to establish the requisite culpability for punitive damages, due in part to the
weakness of the plaintiffs proof of earlier successful lawsuits against the defendant
See note 445 infra.
based on the same hazard. - F.2d lt -.
434. The total verdict was for $425,000, which was divided equally between compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion
for j.n.o.v. or for a new trial was reversed by the Sixth Circuit as to punitive damages
and affirmed as to compensatory damages. - F.2d at -.
435. Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973), and Pease
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
436. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 459, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 421. See also 479 F.2d at 1091.
437. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 458, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 421-22.
438. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
439. The trial judge, however, subsequently ordered a new trial on the punitive
damages issue on grounds unrelated to the conduct of the defendant. The court held,
first, that the representatives of the four persons killed in the crash could not recover
punitive damages because the legislative history behind California's wrongful death
act precluded awards in such cases. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 459-62, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
422-24. Secondly, the court upheld the trial court's order granting a new trial on
the jury award of $3,450,000 in punitive damages made to the owner of the airplane,
also a plaintiff in the action against Beech, because of an erroneous jury instruction
on the elements required to sustain an action in fraud. Specifically, the element
of reliance was omitted from the charge. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 462-65, 113 Cal. Rptr.
424-26. See note 443 infra.
440. 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
441. 479 F.2d at 1094.
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attempted to heed it. The trial judge, however, held that there was

and thus withdrew the punitive damno evidence of gross negligence
44 2
jury.
the
from
ages claim
The fact situations in Pease, Kritser and Johnson all pose the
same fundamental question: did the defendant's failure to warn consumers exhibit such a flagrant disregard for their safety that punitive
damages should be assessed?

Had the plaintiffs in Pease relied on

a general theory of reckless failure to warn of a known danger,
instead of on fraud, the jury would have been required to determine
whether Beech's failure to warn owners more promptly of a defect

in its aircraft amounted to a flagrant disregard for their safety.r

3

In

442. In affirming, the circuit court reasoned:
Mhe jury determined that Beech Aircraft gave Kritser notice of fuel displacement under some circumstances and warned him against prolonged slips. The
fact that the company took such steps to inform Kritser of potential danger
absolved Beech Aircraft of liability only for punitive but not compensatory damages. The defendant did not exhibit the conscious indifference toward the puband there is no evidence that
lic which generally typifies gross negligence, ...
it committed any wilful act or omission.
479 F.2d at 1097 (footnote omitted).
443. In most cases in which the plaintiff can establish a fraudulent attempt by
the manufacturer to mislead the public concerning a material product hazard, the
plaintiff should also be in a position to establish that the defendant failed to warn
the public in reckless disregard of the presence of the hazard in the product. The
plaintiffs in Pease were somewhat restricted, however, by the language of the California statute that permits punitive damages awards only "where the defendant has been
guilty of oppression, fraud or malice .... ." CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 3294 (1970).
Some courts have construed the statutory words "oppression" and "malice" narrowly
to exclude "reckless" or "wanton" misconduct. See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); note 505 infra. But see
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
The plaintiffs in Pease thus may have felt compelled to base their punitive damages
claim upon an allegation of fraud. This was rather unfortunate for the airplane
owner in Pease, since the judge neglected to charge the jury on the element of reliance. See also Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 590, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 703 (1976).
A general requirement in products liability litigation that would restrict punitive
damages awards to cases in which there has been provable fraud not only would
be doctrinally unsound but also would give rise to significant and unnecessary difficulties. In some cases, a plaintiff will be able to trace his injury to a defect in
a product that was kept on the market in a defective condition only because of the
manufacturer's success in misleading the public concerning the product's safety.
Many such plaintiffs, however, will be unable to point to any specific act of fraudulent-type behavior on which they relied to their detriment and thus will fail if they
base their claims upon the traditional theory of fraud and deceit. If, on the other
hand, these plaintiffs were allowed to proceed on a theory of reckless failure to warn,
they would be entitled under modern principles to a presumption that they would
have read and heeded the warning. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d
1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Natl. Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. App. 1975).
This is the better result. While the manufacturer in this type of case may not intend
to mislead specific consumers by its fraudulent-type conduct, the deceitful conduct
very probably is intended to mislead some persons in order to keep the product on
the market in a condition that it knows will expose all consumers to an excessive
risk of harm. Cf. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 577, 120 Cal. Rptr.
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Kritser and Johnson, on the other hand, scrutiny should properly
have focused on whether the inadequacy of the warning actually

given exhibited such a disregard for consumer safety. Assuming the
evidence in Johnson was sufficient for the jury to find that Husky

knew of the risk of asphyxiation, 44 4 the trial court was probably correct in allowing the jury to find as reckless, if not conscious, miscon-

duct the defendant's failure to convey in its warning any notion of
the actual extent or nature of the danger presented. 4 5 Kritser, however, is a more difficult case. The warning did indicate in general

terms the true nature of the risk, but the conditions of operation that
would trigger a failure were described so vaguely that some pilots

might be unable to put the information to practical use. While it
could be argued that the warning was so vague as to show a reckless
indifference to the safety of aircraft owners, it could also be argued

that the manufacturer expected the warning to be read by experienced pilots who would appreciate the nature and seriousness of the

danger.

It thus may have appeared to the trial judge that the

defendant showed at least the rudiments of a good faith attempt to

warn consumers adequately, and from this perspective the court was
probably correct in withdrawing the punitive damages claim from the
jury.
Warnings may be inadequate not only in substance but also in
the manner in which they are communicated. Even the best of
warnings will be worthless unless certain conditions are met: first,
the warning must be likely to reach the consumer or someone who
will act on his behalf; second, it must be transmitted in a way likely
to attract his attention; and, third, it must be in a form that he is likely
to understand.
681 (1975); Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Causation, 2
HoFsTm L. REv. 561, 563-65 (1974). Perhaps the reliance of some can fairly be
imputed to all. Alternatively, all consumers could be said to rely upon an implicit
representation of product manufacturers that all necessary warnings have been supplied and that when product defects are discovered they will not be deceitfully covered up. Cf. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1969); Shapo, supra note 169, at 1367-68. See also R. NoSMTRoM, LAW OF SALES
209 (1970) ("The court's task is to determine whether that injury was caused by
a defect in the product, and any statements made by the seller designed to induce
the public to buy his product are relevant in making this determination. . . . The
'basis of the bargain' is also the item purchased, and a part of that bargain includes
the statements which the seller made about what he sold").
444. See note 433 supra.
445. See Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 54 Mich. App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137,
affd., 393 Mich. 136, 223 N.W.2d 290 (1974) (reversing a directed verdict for the
defendant in a similar case involving a death and an injury claimed to have been
attributable to the inadequacy of the warning provided by Husky on its bags of charcoal briquettes).
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Illustrative is Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,44 in which an
action was brought against a drug manufacturer for eye injuries
attributable to the use of chloroquine phosphate, a prescription drug
marketed under the trade name "Aralen." The plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages was based on allegations that the manufacturer had

inadequately warned the FDA and the medical profession that the
drug could cause retinal damage.447

Sterling Drug showed in

defense that once it learned of the danger its salespersons warned
physicians by mailing or personally delivering product cards and promotional brochures containing the necessary warning. Nevertheless,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the district court's
refusal to submit the punitive damages claim to the jury and

remanded on that issue, 448 holding that the manufacturer's duty "was
to warn of retinal damage in a manner which could be expected to
alert the medical profession. '449 Pointing to evidence that many
physicians pay little attention to comments of drug company salespersons or to promotional literature received in the mail, the court stated
that a drug manufacturer "must be charged with knowledge of the
workings of the distribution system" it selects to convey its warnings
to the medical community. 450 The court concluded that on these
facts a jury could properly find that Sterling's "failure to take action
reasonably calculated to warn physicians of a risk of great magnitude
446. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
447. 485 F.2d at 144-45 n.41.
448. 485 F.2d at 147.
449. 485 F.2d at 146-47.
450. 485 F.2d at 146. The court suggested by way of example that in this case
an adequate warning should have been included at an earlier date in the Physician's
Desk Reference or in "Drug Precaution" letters individually sent to physicians. 485
F.2d at 147. It is noteworthy that the court "charges" the defendant with knowledge
that may be used in partial support of a punitive damages award. There are some
undeniable overtones of strict accountability in this phraseology, and the thrust of
the statement may be that the failure of a manufacturer to have knowledge of the
workings of its distribution system will automatically be deemed to be a reckless
omission when the proper operation of the system is necessary to prevent the public
from being exposed to a hazard known to exist in the product.
Despite the novelty of "charging" a defendant with knowledge of its business
in the punitive damages context, and it may indeed be proper in this context, the
principle is an accepted one in products liability law involving claims for compensatory damages. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1277 (5th
Cir. 1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 139, at 1541; Noel, supra note
390, at 847-55. This principle was noted in the first reported products liability case
awarding punitive damages. Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 182, 13 B. Mon. 219,
228 (1852). Rather than "charging" a defendant with knowledge of his business,
perhaps the same result could be achieved more comfortably in punitive damages
litigation by utilizing an evidentiary presumption that product manufacturers understand the nature of their particular callings.
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was in reckless disregard of the public's health" and that a jury thus
would have grounds for a punitive damages award. 451
Finally, there are cases in which a substantively adequate warning is properly conveyed to a consumer who comprehends the risk
but is nevertheless incapable of taking practical steps to reduce it.
Judicial opinions in such cases often discuss the sufficiency of the
warning; however, these cases are more properly analyzed by focusing on the adequacy of the product's design. The latter approach
is more appropriate because the obligation to warn arises only when
a warning could in some way help to reduce the risk of harm. Thus,
if a warning cannot adequately protect consumers, and if a product
can reasonably be redesigned to reduce the risk, -the warning no
matter how complete is hardly "adequate" to remedy an unreason45
able risk of harm. 1
In Moore v. Jewell Tea Co.,4 53 for example, the plaintiff

sustained eye injuries when a can of "Drano" drain-cleaner exploded
on the counter as she was preparing to use it. The court upheld
a jury award of punitive damages against the manufacturer primarily
on the ground that it had failed to warn consumers of a known and
serious risk of harm."54 Yet the defendant's failure to warn consumers
should have been irrelevant to a determination of liability for either
punitive or compensatory damages. Perhaps the plaintiff could have
worn goggles to protect herself had she in fact been warned, but clearly
it would be unreasonable to expect her to do so. Since even a complete warning in this case would have been inadequate to protect
the plaintiff, the inquiry for both compensatory and punitive damages
liability should have focused exclusively on the adequacy of the
design and testing of the Drano container.455
It is axiomatic that a manufacturer owes a duty to consumers to
451. 485 F.2d at 147. After five weeks of retrial the case was settled for
$600,000, see 18 A.T.L.A.N.L. 120 (1975), $163,000 in excess of the original verdict
for compensatory damages. See 485 F.2d at 135. Several pretrial matters on the
remand of the case are reported in 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
452. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 423, at
501-05, 517-21.
2d 288, 263
453. 116 111. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), afid., 46 Ill.
N.E.2d 103 (1970) (no discussion of punitive damages issue in Supreme Court opinion).
App. 2d at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649 (jury award of $920,000 in
454. 116 Ill.
compensatory damages to plaintiff and her husband and $10,000"in punitive damages
to plaintiff).
455. In fact, in addition to the failure of the manufacturer to warn of the danger, an important basis for the court's decision sustaining the punitive damages verdict was the defendant's failure to test the container to determine whether it could
safely contain the cleaning substance that it knew to be potentially explosive. 116
Il. App. 2d at 136, 253 N.E.2d at 649.
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warn them adequately of hidden dangers in its products. 4"0 If the
manufacturer knows of a danger and is able to convey this information effectively to consumers at reasonable expense, the failure to
take such action may evidence a flagrant indifference to public
safety. Punitive damages may then be appropriate. Moreover, if
a manufacturer consciously withholds information of a substantial
hazard from consumers to protect its general reputation and its
marketing of the product, 457 a punitive damages assessment would
appear necessary both to punish the defendant and to make it clear
that such behavior will be neither tolerated by society nor profitable
for the manufacturer.
5.

Post-MarketingFailuresto Remedy Known Dangers

The discussion to this point has primarily considered whether it
is proper to characterize as flagrant misconduct a manufacturer's
decision to market a product it knows is likely to be excessively
dangerous." 8 Occasionally, however, a manufacturer learns that its
product is likely to be defective only after the product has reached
consumers. These cases raise two questions: first, whether the
manufacturer is under any legal duty to remedy defects in its
products that are already in use; and, second, if there is such a duty,
under what circumstances its breach should give rise to a claim for
punitive damages.
Although a manufacturer's post-sale responsibilities to consumers
have yet to be clearly defined, several courts have enunciated a rule
requiring manufacturers to take "all reasonable means" to remedy
defects discovered in products already marketed. 4 9 This rule was
456. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388, 402A, comment 1
(1965); 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRiEDMAN, supra note 372, at § 8; Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directionsfor Use and the Duty To Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955);
Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Description of the Model of Decision, 53 TEXAS
L. REv. 1375 (1975); Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions
or Warnings, 23 Sw, L.J. 256, 264-67 (1969); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 423.
457. See notes 181-84 supra and accompanying text; notes 478, 489-90 infra and
accompanying text.
458. Alternatively, the manufacturer's marketing decision might reflect a conscious disregard for consumer safety where the manufacturer simply has no knowledge of whether the product might be unduly hazardous due to the gross inadequacies
in its testing or inspection procedures. See notes 390-421 supra and accompanying
text.
459. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959),
is apparently the progenitor of the rule. Accord, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CurtisWright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969); Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1965). See also Balido v. Improved
Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 2d 644, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Patterson, Products
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applied in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,4 6 which
involved a claim against the manufacturer of an aircraft engine for
compensatory damages resulting from a crash that occurred when
overheating caused a cylinder to fail and to separate from the engine.
The plaintiffs claimed the defendant learned of the design defect
nearly eight months before the crash yet had failed to take effective
remedial action. In reversing the trial court's directed verdict for
the defendant on the negligence claims, the Second Circuit articulated the nature of a manufacturer's post-sale duties to consumers:
"It is clear that after such a product has been sold and dangerous
defects in design have come to the manufacturer's attention, the
manufacturer has a duty either to remedy these or, if complete
remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and
instructions concerning methods for minimizing the danger." 461
Defining liability for compensatory damages in these terms raises
a problem in determining what additional culpability is needed to
support a claim for punitive damages in a post-marketing case. That
is, according to the Braniff Airways test, the misconduct that must
be proved to recover compensatory damages-failing to remedy a
known and reasonably curable defect-is very similar to the kind of
misconduct usually sufficient for punitive damages in the pre-sale
cases.4 2 The primary problem, then, is whether there is any difference in post-sale cases between the standard of liability for compensatory damages and that for punitive damages. A corollary problem
is whether punitive damages may be awarded at all in such cases.
A solution is to assume that the Braniff Airways court simply
articulated a test for compensatory damages liability in terms that
reflected the facts of the case and did not even consider whether
punitive damages may in fact have been appropriate. The court
most likely was neither attempting to exclude manufacturers less culpable than the defendant from post-sale liability for compensatory
damages nor to rule out liability for punitive damages in all postsale cases. This interpretation would be the most desirable since
it would permit a manufacturer to be held answerable in negligence
for compensatory damages if it did not know, but should have known,
that its marketed product contained a defect requiring remedial
Liability: The Manufacturer's Continuing Duty To Improve His Product or Warn
of Defects After Sale, in P. RHMGOLD & S. BmNmAUM, PRODUCT LsmMrny: LAw,
PRACTECE, SCiENCE (2d ed. 1975).
460. 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959 (1969).
461. 411 F.2d at 453.
462. See notes 422-57 supra and accompanying text.

1354

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1257

action. 43 If the manufacturer were then shown to have learned of
a probable defect in its marketed product, its failure to warn consumers or to recall the product might justify a punitive damages
award as well.
The failure of a manufacturer to remedy a known defect in an
already marketed product has been important in several products
liability cases in which punitive damages claims have been made.
For example, a basis for the punitive damages claim in Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc. was the defendant's failure to warn consumers
promptly once it learned from users of its drug that it contained a
risk of serious side effects.4 64 In Deemer v. A. H. Robins Co.,4"'
the plaintiff based her punitive damages claim in part on the IUD
manufacturer's failure to mail remedial "Dear Doctor" letters once
40
it learned of the seriousness of the dangers in using the device. "
In Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div.,4 17 the large size of the punitive

damages award 46 1 can be partly explained by evidence that the company knew of similar fatigue failures in its engines yet neglected to
recall the defective engines or even to warn owners of the danger. 40
The plaintiff's evidence also indicated that until 1962 the defendant's
service department had no procedure for retaining, much less analyzing, complaints of engine failures; 470 that the company had made no
463. Cf. Lorenz, Some Comparative Aspects of the European Unification of the
Law of Products Liability, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1005, 1015 (1975) ("[The consumer] may expect a manufacturer to constantly observe his products after having
put them into the stream of commerce. In other words, the manufacturer is under
a duty of product observation ...

).

464. 485 F.2d 132, 145-47 (3d Cir. 1973).
465. No. C-26420 (Dist. Ct., Sedgwick County, Kan., filed Oct. 1972), appeal
filed, No. 48,504, Kan. Sup. CL, Aug. 23, 1976.
466. Pretrial Order at 4, Deemer v. A.H. Robins Co., cited note 465 supra.
467. No. 202715 (Super. Ct. Santa Clara County, Cal., March 8, 1972), affd.,
No. 32,999, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 24, 1976, cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Cal.
(1976).
468. The amount of punitive damages assessed by the jury against the defendant
was $10,500,000.
469. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 46-52, Rosendin v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited
note 467 supra.
470. Id. at 46-47. The failure of manufacturers of products that are likely
to be particularly hazardous if defective to maintain any system for receiving and
considering product failure information from the field may well indicate a conscious
or reckless disregard for consumer safety. The Consumer Product Safety Commission proposed a rule pursuant to section 16(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act,
15 U.S.C. 1 2065(b) (Supp. IV 1974), that would require product manufacturers
to maintain files of consumer complaints: "The proposal under consideration would
require records of all consumer product safety complaints to be maintained in an
accessible location for a period of at least five years from receipt." 39 Fed. Reg.
31,916 (1975). "Although the proposed rule may have an effect on private products
liability litigation, the Commission believes that the proposed rule is within its authority and it believes that the benefit to be obtained from the ability to monitor
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effort to solicit information on engine failures from its customers; and

that the company even had an unwritten policy of not taking corrective action until it was notified of a failure rate of between one and
472
two per cent. 47 1 Finally, in Johnson v. Huskey Industries, Inc.,
in an opinion denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict,
the trial judge held that the jury could reasonably find the defendant
grossly negligent for failing to add an adequate warning to its unsold

bags of charcoal briquets, after earlier claims had been made against
the company for deaths purportedly caused by the product. 47 3
A consideration of three recent cases will further help to clarify

the type of post-marketing conduct that may support a punitive damages claim. Gillham v. Admiral Corp.4 4 was an action brought
against the manufacturer of color television sets by a seventy-fiveyear-old woman who was severely burned when her set caught fire.
The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive

damages and attorneys' fees, but the district court vacated the awards
of punitive damages and attorneys' fees upon motion of the defend-

ant. 475 The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, however, ordering
that judgment be entered upon the verdict.476 The evidence indi-

cated that the fire had been caused by a defectively designed high
voltage transformer; that the defendant knew of at least ninety-one
similar fires, some of which had likewise burned homes and caused
personal injuries, over the four-year period preceding the failure of
the plaintiff's set; that two years before the plaintiff's injury, all six-

teen transformers tested by one of the defendant's own engineers
consumer product safety complaints requires that the rule proposed be issued." Id.
Violation of the rule could subject the manufacturer to civil or criminal penalties
under the Act. Id. The proposed rule, however, has not yet been adopted. See
note 531 infra.
471. Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 469, at 47; see Order of Court at 3, Rosendin
v. Avco Lycoming Div., cited note 467 supra (unpublished opinion of trial court
granting motion for new trial on punitive damages, June 7, 1972). As the Brief
for Plaintiffs explained,
Any failures at all are intolerable .

. .

.

In view of the serious consequences

of a failure of an aircraft part, failures are not allowable in the industry, and
every effort should be made to prevent them. . .. While you are waiting for
the data to build up to a predetermined level of one, one and a half per cent
or whatever per cent is established, the only way you get data is through accidents.
Brief for Plaintiffs at 51.
472. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1976).
473. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5, Johnson v. Huskey Indus., Inc.,
Civil No. 3008 (E.D. Tenn. May 29, 1975). The punitive damages verdict was
reversed on appeal. See notes 432-34 supra and accompanying text.
474. 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
475. The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages of $125,000, punitive damages of $100,000, and attorneys' fees of $50,000.00." 523 F.2d at 104.
476. 523 F.2d at 109.
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had caught fire; 4 7 7 and that the manufacturer not only failed to recall
the sets or even to warn consumers of the hazard, but also systematically attempted through its complaint manager,47 8 and even its
477. 523 F.2d at 105-06.
478. 523 F.2d at 106-07. The pattern of deliberate frustration of consumer
complaints in Gillham is startling:
[W]hen a motel owner who had 20 Admiral sets in his motel inquired as to
whether there was a defect after one set burned in a motel room, Admiral wrote
him a letter telling him to place a claim with his insurance company, but not
answering his question. Numerous individuals who inquired about the risk of
fire in their sets received similar treatment. In April, 1970, a customer asked
about the safety of color TV sets after her high voltage transformer had burned
from what Admiral called a "normal transformer failure." I.F. Johnson, who
was in charge of receiving and processing fire complaints, did not answer her
question. He did tell her that she should go to her own insurance company,
and he did write to an Admiral Service Manager saying, "We prefer not to answer some of the customer's questions in a letter...." In another fire case
in March, 1971, Johnson wrote to an Admiral representative, saying the customer would be given a new transformer free, if necessary, because the customer
... asked some very pointed questions relative to fires, and I would like to
see him satisfied .... ." Other customers received no answers or evasive answers when they inquired as to the hazard after experiencing a fire in an Admiral color TV set.
Brief for Plaintiff at 28-29, Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975).
The company also practiced outright deceit. On May 4, 1970, with reports of more
than 150 fires in its records, Admiral falsely reassured two customers: "It would
seem evident from the information contained in your letter that it may be the high
voltage transformer has developed an electrical defect. This would cause some smoke
and an odor but not any flame that could damage your set or property." Id. at
31. Similarly, a few months later, I.F. Johnson sent the following answer to a customer who reported a fire in his Admiral color television that damaged his house:
'The damage to your set could occur from improper service such as the incorrect
setting of the high voltage by a technician, using an incorrect part or using a part
not recommended by the Admiral Corporation. The fact that the set did operate
for a period of five years indicates that it was basically designed in accordance with
the technique and parts available at the time of manufacture." Id. at 31. Admiral
failed to tell this customer that the engineer who designed the transformer "anticipated that it might catch fire in customers' homes." 523 F.2d at 108. Nor was
the customer informed that the net addition to the production cost of installing safe
transformers in some models, as other manufacturers had done for years, was only
sixty cents. 523 F.2d at 107-08 n.3.
Admiral even deceived its own insurance company. In 1971, when the insurance
company inquired whether Admiral had knowledge of any fires caused by television
sets similar to one that had burned down the house of one claimant, I.F. Johnson
had eleven fire reports on the same model in his file. He received the last report
on the day that he informed Admiral's insurer that Admiral had not had any fires
in the model. Brief for Plaintiff, supra, at 33.
An attorneys' fee award to the plaintiff, at least, appears appropriate in this context. One of the narrow situations in which the Supreme Court has held that attorneys' fees may be granted in federal equity cases in the absence of statutory authority
occurs when the defendant has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. - .. " Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S.
240, 258-59 (1975), citing F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974); see note 154 supra. The Court has applied this standard and awarded
attorneys' fees in a case in which the defendant shipowner ignored the plaintiff seaman's attempts to secure from the defendant illness compensation to which he was
clearly entitled under the law of maintenance and cure:
In the instant case respondents were callous in their attitude, making no investigation of libellant's claim and by their silence neither admitting nor denying
it. As a result of that recalcitrance, libellant was forced to hire a lawyer and
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counsel, 479 to conceal the defect from consumers and to frustrate
inquiries about the danger. When a manufacturer fails to take any
steps whatsoever to remedy a hazard as serious as that in Giliham,
even though it clearly knows of both the specific defect and the
seriousness of the risk to consumers, a punitive damages assessment
is particularly appropriate." s
A second recent case in which the jury awarded both compensatory and punitive damages against a manufacturer for breaching its
post-marketing obligations is Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.4 81 In this case the plaintiff physician burned an eye when
electricity discharged from the metallic end of the eyepiece of a
resectoscope (a surgical telescope) he was using. The jury assessed
go to a court to get what was plainly owed him under laws that are centuries
old. The default was wilifull and persistent. It is difficult to imagine a clearer
case of damages suffered for failure to pay maintenance than this one.
Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). While the dissent expressed
the view that counsel fees were an improper element of compensatory damages, it
did state that a punitive damages award would be appropriate under the circumstances
if the refusal to pay were shown to have "stemmed from a wanton and intentional
369 U.S. at 540 (Stewart, J.,
disregard of the legal rights of the seaman ......
dissenting).
The Gillham situation is clearly analogous to Vaughan. It is probable that the
motivation of a manufacturer, like Admiral, in frustrating inquiries from consumers
who have suffered losses from product failures is to avoid revealing to the public
that its product is indeed defective. A manufacturer might seek to conceal the defectiveness of its product both to protect its general reputation and to reduce the number
of consumers learning that their legal rights may have been violated by the manufacturer in order to avoid compensating for such injuries. See note 490 infra and
accompanying text; notes 176-77, 457 supra and accompanying text. In short, a
manufacturer's motivation for intentionally frustrating inquiries from injured consumers may "stem from a wanton and intentional disregard of the legal rights" of the
inquiring consumers.
479. On April 11, 1973, a memorandum was sent by one of Admiral's in-house
legal counsel to the official in charge of "product safety" asking whether Admiral
"could keep claimants under better 'control' in cases such as this by informing the
claimant that the matter has been referred to [the company's] insurance company
who will contact them shortly. Alternatively, [the company] could inform them
that a representative of National Service will make contact. . . . [S]o informed,
claimant would be less inclined to get a lawyer involved." Brief for Plaintiff, supra
note 478, at 34.
480. Plaintiff's counsel in Gillham argued cogently on appeal:
Considering Admiral's certain knowledge that its color TV sets were fire
hazardous and its knowledge of the frequency with which such Admiral sets
were igniting in customers' homes, and considering the extreme danger to which
this exposed plaintiff and others, Admiral's failure to eliminate the hazard, or
to warn plaintiff and others of the hazard, constitutes legal malice which justifies
and even demands that Admiral be punished by the imposition of punitive damages. The only inferrable motive for Admiral's conduct is that Admiral consciously decided to perpetuate the hazard, because to eliminate it might have
been costly, and to warn its customers might have adversely affected sales. Thus,
solely for financial gain, Admiral deliberately exposed Mrs. Gillham to the fire
hazard which, as was forseeable [sic], caused a fire, burned her severely, and
permanently ruined her life.
Brief for Plaintiff at 45, Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975).
481. 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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$475,000 compensatory and $200,000 punitive damages against the
manufacturer. The court upheld the compensatory damages award,
but granted the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages award, holding that the evidence was "insufficient as
a matter of law to demonstrate that type of 'outrageous conduct' on
which an award of punitive damages must depend." A "somewhat
obscure reference in the medical literature" had indicated as early
as 1959 that injuries to the cornea could result from electrical arcing
on the uninsulated eyepiece. Although the particular eyepiece
model that injured the plaintiff was designed to be used only with
a camera, the defendant had known at least since 1969 that physicians
were using the camera model eyepiece with the naked eye; yet it
neglected until 1973 either to warn of the danger or to recall the
camera model eyepieces for proper insulation.48 2 In the seventeen
years that the resectoscope had been on the market before the plaintiff's injury, however, the defendant had received only one report
of a similar accident, and the user in that case suffered only a burned
48 3
eyebrow.
Such a long history of safe use suggests that the risk of injury
from the product was very small. On the other hand, it probably
would not have been too costly for the manufacturer to warn all
known owners of this specialty instrument since the number was
probably quite small and the defendant or its sales agents probably
had records of their names and addresses. The jury in awarding
punitive damages must have been convinced that the defendant
knew of the danger by 1969 at the latest; that the danger plainly
outweighed the cost of warning users of the product; and that consequently the defendant's failure to warn manifested a reckless disregard for the safety of users uninformed as to the risk. Nevertheless,
in the absence of other evidence that the defendant knew its product contained a substantial risk of eye injury, the long period of safe
use appears to justify the court's overruling of the punitive damages
verdict.
The last recent case to be considered is Scott v. Outboard
Marine Corp.4 4 In June 1970 two persons were riding in a nineteen foot, 210 horsepower inboard-outboard boat built by the
defendant when the steering mechanism suddenly failed. The boat
482. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motions for Judgment
N.O.V. or for a New Trial at 12, Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,
cited note 481 supra.
483. Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Claim for Punitive Damages
at 2, Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., cited note 481 supra.
484. Civil No. 71-1661 Civ JLK (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 28, 1971).
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spun out of control, threw the riders into the water and then struck
them, killing one and seriously injuring the other. The failure
resulted from a design defect in the steering system that made it particularly susceptible to corrosion.485 A company report in 1965 first
indicated steering system failures caused by corrosion,48 6 and by
early 1969 the company's main test facility was reporting similar failures with some frequency. For example, there were steering system
failures in seven of seventeen boats of a particular model tested over
an eighteen-month period. Other reports stressed both the seriousness of the danger and the need for an immediate remedy. 48 T One
memorandum, prepared shortly after the steering on the boat of the
chairman of the defendant's Board of Directors had failed in April
1969, stated prophetically: 488"One of these days, someone's going to
get hurt-hope it isn't me."
Recognizing the emergency nature of this problem, the defendant's engineering change committee in July 1969 ordered a simple
design change: the substitution of a stainless steel retaining ring for
the bronze one that had been causing the corrosion problems. The
company decided the following month that the problem was serious
enough to make the change on all boats held by the company and
its distributors, generally wholly owned subsidiaries, but -thatthe substitution, estimated to cost five dollars per boat for both materials
and labor, should stop at that level. Thus, the defendant deliberately kept its dealers and existing owners ignorant of both the hazard
and the simple, inexpensive means to eliminate it. 489 The plaintiffs
contended that the manufacturer's decision, probably made to protect
its reputation and to save the relatively small expense involved in
informing retailers and owners, 40manifested a conscious and flagrant
indifference to the public safety. 9
After thirty days of trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs compen485. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Claim for Punitive Damages at 4, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp.,
cited note 484 supra.
486. Supplemental Documents Filed in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment oi the Issue of Punitive Damages, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., cited note
484 supra, OMC "Progress Report" No. 9, Sept. 22, 1965.
487. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
on the Issue of Punitive Damages at 22-25, Scott v. Outboard Marine Corp., cited
note 484 supra. One test report issued in 1969 indicated: 'This creates a very dangerous condition . . . . Boat is thrown into severe port turn when this failure occurs." Another report stated that "[a] very serious problem with corrosion caused
by dissimilar metals which must be remedied immediately." Id. at 23.
488. Id. at 22.
489. Id. at 25.
490. Id.
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Since the

defendant was fully aware of many dangerous failures in boats
already sold and thus consciously chose to ignore this risk of injury, 4 2
the jury would probably have been justified in awarding the plaintiffs

punitive damages. Nevertheless, the jury was also probably acting
within its sound discretion in refusing to award such damages. It
may have concluded that the defendant's actions were not so culpable as to merit punishment because Outboard Marine, even though
it knew of steering failures in its boats, had no notice the boats were
actually causing injury.
The determinative factors in awarding punitive damages for postmarketing misconduct of manufacturers are largely the same as
those in the other categories of marketing misconduct previously
analyzed. The distinguishing feature of the post-marketing cases is
that the results of the ultimate test of a product's safety-its performance during use by consumers---can be ascertained to help
determine whether the product is in fact excessively dangerous. If
its products are failing in a manner likely to produce severe injury,
as in Scott, a manufacturer should seriously consider correcting the
hazard.

When defects are in fact causing injury, as in Gillham,49 3

the failure of the manufacturer to act promptly and decisively to
reduce the danger is strong evidence that the manufacturer has little
concern for consumer safety. But sending warning letters and
recalling products are expensive procedures. 494 Thus, before puni491. During the closing argument, counsel settled the claims for compensatory
damages for a total of $900,000: $250,000 on the death claim and $650,000 for
the loss of leg injury claim. Upon agreement of counsel, the amounts of the compensatory damages verdicts returned by the jury were not revealed. Questionnaire
returned from Jon E. Krupnick to David G. Owen, Aug. 1975.
492. However, the company finally sent recall notices to all known boat owners
by certified mail three weeks prior to trial in 1972. Id.
493. See notes 474-80 supra and accompanying text.
494. The Minutes of a Product Safety meeting held at Outboard Marine Corp.
on August 10, 1970 reflected the company's estimate that "it would cost between
$75,000 to $100,000 for a field fix." Plaintiff's Exhibit 26, Feb. 1, 1972, Scott v.
Outboard Marine Corp., cited note 484 supra. The cost of a hypothetical automobile
recall has been set at $570,000. See Stone, Allocation of Risk for Product Recall
Expenditures: A Legislative Proposal, 1975 U. DET. L.J. 24-25. The estimate may
be unrealistically low. In a suit brought by Ford Motor Co. challenging an order
of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to recall some 600,000 automobiles containing defective seat back pivot pins (to which 15-20 minor injuries had
been attributed), Ford asserted that the cost of merely giving notice of the defect
to all present owners would exceed $500,000 and that the replacement of the seat
pins would cost the company approximately $31 per car or $19 million in total. See
Ford Motor Co. v. Coleman, 402 F. Supp. 475, 491, 494 (D.D.C. 1975) (threejudge court) (Hart, J., dissenting), affd. without opinion, 44 U.S.L.W. 3592 (U.S.
April 19, 1976); 3 BNA PRoD. SAFmY & Lm~n. REP. 816 (1975). Moreover, an
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tive damages will be appropriate in a post-marketing case, the
probable reduction in the risk of harm from such remedial measures
should clearly outweigh the cost to the manufacturer.
When a manufacturer learns of serious failures in the field, it is
usually less costly to correct the defects in similar products not yet
marketed than to recall products already on the market. Thus, the
failure to remedy a known defect in products not yet marketed is particularly blameworthy. However, culpability will be less clear when
the plaintiff is injured by a hazard not discovered by the manufacturer until after the particular product causing the injury has left its
hands. The appropriateness of punitive damages in cases of this
type will depend on the manufacturer's knowledge that its product
is failing, the seriousness of the danger caused by the failures, and
the practical and economic feasibility of remedying the defect.
Punitive damages will be appropriate when a consideration of these
factors demonstrates that the manufacturer's failure to take remedial
action under all the circumstances was in flagrant disregard of the
public safety.
B.

Toward a Standardof Responsibility

The foregoing cases reveal varying degrees of manufacturer
misbehavior in differing marketing contexts. In each case in which
punitive damages were properly assessed, the manufacturer was
shown to have grossly. abused the power flowing from its position
of control over product safety information in one of three ways: (1)
by failing to acquire sufficient product safety information through
tests, inspections or post-marketing safety monitoring; (2) by failing
to remedy an excessively dangerous condition known to exist in a
product by altering its design, adding warnings or instructions, or recalling the product for repair; or (3) by knowlingly misleading the
public concerning the products safety.
Since the third form of misconduct is characterized by an intent
to deceive and thus is akin to fraud, it cries out for punitive damages
liability. However, the first two as described above are similar to
mere negligence and thus are not always appropriate for such liability. Indeed, misbehavior akin to negligence and misbehavior
indirect but very real additional cost to the manufacturer will be the damage to the
product image caused by the recall.
Professor Stone points out that the obligation of a manufacturer to recall its defective products should have some positive effects on product safety: "[1]f a person
distributing unsafe goods has a financial accountability for recalling such goods, it
will act as a deterrent to further producing unsafe products." Stone, supra, at 17
(emphasis in original). This is very probable in view of the magnitude of the poten-

tial liability.
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deserving of punitive damages are similar in products liability cases
in that both expose consumers to unreasonable risks of harm.
Two additional elements are necessary, however, before a manufacturer's exposure of consumers to such risks may appropriately
be punished by a punitive damages award. First, the manufacturer
must be either aware of or culpably indifferent to an unnecessary
risk of injury.49 5 Second, knowing that its product is or might be
excessively dangerous, the manufacturer must intransigently refuse
either to determine the seriousness of the danger or to reduce it to
an acceptable level.4 96

This institutional "state of mind" is the key factor in assessing
a manufacturer's culpability and hence in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate. When a manufacturer intentionally
misleads consumers into believing that its product is safer than it
actually is, punitive damages will almost always be in order. 4 7 More
difficult are the cases in which a manufacturer merely fails to discover possible product hazards, since the requisite state of mind
generally exists only when it is known that the product is likely
to cause serious harm if defective and when the means for discovering excessive dangers are inexpensive and readily available.40 8
Finally, there are the cases in which a manufacturer is aware of
a particular danger yet fails to act affirmatively to reduce it.400
Punitive damages should be assessed in these situations only when

it is further shown that the manufacturer was at least construc495. Manufacturing enterprises have awareness of product safety problems only
through their employees. Awareness should be imputed to such an enterprise to the
extent that it is possessed by an employee whose general responsibilities might fairly
require him to act in response to the acquired information. In some situations in
which the employee's responsibilities do not involve product safety, the proper response might be merely to relay the information to someone within the institution
who is more directly concerned with such matters. In any enterprise, each member
of upper management, the great majority of middle management, and selected members of the rank and file will have at least this type of general responsibility for
passing along apparently significant information on product dangers. See notes 20538 supra and accompanying text.
496. See Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Wantonness is
characterized by a realization of the imminence of damage to others and a restraint
from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of indifference to
whether it occurs").
497. The MER/29 cases are of course the classic example. See notes 336-51
supraand accompanying text.
498. See, e.g., Domich v. Jee's Juvenile Shop, No. 225,782 (Super. Ct. Sacramento
County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1972). See notes 407-10 supra and accompanying text.
The Dalkon Shield cases may develop into the prototype for this class of misbehavior.
See notes 395-97 supra and accompanying text.
499. Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denlied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976), is perhaps the best example of this form of misconduct,
See notes 474-80 & 493 supraand accompanying text.

June 19761

Punitive Damages

1363

tively aware that the product was exposing customers to-an unneces-

sarily high risk of harm in view of the relatively small cost of substantially reducing the risk. Thus, proof that the manufacturer was
probably aware that its product might be defective often will include
(1) the manufacturer's awareness that the product was inflicting, or
was likely to inflict, substantial injury upon the public; and (2) the

clear feasibility of substantially reducing the risk by adding a warning or changing the product's design.

However, the plaintiff should

not be obligated to establish the manufacturer's actual knowledge of
this feasibility since a manufacturer completely indifferent to consumer safety may well have no idea how practical a risk-reduction
program might be. Moreover, a manufacturer may fairly be presumed to have expert knowledge in its particular field and thus to

be aware of the feasibility of reducing a particular danger, especially
when the feasibility is clear.

Sanctions against manufacturers are appropriate in these situations because of the deliberate or reckless nature of the manufacturer's disregard of the welfare, indeed the rights, 500 of the consum-

ing public.51 It is true that a manufacturer rarely consciously
weighs its interest in marketing a product in a particular condition
against the interests of consumers and then makes a deliberate decision to sacrifice the greater consumer good for its own lesser interest.

Indeed, even the most extreme forms of manufacturer misbehavior
ordinarily are more accurately classified as reckless than as intentional.
Nevertheless, the reckless failure to test or to inspect a potentially

hazardous product, to warn consumers of a hidden product danger,
or to recall and to repair a product known to be dangerously de-

fective, all amount to the same form of gross and deliberate disregard

50 2
for the interests of others that should be sanctioned and deterred.

500. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
501. More specifically, what deserves to be punished and needs to be deterred
is the conscious or reckless and excessive sacrifice of the public's interest in remaining free of unnecessary personal injury for the manufacturer's interest in enhancing
its profits.
502. Punitive damages generally are awardable in most jurisdictions upon a showing of either conscious-or reckless misconduct. "Reckless indifference to the rights
of others, and conscious action in deliberate disregard of them . . . may provide
the necessary state of mind to justify punitive damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 908, Comment b at 80 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973). The difference
between the notions of "conscious" and "reckless"-or "willful" and "wanton"-disregard for the interests of others is practicably indiscernable in many contexts. This
is especially true in the products liability cases involving gross forms of marketing
misbehavior. Accordingly, no sound basis will ordinarily exist for distinguishing
among these concepts in products liability litigation where the recurring forms of
misconduct can be characterized with equal accuracy as either conscious or reckless.
This will not be true, of course, if a court gives an unduly restrictive interpretation
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The variety of situations in which manufacturer misconduct may
arise makes it particularly important that a standard be formulated
so that courts and juries can identify cases in which punitive damages
should be awarded. Most products liability cases articulating such
a standard have adopted traditional punitive damages phraseology,
such as "wilful and wanton," ' 3 "malice, oppression, or gross negligence," 4 or "ill will,

. .

actual malice, or.

.

.under circumstan-

ces amounting to fraud or oppression. '' r°5 But these traditional tests

to the notions of the consciousness or deliberateness of the manufacturer's misbehavior. "The requisite intent that must be shown . . . is that the defendant deliberately
injured the plaintiff or that the defendant deliberately performed an act which he
knew to be substantially certain to result in injury to the public." Rosendin v. Avco
Lycoming Div., Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Dist., Div. 3 at 66 (unpublished opinion
filed Feb. 24, 1976); see G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22,
29-30, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222-23 (1975); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F.
Supp. 1081, 1097 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (punitive damages liability requires showing
of defendant's "'[a]ctual or express malice [which] has been defined as that state
of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a spirit
of revenge, retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon other persons' ").
Narrowly defining the standard of liability in this manner renders the punitive damages remedy unavailable for use in products liability litigation as a practical matter
and consequently frustrates the achievement of the underlying goals of the doctrine.
503. Moore v. Jewell Tea Co., 116 Ill.
App. 2d 109, 135, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648
(1969), affd., 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970). "The question of willful and
wanton conduct is essentially whether the failure to exercise care is so gross that
it shows a lack of regard for the safety of others." 116 Ill.
App. 2d at 136, 253
N.E.2d at 649.
504. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1352 n.13 (D. Hawaii 1975).
505. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 711, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 414 (1967). The California punitive damages statute applied by the court in
Toole allows such damages where the defendant is guilty of "oppression, fraud, or
malice." The word "malice" in the statute has been interpreted to mean "malice
in fact." The Toole court interpreted the malice in fact requirement broadly, holding that it "may be established by a showing that the defendant's wrongful conduct
was wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results. Where,
as here, there is evidence that the conduct in question is taken recklessly and without
regard to its injurious consequences, the jury may find malice in fact." 251 Cal.
App. 2d at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The court concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant had "acted recklessly and in
wanton disregard of possible harm to others in marketing, promoting, selling and
maintaining [the product] on the market in view of its knowledge" of its harmful
effects. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 715, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416. However, this liberal interpretation of the "malice in fact" requirement in the products liability context was
rejected by another California court in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal.
App. 3d 22, 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975).
Other standards of punitive damages liability articulated in the products liability
cases include the following: Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) ("so intentional, reckless, wanton, willful, or gross that an inference of malice could be drawn," 523 F.2d at 109;
"reckless indifference to the safety of others," 523 F.2d at 109 n.4); Hoffman
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973) ("reckless indifference to the
public's safety," 485 F.2d at 146; "reckless disregard of the public's health," 485 F.2d
at 147); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973) ("conscious indifference toward the public which generally typifies gross negligence");
Boehm v. Fox, 473 F.2d 445, 447 (10th Cir. 1973) ("malice, fraud, or a willful
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of liability were originally designed to cover interpersonal intentional
torts or oppressive misconduct by government officials exhibiting

personal hostility or a callous abuse of power.8 06 In each of the cases
examined above in which the manufacturer's marketing behavior was
sufficiently culpable to deserve the sanction of punitive damages, the

could fairly be characterized as "wanton" or
particular misconduct
5 7
"oppressive.1

Yet a more comprehensive and more clearly

defined standard is needed in the products liability context.
Several courts have attempted to refine these tests by defining

the proscribed marketing behavior, as conduct that is in "conscious" or
"reckless" disregard of the public safety.50 s This standard appropriately identifies the "public safety" as the particular interest
invaded by the defendant in a products liability case and the requisite
and wanton disregard of the rights of others"); Thomas v. American Cystoscope
Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1780, 3d
Cir., June 21, 1976 ("recklessness" defined as "a readily perceptible danger and
a conscious choice on the part of the alleged wrongdoer to act despite clear knowledge of a highly probable risk of serious harm," 414 F. Supp. at 266; "outrageous
conduct," 414 F. Supp. at 267); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081,
1098 (N.D. Ohio 1975) ("willful or wanton"; but see note 502 supra); Hoffman
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1974) ("wanton disregard for safety"); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 610 (ED. Wis.
1974) ("'wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights' "); G.D. Searle
& Co. v. Superior Ct.. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 33, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225 (1975)
("conscious disregard of the safety of others" (emphasis omitted)); Pease v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 465-66, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 426 (1974) ("willful and wanton indifference to the safety of persons who might use the [product]");
Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 175, 180, 13 B. Mon. 219, 226 (1852) (exemplary
damages should depend on the "nature and extent of the injury done and the manner
in which it was inflicted, whether by negligence, wantonness, or with or without
malice"); Hawes v. General Motors Corp., No. 76 CP 2551 (C.P. Hampton County,
S.C., filed March 12, 1976) ("so gross as to amount to recklessness or wantonness")
(unpublished Order at 7, June 10, 1976).
506. See 1 T. SEwcK, supra note 16, at 687-94.
507. Perhaps the principal characteristic of oppression is the abuse of power over
the welfare of others. This was indeed the hallmark of the misconduct for which
punitive damages were allowed in the first case in Anglo-American law expressly
allowing such damages. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205 (K.B. 1763). This is also
the fundamental characteristic of the grosser forms of marketing misconduct by manufacturers. The power abused in cases of this type is that which the manufacturer
holds by virtue of its near-monopolistic control over the means for gathering and
applying information concerning product dangers. See note 69 supra. Gross abuse
of the control over information vital to the well-being of others is oppressive misbehavior; flagrant marketing misbehavior by a manufacturer thus quite cleanly falls
within the scope of the phrase "oppression, fraud, or malice" used to describe the
standard of liability in the punitive damages statutes of California and several other
states. See notes 23, 443 supra. Moreover, such conduct might even loosely be
properly characterized as "public fraud," see Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal.
App. 3d 450, 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 426 (1974) ("fraud upon the public"), or
perhaps as "social malice." Social malice of this type is most certainly classifiable
as malice in fact. See Hopkins v. The Railroad, 36 N.H. 9, 19 (1857) ("Gross
carelessness, where duty to the public requires the utmost care .. . has certainly
a strong character of cruelty and moral turpitude").
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state of mind accompanying the invasion as "conscious" or "reckless." But the phrase "conscious disregard" 509 is too restrictive, for
it implies a subjective test of deliberateness of wrongdoing that is

too narrow in scope and too difficult to prove. Such a standard
would permit manufacturers to escape punitive damages liability in
many cases of egregious misbehavior. Moreover, the phrase "conscious disregard" suggests an institutional decision or attitude
adopted by the managerial officers of the enterprise, a notion at odds
with the broader and more appropriate vicarious liability rule. 10
"Reckless disregard," on the other hand, is arguably too easily con-

fused with truly inadvertent conduct 11 and for this reason is in some
jurisdictions rejected as the basis for punitive damages liability. 12
Other language that more precisely identifies the nature of the

proscribed conduct is available. It is helpful in formulating such a
standard to refer to the two predominant characteristics of the mis-

behavior revealed in the cases studied above in which punitive damages were most appropriate. The first is the manufacturer's lack
of concern for the public safety, a spirit of utter indifference to
whether the product might cause unnecessary injuries. The second
characteristic is the flagrancy of this indifference as reflected by the

extent of the manufacturer's awareness of the danger and its excessiveness, the over-all magnitude of the danger to the public, the
ease of reducing the risk, and the motives and other circumstances
attending the manufacturer's failure to reduce the risk.518

These

508. See notes 503-05 supra and accompanying text.
509. The most carefully considered products liability opinion adopting a conscious
disregard standard is G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122
Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975). But see note 505 supra.
510. The vicarious liability rule is proposed above as the appropriate rule of enterprise responsibility in products liability cases. See notes 205-38 supra and accompanying text & note 495 supra.
511. The court in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31,
122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975), noted
the synonymity sometimes ascribed to nonsynonymous terms. Typical is Toole
v. Richardson-Merrell, supra. There the court declared that malice may be established by evidence of conduct which is "wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results." According to dictionary definitions, willfulness and intent denote deliberation or design; recklessness, in contrast connotes action which is insensate, heedless or negligent. To apply these adjectives conjunctively to a single course of conduct is self-contradictory. "If conduct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not negligent." (Footnotes
omitted.)
But see Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 578, 106 S.E.2d 258, 264
(1958) (no "real difference" between "gross disregard" and "conscious indifference").

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 500 (1965)

(reckless-

ness involves risk that is "substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
[the] conduct negligent").
512. See note 30 supra.
513. See note 516 infra.
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two characteristics-the manufacturer's indifference and its flagrancy

-- can form a standard of punitive damages liability tailored to fit
the specific needs of products liability litigation: Punitive damages
may be assessed against the manufacturer of a product injuring the

plaintiff if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects a flagrant indifference to the public safety.
Several aspects of this proposed standard should be noted. First,
the standard does not expressly require that the product causing the
injury be "defective." While most cases giving rise to punitive dam-

ages liability under the standard will involve a product that is legally
defective, 514 the standard is designed specifically to include cases of

fraudulent-type misbehavior that do not always fit comfortably into
the defectiveness mold. "5'

Moreover, much of the defectiveness

notion is implicitly subsumed within the core idea of "flagrant indifference."5 1

Finally, "defectiveness" is often a complex and confus-

ing issue that will already have been determined favorably to the
plaintiff before any consideration of punitive damages liability.
Thus, while a product's defectiveness will in a sense be an implicit
prerequisite to liability under the standard,5 1 7 the omission of an
explicit reference should facilitate a clearer analysis of the other

issues more germane to determining punitive damages.
Also important to the standard are its two causation require-

ments. First, plaintiffs seeking punitive damages must have been
persons injured by the product. This approach is consistent with the
general punitive damages rule in most jurisdictions under which a

plaintiff must establish his right to compensatory damages as a conSecond, plaintiffs must
dition to recovering punitive damages.51
further establish some causal connection between the alleged marketing misconduct and the injury. The phrase "attributable to"
rather than the phrase "caused by" is used to describe this causal
514. But cf. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 S.2d 898 (Ct. App. Fla.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974). See notes 352-69 supra and accompanying text.
515. See note 335 supra and accompanying text & note 443 supra.
516. Marketing misconduct that reflects a flagrant indifference to the public
safety will usually embrace the factors used to determine defectiveness under the
cost-benefit method, specifically, the magnitude of the public danger and the cost
of reducing the risk. See note 3 supra. A product would very probably be classified
as defective under the other theories of defectiveness in a case properly giving rise
to a punitive damages assessment under the standard proposed above.
517. Since punitive damages cannot be awarded at all without some form of liability having been established against the defendant, see D. DouBs, supra note 16,
at 208-10, the plaintiff seeking punitive damages in a products liability case will in
most cases have to establish the "defectiveness" of the product in any event.
518. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 16, at § 83. But see, e.g., Gill v. Manuel,
488 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1973).
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requirement and to emphasize that a punitive damages claim should
not be rejected when the plaintiff has difficulty proving causation
under the strict common-law principles applicable to compensatory
claims but can nevertheless show a real and substantial connection
between the misconduct and the injury."' The stretching of the
normal rules of causation in cases of aggravated misconduct has long
been recognized as appropriate and is properly included in a standard for punitive damages liability.520
Central to the standard is the imposition of punitive damages
liability for marketing conduct "reflecting a flagrant indifference to
the public safety." This phrase can best be analyzed by considering separately the terms "reflecting," "indifference" and "flagrant."
The word "reflecting" calls for an objective determination of the
manufacturer's apparent attitude rather than a subjective determination of the manufacturer's actual state of mind. 2 ' This is appropriate for three reasons. First, a manufacturer's "state of mind" is an
ethereal concept that is difficult to prove. 522 Second, it is quite unlikely that a manufacturer can ever be acting in good faith when it
seriously endangers the public through grossly irresponsible conduct.52 Third, the manufacturer's subjective state of mind is largely
irrelevant to the basic question of whether there is a social need to
deter such misbehavior. 24
"Indifference" to the public safety525 conveys the idea that the
manufacturer simply does not care whether or to what extent the
public safety may be endangered by its product despite the availability of feasible means to reduce the danger substantially. It
implies a basic disrespect and consequent disregard for the interests
of others.
The word "flagrant" describes the final key concept in the standard526 and serves principally to limit its scope. The word connotes
519. This problem is present in some cases of the fraudulent-type misconduct.

See note 443 supra.

520. See note 42 supra.
521. But see Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255,

267 (E.D. Pa. 1976) appeal docketed, No. 76-1830, 3d Cir., June 21, 1976 ("Mhat
subjective kind of awareness . . . is the distinguishing element of reckless conduct").
522. See text at note 527 infra.
523. See note 507 supra.
524. See notes 129-51 supra and accompanying text.
525. The word "indifference" conveys essentially the same idea as "disregard"
as applied to the public safety. However, it is arguable that the word "indifference"
more clearly underscores the generalized nature of the defendant's lack of concern
for the consequences of its marketing activity, as exemplified by cases involving reckless failure to discover product dangers.
526. Surprisingly, the word flagrant is used infrequently in the punitive damages
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misconduct significantly more serious than inadvertent negligence
and thus assures that only the most egregious misbehavior is
punished. Yet it does not call for proof of a subjective awareness
of wrongdoing that the word "conscious" implicitly requires.5 2 7
Instead, the word imputes such awareness to the manufacturer when
its conduct is obviously and seriously wrong. Additionally, the word
"flagrant" is not burdened with the emotional overtones of the more
generally accepted word "outrageous." 52 8 Finally, a standard
based on "flagrant" misconduct appears at once to be sufficiently
flexible to fit varying factual contexts yet definite enough to provide
reasonable predictability.
As is frequently true whenever a complex balancing of social
interests is reduced to a one-sentence test, the proposed standard will
be better administered if its elements are isolated. Thus, the following factors may properly be considered to determine whether a
manufacturer's conduct reflects a flagrant indifference to the public
5 29
safety:
(1) the existence and magnitude in the product of a danger
to the public;
(2) the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an
acceptable level;
(3) the manufacturer's awareness of the danger, of the magnitude of the danger, and of the availability of a feasible
remedy;
(4) the nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manufacturer's failure to act appropriately to discover or to
reduce the danger; and
(5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created
the danger.
Each factor will be discussed briefly. First, a manufacturer's fault
in failing to deal with a product hazard increases with the magnitude
of the resulting potential for harm to the public."' Second, as the
cases. When it does appear, it is usually used as merely one of two or more modifiers for the described misconduct. See, e.g., Certified Laboratories of Texas, Inc.
v. Robinson, 303 F. Supp. 1014, 1028-29 (ED. Pa. 1969); Ingram v. Pettit, 303
S.2d 703, 704 (Fla. App. 1974); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 112,
113, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (1967). See also UNIFORM STATE ANTrrRsT AcT

8(b) (1973) (treble damages for "flagrant" violations).
527. See notes 522-24 supra and accompanying text.
528. See note 304 supra.
529. The factors relevant to the basic determination of whether punitive damages
should be assessed at all in products liability cases reflect many of the considerations
pertinent to the measurement of such awards. See notes 281-99 supra and accompanying text.
530. See notes 286 and 291 supra and accompanying text. Except for Hafner
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costs of reducing such a hazard to an acceptable level diminish, so
also does the credibility of excuses for failing to do so. Third, as
the manufacturer's awareness of the existence, magnitude, and means

to reduce a product hazard increases, so too does its duty to address
the problem and its culpability for failing to do so.81 Fourth, the

nature and duration of a manufacturer's failure to respond appropriately to a product hazard, its reasons for not responding more appropropriately, and the nature and extent of any measures actually
taken, all shed light on the extent to which the enterprise values profits over safety, and, accordingly, on its culpability. Finally, if the
manufacturer created the danger deliberately, as by knowingly deceiving the public about the product's safety, it will usually be es53 2
pecially blameworthy and deserving of punishment.

The determination of whether the marketing conduct of the
manufacturer in any particular case reflected a flagrant indifference
v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1970), in which
the punitive damages verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal, no cases have
been located assessing punitive damages against a manufacturer where the plaintiff
received only minor injuries. However, cases of consumers regularly receiving small
injuries from a product, such as cuts from sharp or raw edges, involve an aggregate
harm to the public far exceeding the small injuries to the individual consumers. If
a manufacturer were aware of such a tendency in its product and failed to take steps
to reduce the hazard, the inaction might well reflect a flagrant indifference to the
public safety for which a punitive damages assessment against the manufacturer
would be appropriate. Furthermore, punitive damages assessments are probably the
only effective means to deter such misconduct because of the economic infeasibility
of litigating cases of this type for compensatory damages alone. See notes 150-51,
178-80 supra and accompanying text.
531. An enterprise will be put on notice of a product danger upon receipt of
a complaint of injury or near-injury from a single consumer. The more complaints
received by the manufacturer concerning a specific danger, the greater will be its
awareness of the existence, magnitude, and possible excessiveness of the hazard. Failing to maintain a complaint file or otherwise acting irresponsibly would itself be
evidence of a manufacturer's indifference to the public safety. See note 470 supra.
A rule has been proposed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission under
§ 16(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2065(b) (Supp. IV 1974),
requiring manufacturers to maintain files of consumer complaints. 39 Fed. Reg.
31,916 (1974); CCH CoNs. PROD. SAFETY GUIDE 40,118. Unfortunately, the proposed rule has not been adopted. But see Consumer Product Safety Commission
Improvements Act of 1976 § 13(a)(1), Pub]. L. No. 94-284 (May 11, 1976), amending Consumer Product Safety Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1970), making
it a "prohibited act" to "fail or refuse to establish or maintain records."
Additionally, section 15(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (Supp. IV 1974),
requires product sellers immediately to inform the Commission upon receipt of information concerning a substantial product hazard. The Commission requires notice
"within 24 hours after a reporting company has obtained information which reasonably supports the conclusion that the product could create a substantial hazard." 3
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 692 (1975). "Section 15(b) notifications are routinely made available to the public .... ." 41 Fed. Reg. 16,574 (1976). See 4
BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 338 (1976).
532. Plaintiffs will not be able nor of course should they be required to establish
deliberate misconduct of this type in all cases in which punitive damages will be
appropriate. See text at note 527 supra.
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to the public safety will often be difficult, but the task should be
facilitated by examining the facts of each case within the framework
outlined above. The guiding factors that have been proposed should
help determine the appropriateness of punitive damages in a
products liability case.
V.

CONCLUSION

Modem products liability theory requires manufacturers to pay
for injuries caused by defects in their products. The threat of
liability and an interest in preserving their good reputation often
induce manufacturers to guard against marketing products that are
apt to be defective. But occasionally manufacturers fail to take even
the most basic steps to discover hazards. In other instances manufacturers actually aware of serious product hazards refuse to adopt
feasible and inexpensive corrective measures plainly called for in
light of the substantial risk of harm presented. And on rare occasions manufacturers deliberately conceal substantial dangers to
enhance the marketability of their products. These types of marketing behavior reflect a flagrant indifference to the public safety that
should be punished and deterred.
While the criminal law has thus far left this type of marketing
misconduct virtually untouched, the punitive damages remedy has
lately begun to fill the void by undercutting the profitability of marketing misbehavior. By making the flagrant disregard of the public
safety costly, the punitive damages remedy converts the profit motive
into a positive force for the promotion of optimal product safety.
The assimilation of the punitive damages remedy into the field
of products liability has just begun. This blending of distinct
doctrines with separate functions cannot be expected to occur without producing a few rough edges. But time and experience will
demonstrate that the union is sound.

